

17 APRIL 1990



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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

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Distribution Unlimited

19980123 151

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-90-020

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State Commission's Work on Chernobyl, Refugee Emergencies Examined

90US0620A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian No 8, Feb 90 pp 8-9

[Article by German Lomanov: "Accidents, Catastrophes, Natural Disasters Should be Forecast, and Their Losses Reduced"; report on the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Emergency Situations]

[Text] It is easier to write about the unusual than the mundane, and more interesting to read about it. Perhaps that is why, following the example of reporters, readers have formed a not-quite correct conception of the tasks of the State Commission for Emergency Situations, of the nature of its work. That is to say, a disaster occurred, and the phones started to ring at headquarters, and teams set out to all corners from there, brigades of rescue workers tearing toward airplanes at the ready. Sometimes that is the case, but only sometimes. And it is time to destroy the stereotype created by exultant journalists, for this Government subdivision is **not a fire brigade, but a brain center.**

The USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Emergency Situations was formed by Government decree in the summer of last year. Its purpose is to ensure the constant preparedness of the organs of state administration of all levels for rapid and effective actions in extreme circumstances caused by accidents, catastrophes, and natural and ecological disasters. The commission must coordinate and control the work of union ministries, departments, and the governments of the union republics for the prevention, aversion, and elimination of the consequences of these disasters and accidents, the creation of accident-restoration, search-and-rescue resources, and living-conditions systems for the population.

I think that it is no coincidence that Vitaliy Khussey-novich Doguzhiyev, formerly minister of general machine building, was entrusted to head the commission. After all, from the very beginning, it was accepted in the "space department" to painstakingly play through all thinkable and unthinkable so-called non-standard situations, to find a way out of what would seem an inevitable impasse. Moreover, the creation of space equipment is impossible without the highest level of organization, very broad cooperation, and the ability to intertwine together the at times contradictory interests of disparate departments. For example, suffice it to recall that 1,200 scientific research institutes, design bureaus, and enterprises participated in the creation of the Energiya—Buran system. This truly unique experience is invaluable for the organization of the effective work of a commission which must, in extreme situations, coordinate the actions of a multitude of organizations.

And there are in the sphere of the commission's direct leadership a small quantity of departments—the union Goskompriroda [State Committee for Environmental Protection], Goskomgidromet [State Committee for

Hydrometeorology], Gospromatomnadzor [State Committee for Safety in Nuclear Power], and for the part of the population's defense in time of peace, the country's civil defense.

Incidentally, the nature conservation activity of the emergency commission (forgive me the involuntary pun), is allotted an extraordinarily important role. And, I confess, I began to attack the commission deputy chairman, A. Tsygankov, with questions of a duty reporter. How many reports of one-time discharges of pollutants do you get in a day, in a week? How much time elapses from the moment of an accident until you find out about it? What forces do you have at your disposal to neutralize the accident? Aleksandr Pavlovich smiled:

"All of this is undoubtedly very important—we take care of the biggest accidents. Yet operational matters are not the main thing now—something else tears at our heart. I was just meeting with the USSR Goskompriroda deputy chairman V. Sokolovskiy—we discussed the latest version of the long-term program, which, in our opinion, can already be introduced for the consideration of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium. And if it is adopted, it should be published for general discussion. What, you are disappointed? Once again, 'papers,' and nothing effective? Yet you will agree that there is no way the country's ecological situation can be called normal; in many regions, it is most likely extreme. And if we are not going to look ahead, if we start, as has been the case, to chase after a train that has already left the station; that's worth about two cents to us."

"And you would like to look..."

"As a minimum, to the end of the century. Unfortunately, in the ecology, there are no quick means to correct the situation; all programs are long-term here."

"Aleksandr Pavlovich, I understand that in two words you cannot retell a document which determines the strategy and tactics of nature conservation activity for many years. But all the same, could you designate at least the basic principles at the foundation of the program; after all, ecological problems trouble every reader."

"The program is supported by three "pillars": It is necessary to develop broad scientific research, to change the system of administration, and to launch the economic mechanism of utilization of natural resources. The main goal is to determine the tasks of the country's ecological recovery for the coming decade, with maximum concentration on them in the 13th 5-year-plan. To mark unsuccessful regions, to define the resources—surely the program will become a basis for subsequent planning. Regional ones will 'propagate' themselves from the general state program—in the republics, oblasts, and major cities. Such are already being created in Kremenchug and Gorlovka. Our principle is a minimal number of "teams" from the center, and maximal amateur activity. Let the local authorities, together with the enterprises develop the primary matters and the long-term goals; let

them get the public involved in control. Recently in Kerch we discussed the draft of a Government decree on the recovery of the Sea of Azov. A painful problem; the atmosphere in the auditorium was heated, but there was mutual understanding, all the same."

"An interesting case if for no other reason than that you read everywhere: Government decisions are prepared and made in a closed-door setting. And here is an open discussion right in the regions with which the future decree is concerned. Is this an incident or a system?"

"We are going to introduce such discussions into practice—contacts with the population are a necessary as air, since many have formed a mistaken conception of the Government's activity in general and of the state emergency situations commission in particular. But we digress..."

"And if we return to the local problems, the question arises: Where are the authorities going to get the funds for the ecology? The soviets' purse is not exactly bursting with money."

"The decision was made not too long ago: Enterprises are going to pay for discharging pollutants. Approximately 50 regions are going to participate in the first phase of the experiment, primarily in Russia and the Ukraine. Starting next year, we hope to introduce such a system everywhere."

"But certainly they are paying fines even now..."

"That is something else. The local authorities establish the fines in a volitional procedure; their size is not well-grounded; they have no legislative backing, meaning that the guilty parties may dispute even a few rubles' fine in court. Paying for discharges is not a one-time action, but an economic 'press' which must force the enterprises to improve the technology in the name of the ecology. USSR Goskompriroda must work out the payment norms. The resources will go to the local budget for the formation of a foundation of nature conservation measures."

The state emergency situations commission carries out general supervision of the regional ecological problems. For example, the Aral Sea, the Sea of Azov, the Caspian Sea. I think the readers know what is happening there. We also know that enterprises are not now very much subordinate to commands "from above." And in order to normalize the ecological situation, for example, in the Caspian area, it is necessary for about 400 enterprises to reduce their harmful discharges to normative levels within 3-4 years. How can they be forced, if the traditional "obligates" and "halts" no longer function? And the commission associates are racking their brains thinking about how best to launch the economic mechanism for environmental protection. If we seek an appropriate simile for their work, then it is not at all reminiscent of a vehicle with a wailing siren and flashing light rushing to the usual accident, but most likely a bulldozer

plowing through old ruins. We have inherited a burdensome legacy, and it will be difficult to rid ourselves of it. Nor is a sin to think about what we ourselves will leave for our descendents. This question must be answered first and foremost by the scientists—the forecasting of the future is an equally indispensable element of the commission's activity as neutralizing the negative consequences of the past. And the future does not inspire optimism—many theoreticians feel that **we have entered an era of frequent cataclysms**, both natural and man-made. The climate is changing—this winter is a vivid confirmation of that; the ozone layer is being degraded; seismic activity is increasing; soil fertility is dropping, soil types can no longer go without chemical "injections"; the forested area, the chief supplier of oxygen, is being reduced. Perhaps it is time to stop, although it is possible to say much more. But this is enough to understand that we have to prepare for the unpleasant effects ahead of time. And for this, we need the maximally reliable forecast."

Fortunately, there is experience in ecological forecasting in our country. Work on the forecasts was headed by V. Sokolovskiy, who worked in the State Committee for Science and Technology at the time, and A. Tsygankov developed a program of research work. These took about 2 years, and the results were presented to the USSR Council of Ministers. The Government examined the forecast... and classified it secret. That was back in 1977, when certain unpleasant things predicted by scientists were not painted into the blessed picture of developed socialism. But alas, they came to pass. Thank god, hiding heads in the sand like ostriches is no longer accepted, so it is to be hoped that the scientists' recommendations will not gather dust on a shelf, but will become a program for action.

I described the work of the commission's ecological subdivisions more or less in detail not just because polluting nature is quite a sore problem. It is simply that such a work style is typical of all the commission's departments. Two more words may be said about them: They are directed toward the future. The statute on the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Emergency Situations is now being prepared. For the time being, it has not been confirmed; there is only a draft, and citing it would seem awkward; something will be changed, something will be clarified. Yet I think I can not only be allowed to, but must cite certain sections of the draft statute, if we regard the document not as the final form of the truth, but as the opinion of the commission workers, which has crystallized after long reflection and heated discussions. So, it is written:

...one of the commission's basic tasks is the creation of a general state system of preventive measures aimed at averting accidents and catastrophes in the national economy, ecological crises, the reduction of potentially hazardous production lines, and the stability of facilities of the national economy and the social sphere in the face of possible unfavorable effects.

"Studying the world experience with analogous work, analyzing the situation in Chernobyl, Armenia, and other regions of the country," says commission deputy chairman V. Gorchakov, "You come to the conclusion that the country must have one concrete organization responsible for the preparation for emergency situations in the initial phase of the operation. This organization must have legislative empowerment and rights in order to have the opportunity to mobilize the union republics, ministries and departments to act not only at the extreme moment, but before it, actions that are aimed at preventing an emergency situation and reducing the possible loss from it. For this, it is necessary to carefully limit the commission's tasks: in the preparation period, while rendering assistance, and during subsequent phases."

Yet developing warning measures capable of neutralizing dangerous consequences, and all the more so, functionally and clearly managing the actions of numerous services **under extreme circumstances** is possible only with information. This is well understood by the commission's leadership. "We are now completely taken up with the creation of "Informatiki-ChS [emergency situations]," the single state system for providing information during emergency situations," describes commission deputy chairman V. Gorchakov. "Its basis will be an expansive data base on the national economy. This will help us foresee the catastrophe, prepare for it, and get out of it with minimal losses."

"A super-brain with a gigantic memory? Is this realistic—about 10 years, sometimes more, is spent on the creation of a global information network. And do you really have to know everything about everything?"

"It is impossible, although desirable. But we simply must bring together the information scattered about the various departments. Judge for yourself: A list of particularly dangerous facilities—nuclear power stations, oil and gas pipelines, chemical combines, gas storage tanks and the suchlike, this we need? Absolutely. The possibilities for power supply? Of course. Information on the roads, airports, harbors? Also necessary. Maps of the seismic regions, the status of housing and industrial buildings—we could enumerate things for a long time... It is a difficult matter. On the other hand, having gathered such information into a single "basket," in any emergency situation, we can quickly make a model of the situation, determine the danger level for the adjacent regions (for example, conceive of where the winds will carry harmful discharges), estimate the possible losses, how many and what type of enterprises, power facilities or housing blocks could be out of order. Then, having played through through the versions with the help of mathematical models, we functionally decide how many forces to send in for assistance, and from where. Of course, we do not maintain information on all the country's bulldozers in the data base, but unique equipment must be registered."

"As far as the deadlines for creating "Informatiki-ChS" are concerned, we are not starting from square one, after all," interjects I. Drozdov, department head of information resources, communications, and situation forecasting. "Data bases and information systems exist in almost every department. Our task is to combine them. The next stage is the passportization of the most important enterprises, railroads, energy systems, pipelines, and cities. The process is already under way; there are already "passports" for several thousand facilities of the national economy."

"By constantly cultivating the data base, we will also increase the number of problems that lend themselves to resolution, increasing their complexity," continues Igor Nikolayevich. "For example, in 2-3 years, there will be enough information to evaluate the radiational, chemical, and fire situations, the zones under water during flooding, the destruction under localized explosions. And of course, in creating the system, we cannot underestimate such a key management element as communications channels."

The commission is determined to broadly utilize space communication media in its work, and systems of ecological monitoring from satellites, in particular, those already discussed in our magazine (PRAVITELSTVEN-NOY VESTNIK No 24 1989). And even the headquarters for controlling the actions during emergency situations should be organized along the model and image of center for space craft and station flight control. It will have groups for planning, analysis, communications links, and visual systems. And of course, the situation center will be united with the "Informatika-ChS" computer system."

...Chernobyl and Armenia. Two bitter reminders of the misfortunes that catastrophes bring, both natural and man-made. There are two subdivisions in the structure of the state commission which coordinated the work in neutralizing the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES and the earthquake in Armenia.

Here, incidentally, a brief digression is appropriate. You will find even in reputable newspapers now and then the reproaches, so to say, that there is a swollen apparatus in the Government. And it is an indispensable portion of the program of any sort of rally. But in the department for the neutralization of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, there are only six specialists, including V. Voznyak, the department head. There are five in the department of restoration work in Armenia. I do not think there is any need to explain the burden they bear on their shoulders, the volume of information they must digest and interpret. Incidentally, in the United States, one out of every three workers is involved in administration. Thus it is no sin, dear reader, to think about when attacks on the apparatus in general (and not sensible criticism of associates who work badly) are born of naivete, and when they are an obvious attempt to destabilize the system of administration, the organs of power. And having thought about it, to ask, to whose advantage is this?

The press reports regularly on Chernobyl matters, but the interethnic conflict in the Transcaucasus has moved the problem of the rehabilitation of the villages and cities damaged in the underground storm to the background. So it is worthwhile to briefly recall the state of affairs. And they are not comforting—only 250,000 square meters of housing were introduced last year instead of the 1,433,000 square meters stipulated by Government decree. How can this be explained?

"The decree was prepared in a situation of shock and very hastily; everything stipulated was simply impossible," explains commission deputy chairman O. Bortnev. "It was hardly necessary to plan the introduction of facilities already in the first year; even with very intense work, it is unthinkable to do in 6-8 months that which usually takes years. We had to do geological prospecting, macro- and micro-regionalization, develop general plans for cities, and only then begin to design concrete facilities. As the construction workers say, all communications, the "engineering" started from scratch. It was finally necessary to create a construction base. We therefore set our task not to kill ourselves for the square meters at any price, but to create good work in anticipation. That is what we managed to do."

O. Bortnev spent almost half a year in the earthquake zone without leaving. They began construction last summer, but there is a blockade here, and for 3 of the 6 months, there were no materials.

"Starting with January, we could have turned over completed construction every month, if there hadn't been the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan," says Oleg Viktorovich.

"The material provisions have been completely paralyzed, and it is hard to say when normal supply will be restored. They call us from other republics; we sent people to work, and they stand idle. A mass exodus of workers is beginning."

...Construction assembly, design, laying down roads, the facade of the work; these are the usual concerns of construction workers. So what is the emergency situation here—this is normal planned work. And in the zone which suffered from the Chernobyl accident, it is also **hard to move forward** if one constantly has to look backward. Where, at what stage should the state emergency situations commission lay down its authority and transfer matters to other departments which are not called upon to work under emergency circumstances, but methodically, according to plan? After all, it is necessary to move forward, all the same. It is no coincidence that the draft statute writes about the commission that it: **Transfers management of the elimination of the consequences of emergency situations to the local organs of power at the decision of the commission after search and rescue work, restoration of facilities necessary for living, and the elimination of dangers to people's life and health have been conducted.**

And one more hard, but completely necessary question: What is to be considered an emergency situation? Recently, the commission examined the emergency situation forming in health care because of the acute reduction in medicine production. The local authorities and public health services have shut down a number of enterprises, and now you cannot buy in the pharmacies analgesics, [norsulfazol], nor many gastric or cardiovascular preparations.

I understand that the commission is forced to deal with many matters, since for the time being, the administrative structures are not very well adapted to the country's changing situation. But the bewilderment remains, nevertheless. We also have an emergency situation in the consumer market—must the emergency situation commission concern itself with this? Finances are in extraordinary disorder. Criminal societies are gaining force. There are not enough fingers on both hands to count the areas in which the situation could be called an emergency, or close to it. All the same, how should the sphere of influence of the state emergency situation commission be drawn? What must become the main thing in its work?

I addressed these questions to V. Doguzhiyev, USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman.

"A great deal of what you have mentioned is one-time orders from the Government," explained Vitaliy Khuseynovich. "Now the situation with 'refugees' has become complicated again; people have begun to leave Dushanbe, and not only that city. In effect, there is no one to study this problem other than our commission—the migration service is still being created. The issue of whether or not the emergency situations commission should be concerned with the affairs of the pharmaceutical industry is also not so simple—I remind you that enterprises which were polluting the environment were closed down, and ecological problems are within our competence."

"In general, the dialectic of our work lies in the fact that we must concern ourselves with very acute situations, requiring a momentary reaction, and with long-term tasks. The first trend is fairly clear..."

"Except for one thing—when must the commission transfer its functions?"

"When the victims have been saved, when living conditions have been adjusted, in a word, when there is no longer any danger for people's life and health. Now for the second trend, which encompasses a broad range of tasks. They all fall, one way or another, into the concept of acceptable, or more simply, sensible risk. I will explain by example. After the California earthquake, the U.S. Senate resolved to send \$8 billion for preventive measures. Not a small sum, but, in the opinion of the experts, it will allow potential damage from possible earthquakes to be avoided. Such an approach is more sensible and economically advantageous."

"Incidentally, on the economy. The national economy is going on the path of reform—does this affect the process of the commission's activity?"

"Absolutely. Moreover, we consider it necessary to "build into" the problems of security in the economic mechanism. For this, it is necessary to determine the sources of financing and allocation of material resources first and foremost for preventive measures. And of course, we must think about how to cover the expenses of maintaining the forces operating during an emergency situation. Various approaches are possible here—I cite such an example to illustrate. A reserve fund for the neutralization of possible accidents is created from enterprises' insurance deductions. a disaster has occurred—the rescue workers have both resources and

equipment, so it is not necessary to constantly dig into the state budget; after all, it is not bottomless. And the insurer will begin a fault-finding sort of control over a dangerous production line; a reduction of its potential danger will be achieved. In our opinion, such financial pressure of responsibility on all levels, from the enterprise to the republic, will, at a minimum, cut the number of various industrial accidents in half."

The commission is now taken up with many matters which do not tolerate delay. If we speak of the general optimal conception of our work, I would put in first place the development of the economic criteria of acceptable risk, followed by methods of predicting accidents, and only then, the coordination and management of actions in an extreme situation.

RSFSR Elections Commission Head Interviewed

90UN0890A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 6, 5-11
Feb 90 p 2

[Interview with Vasilii Ivanovich Kazakov, chairman of the Central Election Commission for Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies, conducted on 3 February 1990 by SOYUZ special correspondent Igor Voyevodin; place of interview not specified: "A Statistical Portrait of the Candidate"]

[Text] The peoples of the RSFSR will make their choice on 4 March. The registration of candidates to the post of deputy has been completed and certain preliminary findings can be shown.

We met last Saturday with Vasilii Ivanovich Kazakov, chairman of the Central Election Commission for Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies. Work was continuing in the Central Election Commission despite the fact that it was the weekend.

[Kazakov] Candidates are registered for all 1,068 electoral districts of the republic. Preliminary data show that 7,018 individuals are continuing the fight for deputy posts. Over a thousand contenders have either withdrawn their candidacy or been denied registration by the okrug commissions.

[Correspondent] Vasilii Ivanovich, on what basis can a candidate be refused registration?

[Kazakov] There is one reason—a candidate's violation of the Law on Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies. A widespread violation has been the absence of a quorum in nominating the candidate. Our commission has had to look into quite a number of disputed cases, the result being that about half of these were resolved in favor of the candidate, and slightly more than half in favor of the okrug commissions. As we see, violations have been committed by both sides. But this is entirely understandable—it the first time an election campaign has been underway in Russia with such enthusiasm, the first time the new law is in effect, and misunderstandings are unavoidable.

[Correspondent] Vasilii Ivanovich, let us attempt to sketch the average statistical portrait of a candidate to the post of deputy...

[Kazakov] The data we have obtained and already processed will allow us to do this. The average age of the candidate is 46, a considerably lower figure than before. He has obtained a higher education—almost 86 percent of the candidates completed institutes of higher learning—and is a party member (CPSU members and candidate members also constitute 86 percent of the contenders). He has most likely been nominated by a labor collective—such candidates comprise three-fourths of the total number. But there is also quite a number of candidates from social organizations—21 percent. Few, unfortunately, were nominated by place of residence—just 3 percent. A great many things were at work here,

including our lack of skill in conducting a pre-election campaign. And sometimes it was simply too difficult for the contenders to find a decent hall for their use—we know of such instances too.

[Correspondent] Can the candidate's occupation be determined by your data?

[Kazakov] He is most likely a mid-level manager—over a thousand directors of industrial enterprises, construction and transportation enterprises, have been registered. There are quite a few kolkhoz [collective farm] chairmen and sovkhoz [state farm] directors. Three union-level ministers are also participating in the pre-election campaign. The allotment of party and soviet workers among the candidates amounts to 7.4 and 7.2 percent, respectively.

[Correspondent] Well, what nationality might our average candidate be?

[Kazakov] Basically the ethnic composition of the candidates is proportional to the population figures of peoples in the republic. The majority is Russian—77 percent. But there is a surprise here too—citizens are represented who do not have their own ethnic entities—there are 53 Germans, for example, comprising 0.8 percent of the total number of candidates and twice the proportion which exists with respect to Germans residing in the RSFSR.

[Correspondent] Speaking of surprises, were there more than enough of these in the work of your commission?

[Kazakov] Yes, and they were not always pleasant. We know of instances in which candidates concealed prior convictions or wound up in such institutions as "sobering-up" facilities—that had to happen. One candidate was under investigation—further comment is superfluous here. But for the sake of fairness we should state that these are particular instances and they do not determine the overall picture, even though statistics must take everything into account.

In less than a month Russia will have the names of its deputies. Time will of course introduce new features into our proposed portrait, perhaps even redraw it in its entirety. And this depends in the final analysis only on ourselves—on whom we elect and how.

Voters Polled in RSFSR Pre-election Campaigns

90US0645A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Mar 90
Morning Edition p 1

[Article by V. Komarovskii, doctor of philosophical sciences, chief researcher, I. Bulygina, and A. Shabanov: "How the Pre-Election Campaign Went"]

[Text] Scientists from the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee, as well as over 5,000 voters of Vladimir and Tula oblasts, polled on the rays of Moscow in late January and February of this year. While not claiming these poll data as an absolute

representation, they came to the conclusion that the election campaign finishing up was, on the whole, conducted less actively than the campaign for USSR people's deputies.

The majority of candidates was perceived by the voters to be some sort of poorly distinguishable common mass. Only those candidates who for various reasons are well-known in their city, rayon or oblast were the exception. The voters' sympathy was most frequently on their side.

On the whole, from 20 to 40 percent of the voters, with the first figure being more typical, were more or less determined about their preferences toward the candidates, depending upon the level of the soviet and the region.

Approximately 40 percent of those polled could not, either in January or February, assess the upcoming election campaign, since they did not participate in it, and did not have information about its course, or about the candidates. Among the remainder of those polled, about one-quarter feels that the campaign has been conducted overall democratically; somewhat more than one-quarter, more democratically than undemocratically; about one in five, more undemocratically, and approximately 10 percent feel that the campaign was proceeding undemocratically.

Approximately one-third of the voters (that is, almost half of those who could respond) noted formalism and idle talk as characteristic features of the current election campaign. It is no coincidence that only one in six voters believes that the candidates are carrying out their promises; about 40 percent believe that sometimes they do, sometimes they do not. Approximately one-quarter does not believe this. Typically, in late January there were notably more who believed in the candidates' promises than there were in February.

Now—on the interest in the elections. If the number of individuals firmly intending to participate in the elections has remained practically unchanged (by comparison to earlier polls)—about 75-80 percent in major cities and 85-90 percent in small cities and rural areas—then the number of voters certain that the new soviets will change the situation for the better has dropped.

Among those who consider themselves to well informed on the course of the election, approximately one-half positively assessed the pre-election work of the party and soviet organs; they feel that they have created equal conditions for the candidates in the nomination and the pre-election fight. At the same time, in evaluating the pre-election work of the party and soviet organs, indeed, a general, most often critical attitude toward them is showing. Some criticize them for having removed themselves from the pre-election work (22 percent of the respondents to this question); others for attempt to "pressure" the voters, to interfere, to use methods not permitted by law (one-quarter of the respondents).

According to the data of the sociologists of the Institute of Sociology under the USSR Academy of Sciences, 2 weeks before the voting in the last elections in Moscow, about half the voters practically did not know their candidates (except for B. Yeltsin). The situation is repeating itself, and in an even worse version. Now, only 25-40 percent of the voters know their candidates 2 weeks before the elections.

For those polled, the primary sources of information on the course of the election campaign were newspaper reports (65-75 percent) and radio and television programs (40-50 percent). About half the voters consider the reports on the elections by the local mass information media to be meager; 60-60 percent, superficial; 55-60 percent, incomplete. Local mass information media are not capable of actively affecting the course of the election campaign: After all, there are thousands of candidates. Even brief information on each of them in the newspapers (radio, television) is technically impossible.

RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies Viewed

90UN1361A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 29 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Deputy Chairman Tatyana Georgiyevna Ivanova by A. Gamov: "Before the Congress of Deputies: Conversation with RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Deputy Chairman T.G. Ivanova"]

[Text] [Gamov] Tatyana Georgiyevna, first of all I think this is a legitimate question: What was the basis for the Presidium's adoption of the Decree Convening the first RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies?

[Ivanova] In October 1989, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet session, while approving the Law on Amendments and Additions to the Constitution of the RSFSR, adopted a resolution on the procedure to put it into effect. This document assigned the task to the Presidium of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet after conducting elections to establish a RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies and to organize preparations for its meetings. It is precisely in accordance with this task that a proposal to approve the well-known Decree was introduced at the Presidium meeting.

[Gamov] Adoption of this document essentially signifies the beginning of preparations for the first forum of Russian Deputies. How will this work be conducted?

[Ivanova] Actually, it has already begun. The initial proposals associated with the organization and conduct of the Congress itself are being prepared. At the same time, we are first of all considering the experience of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies and especially the fact that a similar measure is being conducted in the Russian Federation for the first time. That is why we must carefully and seriously approach this issue.

I immediately want to point out that the Presidium and its staff are in no way planning to monopolize all of this work. The primary portion of it is being assigned to the preparatory commission that will consist of newly elected RSFSR People's Deputies.

What prompted us to this decision? You recall how many censures were directed at the organizers of the First Congress of Union People's Deputies who said at that time that the staff took its preparations into its own hands. We attempted to avoid this. But the fact is not only that we are avoiding some rebukes. The deputies themselves are already prepared to begin working right now. And can we really impede that?

[Gamov] In your opinion, what must the preparatory commission be like? What will its functions and powers be?

[Ivanova] We think the composition of the commission should include one deputy from each autonomous republic, kray, and oblast, and also from autonomous oblasts and autonomous districts. We should invite two to four representatives from the Moscow and Leningrad delegations where the deputy corps is particularly numerous.

We propose that members of the commission that will consist of more than a hundred deputies should be elected at republic, kray, and oblast deputy group meetings.

Of course, we could have created some sort of initiative group and assigned all of the organizational work to it. But we thought that this would simply be unethical. Preparations for the Congress should become a matter for deputies of all of Russia. Furthermore, I think that if representatives of each territorial formation are part of the commission, it will be easier for it to associate with a group of deputies from some oblast or kray and the opportunity will appear to discuss some proposals locally. I immediately need to point out that the preparatory commission will in no way work behind closed doors—any RSFSR People's Deputy who wishes to send his ideas to Moscow can participate in its activities.

What will the commission be engaged in? There are very many issues here. First of all, it needs to develop proposals on the agenda, on the procedures to conduct Congress meetings and sessions, and on working organs. Furthermore, it needs to submit proposals for interim Congress meeting regulations and also on a number of procedural issues that affect registration of people's deputies, voting, and vote counting.

I think we need to also discuss in advance designation or election of officials to the Council of Ministers, Committee of People's Control, the Supreme Court, State Board of Arbitration, and also a list of permanent commissions of houses and committees, and proposals for their formation.

It will be correct if deputies who will actively participate in the work of the commission will also discuss this question right now during the preparatory stage for the Congress: What legislative acts do we primarily need to examine at the Supreme Soviet session that will occur during the Congress or immediately after its conclusion? This is a very important question. Really quite a few new union legislative acts have already been adopted and we need to react to them somehow. For example, they are not proposing adoption of special laws on land and property and therefore their position must find reflection in the appropriate legislative acts.

And one other factor. I am convinced that after announcing the date when the Congress will be convened, quite a few questions and comments concerning the conduct of the impending measures will be directed to us in the Presidium. It is very important that the deputies themselves and not representatives of the staff sort out these proposals. I think that all of this preliminary work will permit us to more effectively utilize the time allocated for the Congress and the session.

[Gamov] Tatyana Georgiyevna, can you tell us today how the work of the First Congress and the session will be publicized?

[Ivanova] This question troubles us quite a bit. Actually, how do we inform the citizens of the Russian Federation about such very important political measures if we still do not have a permanent television channel and we have only several hours on the second program of Central Television that several regions cannot receive. This means that we are still practically without a voice. We need to think about what we need to do so that our voice can be heard. Really, the fate of Russia and Russians in many ways depends on the Congress' decisions.

We also need to discuss organizational and material technical support issues of the impending measures. And there are also quite a few problems here. A hall has been designated in the Kremlin where we will conduct the Congress. But we need to equip it with computer equipment. Of course, we could purchase it but we do not want to spend a lot of money on this. The equipment that was used at Congresses of Union People's Deputies can also completely serve us and we need only to install it.

And there is one other complex issue—how do we print our documents? That fact is that all these years we have used IZVESTIYA Printing House printing presses and we do not have anything else. Right now, there may be problems in connection with the fact that the USSR Supreme Soviet session may be extended and we are faced with quite a bit of work here.

[Gamov] Approximately how much time will the First Congress and the session take up?

[Ivanova] Of course, we have made our own estimates here. I think that the optimal variant is 7-10 days. But the members of the preparatory commission must have their say on this score.

I would like to hope that our work succeeds. Russians are really expecting constructive solutions from the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies. And we must live up to their hopes.

Election Violations in Yaroslavl Alleged

90UN1361C Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in
Russian No 13, 31 Mar-06 Apr p 6

[Letter to the Editor of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: "To the Mandate Through an Honest Campaign: Let Justice Triumph!"]

[Text] We, the voters of Yaroslavl Oblast, are disturbed by the grossest violations of the Law on Election of RSFSR People's Deputies that were permitted throughout Electoral District No. 84. A massive and unprecedented campaign of voter disinformation, lies, and slander were directed against one of the candidates, IZVESTIYA Newspaper Correspondent Z. Shchepotkin. All of this must have insured that First Deputy Oblispolkom Chairman V. Kovalev was elected the RSFSR People's Deputy for this district.

At the very beginning of the campaign, the electoral district commission from this district grossly violated the Law with regard to equal rights of candidates to publication of pre-election platforms. Thus, according to a commission decision, all four candidates—A. Vlasov, S. Moshkov, V. Kovalev, and V. Shchepotkin—each had 5,000 copies of their pre-election platforms published at the Rostov Printing Plant in Yaroslavl Oblast. However, the electoral district commission had 5,000 more published at the Yaroblispolkom UVD [Administration of Internal Affairs] Printing Plant for V. Kovalev. Despite this, Kovalev barely made the second round but garnered fewer votes than Shchepotkin. Then a new round of violations of this Law began.

On 12 March, many heads of enterprises, organizations, and institutions of Yaroslavl and the Oblast were assembled at the Oblispolkom. They were issued 24 texts for placards that appealed for people to vote for Kovalev and against Shchepotkin. At the same time, orders arrived to conduct a meeting in support of Kovalev and against Shchepotkin. Thus, the Oblispolkom used its authority to support its own candidate. This is a direct violation of Article 13 of the Law on Election of RSFSR People's Deputies.

If that was not enough, one of the texts stated that USSR People's Deputies V. Podziruk and I. Shamshev support Kovalev. This lie outraged V. Podziruk and I. Shamshev.

At the same time, a campaign of attacks against Shchepotkin was launched in the local press.

On March 9 and 16, YAROSLAVSKAYA NEDELYA published articles against Shchepotkin. Massive indoctrination of voters occurred on the radio and from the

pages of other newspapers, including the Oblast Newspaper, SEVERNYY RABOCHIY. One after the other they published materials supporting Kovalev.

The grossest violations of the Election Law permitted V. Kovalev to become an RSFSR People's Deputy.

It is intolerable to come to power by flouting the law. Therefore, we demand that the election in Yaroslavskiy National Territorial Election District No. 84 be declared invalid.

N. Aminova, A. Afanasyev, V. Bukin,
V. Romanova, Z. Denisova, Yu. Mitrofanov,
V. Mayorova, V. Smirnov, and others
(426 signatures altogether).

FROM THE EDITOR. Upon receipt of this letter, we communicated with USSR People's Deputies V. Podziruk and I. Shamshev.

V. Podziruk, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet:

First of all, I want to repeat my statement that was sent to Yaroslavl on March 16 and I asked that it be published on March 18. "I am outraged by Yaroslavl Oblast voter disinformation—the dissemination of false information that I allegedly support First Deputy Oblispolkom Chairman V. Kovalev's candidacy in the election for RSFSR People's Deputy. Furthermore, references are being made to my March 3 1990 speech at a meeting with the candidates for People's Deputy at Soviet Square in Yaroslavl. In fact, in my speech I stated that I see in Kovalev the most prepared man for work in local Councils. I appeal to the voters of Yaroslavl Oblast to cast their votes for IZVESTIYA Parliamentary Correspondent Yaroslavl Shchepotkin during the election for RSFSR People's Deputy in the Yaroslavskiy National Territorial Electoral District.

And this is my genuine position.

I. Shamshev, leader of the Yaroslavl People's Front:

I was at the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies when I heard the outrageous news that I allegedly support First Deputy Oblispolkom Chairman V. Kovalev. It was impossible to call this anything other than a deception of the voters. Therefore, I immediately sent a telegram to Yaroslavl that contained the following: "According to news that has reached me, my name is being used, without my knowledge or consent, to support RSFSR People's Deputy Candidate V. Kovalev. Here-with, I state that I support the candidacy of V. Shchepotkin and I wish him success in the election." All new information concerning various violations of the election law is arriving at the Yaroslavl People's Front. At first we were gathering this information to send it to the Tsentizbirkom [Central Electoral Commission] but, since it recognized the election in this district as valid, we now will send the citizens appeal to the procurator's office organs and to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies Mandate Commission.

Restoration of Volga-German Region Viewed

90UN1361B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in
Russian 29 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* Correspondent V. Lifanov: "Period of Alienation: How the 'German Question' Is Being Resolved in the Volga Region"]

[Text] "To Radon Plant Partkom Secretary V.I. Proskuryakov and STK Chairman Ye.S. Morozov,

"I read Spravedlivost organizing committee group's appeal to the Second Congress of People's Deputies in NOYVS LEBEK with great agitation. Thank you, comrades, for your humanity and truly international position. Among the stream of all kinds of "concerned," "bewildered," and at times simply hostile statements directed at Soviet Germans, your voices sounded like the voices of friends."

F. Gubert, Novosibirsk
Tyazhstankogidropress Association worker

"Dear Spravedlivost! I welcome your appeal with all my heart. I assess it as an act of civic courage and as a manifestation of humanism with regard to all 'punished' peoples. Together this is also a worthy rebuke to the rabid petty bourgeois for whom even today charity begins at home and who forgot the horrors of the Stalinists too soon."

M. Malinovskiy, Barnaul
Candidate of historical sciences,
participant in the Great Patriotic War

"In the Radon Plant Partkom

"In connection with the publication of Spravedlivost Society's appeal, we consider it necessary to state that Partkom Secretary V.I. Proskuryakov did not have the right to sign it without considering the opinions of plant communists and the entire collective or to disregard their trust. We demand that a Party meeting be conducted immediately with the following agenda: 'Personal affairs of Communist V.I. Proskuryakov.'"

CPSU Member since 1961, V. Sadchikov,
CPSU Member since 1964, T. Myasnikova

"Heard: Information of Shop No. 90 Party Buro Secretary I.P. Tomilyets on the Spravedlivost Group and its appeal to the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

"Resolved: To express political distrust to Comrade V.I. Proskuryakov. To demand that an emergency partkom meeting be convened to determine its position on the question of restoring the ASSR of Volga Germans. To also demand a plant-wide party meeting be convened with the following agenda: 'On Party Members V.I. Proskuryakov's and Ye.S. Morozov's abuse of official position.'"

Adopted unanimously.

Just how did the party committee secretary and the STK [Union of Labor Collectives] chairman stir up the plant workers? Why did seven of 17 shop party organizations

unequivocally raise the question of their party responsibility and their resignation? It is hard to believe and at first I did not believe it, but... for the kindness, for the response to someone else's pain, and adherence to the international. That is precisely why F. Gubert, M. Malinovskiy, and other authors of letters addressed to Spravedlivost [Justice] welcome them with all their hearts.

"Each person who recognizes his responsibility for tomorrow," states one of the program documents of this social organization, "must be concerned about the outpouring of negative emotions on the wave of which a discussion of the Soviet German problem is being conducted. It is astonishing how eagerly some people thirst for confrontation while striving not to understand but to hiss those who disagree with their point of view. But extremes do not reflect the truth...."

Unfortunately, among "some people" is the Marks-ovskiy Rayon Marx workers collective committee of representatives who appropriated the right for themselves using all available methods including ultimatums including with regard to the highest organs of power to oppose restoration of German autonomy. "We do not want," its director states publicly, "one more 'Karabakh' to arise in the very center of Russia or for Russians to suddenly find themselves second class citizens."

"No threat has emanated from nor will it ever emanate from Soviet Germans," activists of the Vozrozhdeniye [Revival] German Society decisively reject such suspicions. "Having undergone severe trials, we intend to solve our problems not at the expense of some other people but together with other people." However, we will note that Vozrozhdeniye is also not without sin. For example, one of its co-chairmen was talking about establishing an interim autonomous republic government not nearly on a democratic basis which caused an outburst of indignation among the region's residents.

Spravedlivost took it upon itself to reconcile opponents and supporters of German autonomy, to bring their positions closer to each other, to transition from rally "mono-democracy" to a deferential and friendly dialogue where V. Proskuryakov and Ye. Morozov are among the first along with other Radon workers and representatives of the city's intelligentsia. No matter how much you search, you will not find a criminal here. At that time for some reason, it is asked, was there not thunder and lightning on their side? And that is the reason. Spravedlivost Organizing Committee listed the actual causes for the rapid deterioration of the situation in the region in their appeal to the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

The document states that "Some leaders are using confusion among uninformed people who are exhausted by economic ruin and frightened by the terrible news from Karabakh and Fergana for their own local interests. The CPSU gorkom staff has practically joined ranks with the committee that is coming out against recreation of the

republic. Staff workers are pressuring workers collectives along with them while forming mass opinion inasmuch as grounds have been prepared by our social crisis...."

Lack of moderation or an exaggeration. Maybe. In Marx, I had the opportunity to hear more than one example to confirm what was said above. Thus, while speaking at a meeting with collectives of a number of Radon Production Plants, Party Gorkom Secretary V. Artamonova tragically lost heart: "Comrades! One hundred to two hundred thousand Soviet Germans are planning to come here to settle. But where will we find housing for them? Where will they work?"—and so on in that same vein. And not a word or a syllable about the fact that the Germans will come here not to "eat the Volga Region out of house and home" but to work and that the steps to restore the republic, including construction of homes and creation of new jobs will be completely financed from outside the local budget and with proper consideration of the interests of the entire population.

To tell people that all of them—Russians and Germans, Ukrainians and Tatars, Kazakhs and Jews will only gain if they use their common efforts to return the Volga Region to its forgotten glory as the country's grain producing region, if we erect new villages and cities here, extend good roads, and resurrect former industries, if jointly with firms of the GDR, FRG, Austria, and Switzerland, we establish totally equipped enterprises for production of consumer goods and for processing agricultural products—for example, the FRG has been ready to extend a helping hand for a long time.

And to relate still more about the tragic history of the Volga Germans who, for no reason at all, were driven off this land in August 1941, having been branded with the shameful labels of "spies" and "saboteurs." Having been sent to Siberia, Kazakhstan, and other eastern areas of the country, they made up the backbone of the so-called workers army where all able-bodied men and juveniles 15 years of age or older and later women and girls were "mobilized." Located behind the barbed wire in NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] camps, they lived in horrible conditions of starvation and cold and worked one and a half to two shifts per day at timber felling, in coal mines, or at construction sites. Yes, it was hard for everyone at that time. But it was twice as severe for Soviet Germans because they were placed on the same plane with the enemy and were morally and physically humiliated.

After the war, in 1948, a new blow befell them—they had been resettled permanently. They had to remain in the zones of these same camps, it is true, without any barriers. But for being absent without leave—the punishment is up to 20 years at hard labor. Only in 1955 did they begin to remove the specially resettled people from the books and to free them from administrative supervision. However as before, they did not have the right to return to their native land. Charges against the Soviet Germans were completely dropped only in 1964. But the

USSR Supreme Soviet Decree about this was not published in the nationwide press and the country actually did not know about it. Furthermore, it turned out to be only a half-measure—autonomy was not restored. Left without their own statehood, Soviet Germans lost the capability to preserve themselves as a people and began to lose their native language and their national culture.

"We print 'Red books,'" noted Commentator Eduard Schmidt in despair. "We are struggling to preserve our plants and animals... The fate of a people of two million who are scattered throughout the country leaves some of their fellow citizens indifferent and apathetic. Worse still, any of Vozrozhdeniye attempts to shed light on the true situation of Soviet Germans encounter a lack of understanding and even aggression in the majority of cases."

Yes, I am telling you all of this to explain to people about a recently adopted USSR Supreme Soviet Declaration "On Recognition of the Illegal and Criminal Repressive Acts Against Peoples Who Were Subjected to Forced Resettlement and to Provide Them their Rights." But who will say it if people chase Vozrozhdeniye activists from the speaker's dais with yells and clatter, and skilled lecturers from Saratov and Moscow very rarely appear in Marx and other of the region's hot spots. As for local ideological workers, they operate in the spirit of the tenets that come down from the oblast: "What, do you want Germans to be your bosses?"

"Absurd and horrible rumors are being born," V. Proskuryakov repeatedly stated at the Party Gorkom. "It is as if everyone living in old German houses will be resettled in 24 hours. It is as if they will not be allowed into the stores without a knowledge of the German language. It is as if the fate of the Volga Region becoming a 'Small German State' has been prepared and financed by the FRG, etc. We need to neutralize rumors and conjecture as soon as possible and to actively involve the local, oblast, and central press in this using our own agitators and propagandists. Otherwise, we will encounter serious complications."

But A. Yefremenko, head of the ideological department, and V. Artamonova, secretary for ideology, were decisively cool to Valentin Ivanovich:

"Do not get carried away by this matter. Let the people express themselves."

And this "self-expression" began so that even an ordinary man could not sleep through a bad dream. I will cite several sentences thrown out in rally-style quick temper to demonstrate my point: "It does no good to show false sorrow! Have we not suffered enough from the Germans?! Have we not shed quite a bit of Russian blood?!" Or: "We did not beat the Fascists so that we could live on the Volga in a German autonomy. And we do not need to hear about the victims of Stalinism. You hate Stalin and we hate Hitler." And this is about Soviet Germans who certainly hate Fascism no less than we do!

According to V. Proskuryakov, his conversations with First Secretary V. Rogalev also went badly. But once this occurred on the eve of the first meeting between representative of the workers collectives and Vozrozhdeniye (incidentally, it was organized at the initiative and insistence of the Radon Plant Partkom), Valeriy Viktorovich directly told Valentin Ivanovich that there would be no speakers in defense of autonomy from the plant. This allegedly was the Obkom and Oblispolkom position.

However, a civic conscience also exists. And that is why speakers "who did not want to" nevertheless rose to speak on the dais. V. Proskuryakov was one of them. It is true that ZNAMYA KOMMUNIZMA, the local newspaper, decided to publish what was said... just four months later.

Was there a need for Spravedlivost to turn to Moscow? Plant Specialists A. Kondrashov and V. Chudskayev, G. Kisel and G. Bronnikova, Teachers Yu. Rogulev and V. Ametov, N. Yevstigneyev and G. Sosner, Cultural Workers L. Zaslavskaya and S. Zhukova, Cooperator V. Yudin and Journalist M. Viryukova, who form the nucleus of the new social organization, answer simply—there was. Emotions began to gain the upper hand over reason in Marx and in the areas adjacent to it. Appeals for rallies, strikes, and distrust of the USSR Supreme Soviet began to be increasingly reinforced by direct chauvinistic attacks.

Yu. Nedelyayev, chairman of the committee opposing autonomy and, according to his papers, Markovskiy sovkhos and technicum partkom secretary, and actually—a party gorkom employee who is part of the staff here and who receives his salary here too, proposed the initiative together with like-minded people from other rayons of Saratov Oblast to send a representative delegation to Moscow during the days when the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies was in session in order to set up picketing of deputies residences and to thus exert strong pressure on them.

"We demand removal of the issue on re-creation of the German ASSR from the agenda as inadequately prepared and not reflecting the opinions of the region's population!" Decisive minded picketers also attempted to bring to the "consciousness" of Moscow residents, deputies and the CPSU Central Committee this and other points of the resolution adopted in Marx on the eve of the Congress at a conference of workers collectives representatives. For four days their speeches, reinforced by scathing placards, rang out near the Rossiya Hotel.

Spravedlivost Society's appeal turned out to be a cold shower for the "impatient" and it meant that Yu. Nedelyayev's committee represents far from the entire region's population and therefore cannot be a comprehensive reflection of its opinion. That is also how it actually is. In the information vacuum and in the absence of systematic explanatory work in the collectives, the committee did not even attempt to coordinate

free discussion while subjectively interpreting the history of the Soviet Germans and, essentially, without delving deeply into the problem.

It is clear that the staff could not forgive Spravedlivost for such exposure. And here I will note that the anti-autonomy group is very strong at Radon and the "arousers of public opinion" have suddenly appeared with a copy of the appeal that V. Proskuryakov considered necessary to send to the CPSU Gorkom. And this is what has already made the rounds at the plant: "The Partkom and STK betrayed us! let us have a meeting!"

It took place on December 26. V. Proskuryakov was told off. But how? Many expected a confession from him but he gave the authorities quite a battle. He conclusively stated that local functionaries are afraid to lose their portfolios and chairs with the restoration of the ASSR. The "Doctrine" of gradual decision of the ethnic question and in essence to prolong it for many years is a "horse" that could save them during the impending committee elections because the majority have no other serious programs behind their back and that some in power do not want to transfer the left bank to other hands where billions of rubles have been buried in the land and over 60,000 hectares of land have become swampy and salinized as a result of pseudo-reclamation. The German-pedants will conduct their expert assessment and give us the answer. That means, do not permit it!

The meeting turned out to be a stormy but futile one. Some supported V. Proskuryakov, Ye. Morozov, and Spravedlivost, others spoke out against them, while still others maintained silence, not knowing which side to give in to. And, by the way, the outcome was nevertheless certain. Many people thought about what is happening in our country today and what we are doing with perestroika.

But there is still one more result. In January, Spravedlivost succeeded in assembling the opposing sides at a roundtable—representatives of Vozrozhdeniye and the committee opposing autonomy. The party gorkom secretary also sat at the same table with them. And in February, a Spravedlivost Oblast Association Founding Conference took place in Saratov as a sign of the fact that the movement of internationalists is gaining strength.

When this article was prepared for press, I found out that a factory wide report-back election meeting took place at Radon. They allocated 15 minutes for V. Proskuryakov's report. The work of the partkom was recognized as satisfactory by a majority vote and the work of its secretary was rated unsatisfactory. This decision was strange and illogical and it struck your eye like it was programmed earlier and therefore at the end of the meeting another verdict was rendered that stated dissatisfaction with the partkom. I was not surprised at this chicanery. As one of the speakers honestly stated, "there

were no particular grievances against Valentin Ivanovich until November of last year. But he got carried away with Spravedlivost...."

Estonia's Ryuytel to Deputies on Tartu Peace Anniversary

90UN0958A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 3 Feb 90 p 2

[Arnold Fedorovich Ryuytel: "Speech by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Dedicated to the 70th Anniversary of the Peace Treaty of Tartu"]

[Text] We are commemorating a great event in the history of the people of Estonia. Today, at 2 a.m. is the 70th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Tartu between the Estonian Democratic Republic and the RSFSR.

J. Poska, the leader of the Estonian delegation to the peace talks, said in connection with this: "Today is the most important day for Estonia in its entire 700 year history—today for the first time Estonia has determined its fate."

And really it was this day, one of the days in a sequence of very important events over 30 months, that completed the creation of an sovereign and independent Estonian state.

On 28 November 1917, the Estonian Zemskiy Soviet declared itself to be the sole supreme power in Estonia. It assumed state power and actually created the Estonian state. On 24 February 1918 the council of the elder Zemskiy Soviet declared it to be the independent Estonian Democratic Republic. This act broke off state ties between Estonia and Russia.

The Estonian people won their state independence from considerably superior forces over a 13 month struggle and at great cost in efforts and losses—12,000 people shed their blood for the fatherland, 5,000 paid with their lives. They were ready to shed the last drop of their blood to protect this independence as the most valuable possession. The Estonian people achieved what had initially seemed hopeless and improbable.

An independent Estonian state arose. Estonia and Russia decided to reach a durable, honest and just peace. Article II of the Treaty of Tartu Treaty says: "Based upon the RSFSR's stated right of all people to free self-determination, up to complete separation from the state in which they are included, Russia acknowledges the unconditional independence of the Estonian state and renounces, voluntarily and for all time, all sovereign rights held by Russia regarding the Estonian people and land under the previously state and legal order and on the basis of international treaties, which, in the sense indicated here, lose their force in the future."

"The Estonian people and land will not have any obligations to Russia regarding their formerly belonging to Russia."

The peace treaty meant the first legal recognition of the Estonian state. This recognition was all the more important in that it came from an interested state that was the former sovereign. In international law this is much more important than to be recognized by some third, non-participating state. Russia's recognition was in the form of a treaty between states and had the indisputable force of law. International treaties are signed in order to be observed. One cannot simply and unilaterally reject them; they are not annulled by treaties signed with a third party. The Treaty of Tartu is in force today, nobody has abolished it.

On 19 May 1919 the Founding Conference of Estonia explained the reasons the Estonian people decided to take the path to state independence: "The Estonian people know that this step means a break in the ties binding it to the Russian state for 2 centuries. However, the Estonian people also know that Russian power was a stepmother to them. The Estonian people know that the Russian state did not do anything to create strong internal bonds between itself and the Estonian people. Moreover: the Estonian people bitterly recall all the injustice they suffered under the Russian state or with its clear support."

Estonians, the native inhabitants of their land, lived for 7 centuries under the oppression of a foreign power. However, they remained themselves; they did not lose their national identity. The Estonian people did not become Germanized. In the 19th century, when the Germans began to seriously think about the Germanization of Estonia, it was too late.

In 1880 Russian state authorities began to take decisive measures to Russify the Estonians. Russian became the official language in school, in the courts and in all official institutions. Business could not be conducted in Estonian on the railroads or in the post office. The Estonian people protected their national identity even under the threat of losing it and under intense national oppression. In two generations they transformed themselves from serfs to a European people with a clearly developed self-consciousness, its own intelligentsia, and other social classes (except, of course, the nobility) and with a strong will for an independent existence. On the basis of the free will of the overwhelming majority, this small people created its own state and defended it with weapons in their hands. The creation of a cultured people in such a brief time is an outstanding achievement of the Estonian people. Not all small peoples are able to do this.

The Soviet state has always had a sympathetic attitude towards liberation movements all over the world.

The Treaty of Tartu laid the basis for the recognition of Estonia by other states. Estonia was accepted into the

family of peaceful independent states. On 22 September 1921 it was admitted into the League of Nations.

Estonia is one of the few members of the League of Nations that is not now a member of the United Nations. The Estonian people have every right to become independent. As they used to say, it is a God given right for every people to have its own motherland and to be independent. Since time immemorial this right has belonged to the Estonian people, the ancestors of whom have lived on the Baltic Sea shores since the Stone Age.

The sovereign rights of Russia, mentioned in the Treaty of Tartu, were held for 200 years. They were acquired by force of arms during the Great Northern War, after conquering Estlandia and Liflandia from Sweden.

In accordance with the Treaty of Nystad, signed between Sweden and Russia on 30 August 1721, the King of Sweden, in his name and the name of his successors to the throne, ceded to Tsar Peter the Great and his successors and to the successors of the Russian state, full, inalienable and eternal possession of the provinces won by force of arms of the Tsar from the King of Sweden: Liflandia, Estlandia, Ingermanlandia and part of Karelia.

The Tsar solemnly swore to eternally and irrevocably protect the customs and rights of these provinces and their inhabitants. These were the gains which Russia renounced in 1920. There were no other rights, neither legal nor moral.

Discussions about the inclusion of the territory of Estonia into the Russian state in the 11th century are groundless fabrications. Ivan IV, who was justifiably called "the Terrible" by the people, used these as the basis for his rule.

Making demands on the eve of the war over Livonia (1554), Muscovite diplomacy persistently asserted that the Episcopate of Tartu was an area previously under the control of the ancient Russian state. Equally groundless are the assertions about the original Slavic inhabitants of Estonia; they are supposed to have made up 40 percent of the population. Prior to the 16th century there were not even any traces of Russian settlers. A few Russian settlers came along with the others to the lands around the Chudskoye Ozero that had been ruined during the war over Livonia. During the 17th century more Russian families arrived, including Old Believers, who were being persecuted in Russia. Villages with Russian inhabitants sprang up along the shores of the Chudskoye Ozero. There were only a few Russian villages. The number of Russians in pre-Soviet Estonia was always insignificant.

In 1881 the population within the present boundaries of Estonia was 3.3 percent Russian, in 1897 it was 4.0 percent and in 1922—4.7 percent.

In 1934 the population of Estonia, together with Pechorskiy Uezd and the volosts beyond the Narva was

88.1 percent Estonian, 8.2 percent Russian and 1.5 percent German. So, the national composition of the state was compact and stable.

Molotov acted on the rights of the strong when in 1939 he presented the Estonian minister of foreign affairs with a demand for military bases: "The Soviet Union is now a great power, the interests of which must be taken into consideration. I tell you, the Soviet Union needs an expanded system to assure its security. For this it needs access to the Baltic Sea. If you do not want to sign a mutual assistance pact with us, you will have to take other paths to security, perhaps steeper and more difficult. I ask you not to make us use force in our relations with Estonia."

In a speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet on 1 August 1940, that is 5 days before Estonia was made a Soviet republic, Molotov said: "It is very important to our country that the Soviet Union will now have the Baltic Sea shore as its border. Also, our country will have an ice-free harbor, something it needs very much..."

Then he read figures showing how much territory and how many people the Soviet Union had gained. Propaganda did not fail to mention historical rights, the same which Russia solemnly renounced on 2 February. It was now asserted that the territory which later became the Baltic republics had been part of the Russian Empire for centuries.

The "very brief" state connections between Russia and Finland lasted from 1809 to 1917, i.e. for 108 years.

The legal basis for great power pretensions during 1939 and 1940 was not the Nystad Treaty of 30 August 1721, but the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939. These were treaties concerning the break up of neighboring states. They were criminal and invalid from the perspective of international law and were based upon the principles of colonialism.

Now, finally, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies has declared the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact to be legally invalid from the time they were signed.

The Congress decree says: "The protocols did not create a new legal basis for relations between the Soviet Union and third countries, but were used by Stalin and those surrounding him to make ultimatums and to exert strong pressure on other states and to violate previously assumed legal obligations."

This formulation gives a legal and political evaluation of our subsequent history. These protocols became the basis for subsequent occupation and annexation.

In 1939 M. Litvinov, USSR people's commissar for foreign affairs, said the following about small states loosing their independence:

"It is difficult to believe that any people would voluntarily agree to lose their independence and to join

another state, especially a people who for hundreds of years struggled for their independence and have protected it for more than 20 years..."

These words are a genuine description of the peace loving foreign policy of a great power, respecting people's rights. However, they were not said about Estonia, or any of the Baltic republics or Finland, but about Czechoslovakia, which was seized by Germany in March 1939.

There is now an explosion of liberation movements in Czechoslovakia and other countries of Eastern Europe. It caused by the pressure which has built up over decades, pressure that is mainly influenced by foreign factors.

We have many sore spots in common with these Eastern European countries, but our pain has penetrated deeper into the spirit of the people.. Even in the most difficult years in these European countries, the people's democracies retained at least the external forms of statehood and independence. The force that was often used by foreign hands did not assume the character it did in the Baltic republics.

The displacement and even the annihilation of nations began with the annexation of the Baltic states in 1940. During 1940-1941 began the removal of state, political and public figures, military and official personnel and the active part of the intelligentsia.

In 1941 began mass terror, deportation and murder, the victims of which were the most energetic, active, creative and hard working people of Estonia.

The deportations of 1949 inflicted a blow on a broader strata of people, especially the peasantry. The number of victims is in the tens of thousands, but historians have not yet been able to precisely determine the figure. This terror was to a great extent inflicted upon women, children and the elderly. Every fifth or sixth person lost his home or even his life. Stalin, with whose name this is linked, was, in reality, simply the figurehead for a powerful, all-encompassing force.

At the same time a policy of immigration was made more active. In addition to cadre on the nomenklatura, after the war numerous industrial workers entered all sphere of life in Estonia. This was in spite of an acute shortage of work hands in central Russia.

Investment in industry, especially in the development of heavy industry, was comparatively high in Estonia. This entailed the construction of industry with all-union investments, all-union labor, for all-union goals and the import of raw material and the export of products. Local authorities were left with ecological and service problems. This is difficult to explain by purely economic reasons.

Volume III of the 1971 *Istoriya ESSR* [History of the Estonian SSR] says: "During the years of the construction of socialism, the ranks of the Estonian working class

were increased by people from other nationalities. Common interests, goals and labor linked those arriving from fraternal republics with the local workers. These were fused together into the unified working class of Soviet Estonia.

And a few lines later: "Political education helped working people free themselves from the influence of bourgeois-nationalist propaganda. In order to transform working people into conscientious builders of socialism they had to be given a clear idea of the prospects for the development of the Soviet country and their enterprise's role in this."

At the same time it would be incorrect to blame any one of these working people personally; they tried to devote their labor and knowledge to make things better.

So, Estonians were a steadily decreasing percentage of the population of Estonia, while the role of other nationalities, especially Russian, was increasing. After the war Estonians made up about 94 percent of the population, after the March deportations, about 77 percent and in 1989—61.5 percent. In 1989 there were 963,000 Estonians; at the end of independence there were 993,000.

This means that over a 50 year period natural growth and the influx of so-called Russian Estonians could not compensate for human losses resulting from the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

Such a large increase in the Slavic population in less than a generation was an aspect of great power pressure.

Language policy introduced monolingualism into agencies, the post office, the railroad, savings banks and medical institutions. Elderly native born Estonians not knowing Russian could not handle their affairs.

Calling the Russian language the key to world culture, at the same time the Russians broke other keys for communicating with the world.

Forceful collectivization initially meant the breakdown of agriculture, but Estonian peasants' traditions of hard work and persistence prevented them from perishing forever. Today we have progressive farms that continue the better traditions of our agriculture.

The great power development of industry left many regions with irreversibly and dangerously polluted environments. Common human values were damaged. Even such clear concepts as happiness, freedom and sovereignty were given quite different meanings. However, freedom remains freedom and sovereignty remains sovereignty.

Sovereignty means state independence from other states, which do not have the right to exercise state power within its boundaries. It means the freedom to express the state will of its people independently of other states, to determine this state structure and to manage this state.

Our duty is not only to clearly recognize, but also to boldly say that, as a result of repression, uncontrolled immigration and national pressure, the Estonian people have been reduced to a grievously ruined minority in the land where their ancestors lived for millenia. This dampened national aspirations, resulted in hopelessness and torpidity, and put the nation into a deep sleep.

A process can develop imperceptibly to a fatal moment where it becomes irreversible. It is impossible and intolerable to remain silent.

A people is a living organism that is born, lives, feels pain and dies. The pain threshold of a small people is reduced and it finds itself on the edge of the constant danger of annihilation.

A people has its own sense of justice and its national rights. These rights belong to a people and the state it creates, and not to separate individuals, who are not subjects of international law as is a people who lives in its native territory and has created a state.

They have human rights guaranteed by all civilized countries. They are completely equal in their human rights and in all civil-legal relations.

In Estonia there has always been respect for other nationalities, including Russians, who are now the dominant component of our union state. Their ethnic territory is vast and large numbers have flowed outward.

The intention to found a new state formation in Estonia is an attempt to tear away a piece of Estonians' native land. This is in complete conflict with international law and the will of the Estonian people. It is also a provocation with regard to the representatives of the nationality in whose name this demand is made. This demand has no goal other than sowing hatred and enmity between several generations of Estonians and Russians. New settlers do not have sovereign rights in the territory.

Our relations can be based only upon mutual good will. On its part, Estonia will give all civil rights to all of its inhabitants. A small people has its own kind of patience. A small people cannot harbor dreams of revenge. It does not have the power to live in hatred towards strangers or neighbors.

The founding convention of Estonia declared on 19 May 1919: "We do not want to live in hatred and enmity towards the Russian people. We want to have neighborly and friendly relations if they will leave us in peace. Any kind of thirst for extreme expansion of power beyond its borders has been and remains alien to the Estonian people. They want to freely and independently build their lives in their own homes, exercising their natural rights!"

The Estonian people consider these principles true today. The political decisions of the Estonian people in no way infringe upon the interests of other nationalities. A small people's exercise of the right to self-determination in no way violates general civil rights,

which in Estonia are guaranteed by law. A small people does not have the strength to scatter or crush within its boundaries. A small people needs to consolidate its strength.

As was said about 1848, it is now the springtime of nations in Eastern Europe. There is a great liberation, as there was at that time. The reasons for this great liberation movement are not only economic, linked to the desire to improve living standards. It is a serious error and especially inherent in the great power way of thinking to assume that if the stores were full then there would not be any more political or national demands.

Clearly, in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and especially in East Germany, there were no problems about goods. Events were determined by aspirations for political and national independence. Statehood assumes the presence of independent political and economic structures.

Our undertaking to implement republic cost accounting is a good prerequisite for the necessary independent political structures that could finally be formed under politically free conditions. There will be serious difficulties in realizing our economic aspirations. However we will not shrink from any difficulties in realizing our ideas.

Of course, the populist democratic problems in Eastern Europe are much easier than ours. They all have sufficiently autonomous political structures playing a great role in the revolutionary process and the liberation movement. Here there are no such organized state and political foundations. However, we have our political experience, learned from the lessons of history.

These teach that only a democratic society in an atmosphere of spiritual freedom and openness can guarantee each individual's conscientiousness and capability of initiative.

For a small people and a small state all this is very necessary for development, unification and the attraction of all national groups.

These are needed to struggle with all one's strength for meaning in life and for survival, for justice and the freedom of a people.

Our society shows maximum tolerance towards all its members and has created broad political and legal foundations for various national movements. This tolerance, internal tolerance, should also be integral to all political and popular movements, and be an inviolable rule in their interaction.

We have now formed a very broad and diverse spectrum. The activities of various political tendencies should not be condemned in principle, and not one of them should claim a monopoly.

Soon there will be elections to the Supreme Soviet. We should try to have a democratically elected Supreme Soviet form a genuine parliament which would have the

authority and ability to make decisions of state importance in the name of the people and state.

In order to form a parliament capable of functioning we should try as much as possible to unify forces and try not to nominate candidates for personal reasons. This demands common interests.

The movement of committees of citizens based upon genuine citizen initiative has become a large mass movement. Lists of citizens with native national rights to determine the fate of their country have been compiled. The initiatives of citizens' committees must be expanded.

We should also recognize the role of the planned Congress of Estonia, which is authorized to speak in the name of the citizens of the Estonian Republic.

For us and for all democratic movements and citizens initiatives the sole aspiration is to attain and maintain Estonia's state independence.

It is necessary to unite all forces and support everybody who seeks a peaceful path to attain this goal. Today we must support it with our will. This was stated in the Declaration of Independence by Representatives of the People of Estonia.

This is an important step along the path which we have been moving together since 16 November 1988. Harsh history has shattered our illusions. We do not see any other path to our future.

The guarantee of our success is our fundamental right, the support and sympathy of all democratic forces in the Soviet Union, the understanding and sympathy of people of good will throughout the entire world and the unwavering will of our people.

For this we stand, we can do no other.

Vyalas Addresses Estonian Party Conference

90UN1033A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 10 Feb 90 pp 1, 2

[Speech by V. Vyalas at Estonian CP Conference: "Report by V. Vyalas, First Secretary of the Estonian CP Central Committee"]

[Text] Comrades!

We had planned the Estonian CP Conference to be an intermediary step to the 20th Estonian CP Congress, a forum that would help us understand better our political and ideological roots and raise our in-party discussion to a new level. During preparatory work, the conference acquired yet another important dimension. The February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee took place in the meantime, and it can be seen as the start of a decisive turn in the restructuring of the party itself. Thus, we must amend drafts prepared for the conference

by the commission of the Estonian CP Central Committee and ask the republic party organization to discuss also the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th CPSU Congress.

The CPSU Central Committee plenum also passed a resolution on the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress, which was published in the press. The resolution allows all Lithuanian communists to take an active part in preparing and holding the 28th CPSU Congress.

The CPSU Central Committee platform is a document for the future. If the 28th CPSU Congress adopts it, it will no longer be a mere platform but become a provisional CPSU program, which will be in force until the new party program is drafted. It is clear that the directives included in the CPSU Central Committee platform will determine the development of the CPSU in the near future and change the relationship between party and people, as well as between republic CPs and the CPSU as a whole.

We should also keep in mind that we are dealing with a document that will be changed and amended, and will continue to develop, which is a process where we, Estonian communists, can make a contribution.

To say it briefly, the draft CPSU Central Committee platform ushers in serious reform of our party ideology. Thereafter, we will begin to reorganize the structure of the party. It is unavoidable, the logic of reorganization demands this. These issues have long been on the agenda in our republic.

What is the essence of the action and the main substance of the reorganization that has begun? The essence is undoubtedly in the fact that the type of a political party the CPSU was in recent past, a party that had grown with state authorities into a single structure of power and totalitarian domination of all aspects of public life, has become a historical anachronism. The party, its inner life and ideology have become a dead weight on the progress of society. As a party-state and undemocratic structure of power, the CPSU is totally finished.

How to find a way out of this situation? We know that various movements offer solutions, ranging from moderate liberalization to total dissolution of the party. Similar calls have been heard in our primary organizations. In its platform, the CPSU Central Committee sees the solution in reforming the party into a parliamentary party of a democratic type competing with other political forces in free elections and vying with them for the trust of the people, for obtaining the mandate of the people to organize the life of society. In a democratic society, there can be no other source of state power except for the free will of the people.

This is the essence of the revolutionary coup in the CPSU Central Committee platform, and it engenders cardinal changes both in party ideology and the norms and methods of its activities, as well as in its organizational principles. But it is beyond doubt—let us repeat

this idea once more—that the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum started a radical reform of the basis of the party's activities.

I am sure that the ideas expressed at the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum deserve serious attention of the Estonian CP. They are yet to be studied and discussed by the republic party organization. This is why I will refrain from hasty assessments and final directives here. Let them emerge in a general party discussion. But I would like to direct the attention of delegates to some crucial points that must be taken into account when Estonian CP programmatic documents are finalized.

The CPSU Central Committee platform proclaims a clear goal: democratic socialism as an ideal the CPSU will pursue in its future activity. Thus, the CPSU will reject existing Utopian visions of the future. And not only that. The primitive class position is rejected, too, the one that, in a purely sectarian fashion, pitted the interests of the working class against human values. Pervasive interference by the state in public life must become a thing of the past, since it has led to nothing but arbitrary power, lawlessness and suppression of popular will. Man, his rights and liberties will come into focus. The people will subject the state to its will, not the other way around. This, as well as what I will say shortly, is contained in the materials of the 11th Estonian CP Central Committee Plenum and our later documents.

It is a dramatic departure with a profound ideological meaning. We are talking about nothing short of rejection of the existing order. Of course, changes in party directives merely reflect reality. Liberated popular initiative has already begun to subject the structure of power to its will. But the fact that this is recognized in the programmatic document of the still-ruling party attests to the serious intention of the party, of its progressive wing, to support the wishes of the people and to create a truly democratic society.

Economic life in our republic must be based on variety of forms of property and development of goods and money economy. Transition to market economy requires the emergence of other forms of property in addition to state property, as well as a radical reorganization of state property itself, subjugating it to the true producer. The stated principle is: the market regulates the producer and society regulates the market; moreover, society does not do so directly but rather indirectly, by means of credit, tax and pricing policy. Here, as in other areas, the view of society as a self-regulating system is affirmed.

The same is true of the political organization of public life. The CPSU Central Committee platform views social and political movements that have emerged and continue to emerge as a natural phenomenon. In its future relations with them, the CPSU will not aspire to a monopoly on absolute truth, but will be open to a dialogue with all movements and groups supporting the course to social renewal. Essentially, it recognizes the inevitability of a multiparty political system and the

need for the CPSU to work together with emerging parties. The only caveat is that such a system in and of itself will not solve all problems. Importantly, the program also proclaims the principle of separation of power: we must decisively separate legislative, executive and judiciary power.

Of course, it was especially important to us to find in the draft platform the new content of the relationship between center and republics and of federalism. It stems from total rejection of the model of the stalinist unitarian state; the new type of federation appears to be a union of free and equal nations voluntarily delegating some of their rights to the union. Moreover, we are talking mainly about the need to create legal conditions to legitimize various forms of federal ties. This opens new vistas for us. Union republics are sovereign states possessing full freedom to choose forms of social organization independently and to set up institutions of their statehood. Measures to protect ethnic languages and cultures are viewed as fully justified. Particularly noteworthy is the paragraph according to which every republic has its own special features and thus its own special relations both with the center and with other republics. This gives rise to a variety of union charters for different republics. Freedom to choose socio-political systems and compromise are declared universal principles in relations between nationalities. These principles should replace the old policy of force. This new thinking, borrowing from foreign policy, will undoubtedly find broad application in party activities related to domestic policy. If it is true that only acceptance of different forms and aspects of development in the ethnic and socio-political area can guarantee stability of a community of nations, does it not apply in equal measure to the multiethnic and multifaceted Soviet Union?

Let us think about these principles. Let us recall the major conflict situations in Estonia of the past year. Let us compare in our mind's eye the path traveled by our republic and the points made by the CPSU Central Committee program:

We have the declaration on sovereignty dated November 16, 1988, on the one hand and the statement in the platform that every republic is sovereign on the other;

—the Law on Language here and approval by the CPSU Central Committee of measures taken to protect languages and cultures there;

—the national flag raised over the Tall Herman tower and admission that republics as sovereign states are free to choose not only their heraldic symbols but state institutions as well;

—the concept of republic economic accountability and the right of every republic to make its social and economic choices, the freedom to choose—I stress—the forms of its social organization;

- the law on migration that is being drafted here and the principle that no nationality must become a minority in its historical land expressed in the CPSU Central Committee platform ;
- the initiative of the Estonian CP Central Committee to change Article 6 in the Estonian SSR Basic Law and the statement in the CPSU Central Committee platform that the party does not seek constitutional privilege;
- historical and legal assessment of events of 1940s and the need to know the full, albeit bitter, truth about the tragic pages of our history stressed by the CPSU Central Committee.

This list can go on.

One thing I will tell you: the Estonian Communist Party has stayed this course since its 11th plenum and will continue to do so in the future. We did not need the CPSU Central Committee platform to justify our steps. The function of the platform is to steer party organizations of all union republics to the new path of independent decision.

The CPSU Central Committee platform is a set of truly democratic principles. Only one question remains: what kind of a party has proclaimed these principles? The CPSU Central Committee provides the answer: it is a party that has made a socialist choice. This party does not seek privilege or a constitutionally established special position in the political system. It seeks dialogue, cooperation and partnership with all other political forces. This party will not be constrained by barrack-like mores and rigid internal hierarchy. This party will tolerate freedom of opinion and diversity of political platforms. This party will consist of communist parties of the republics which, obviously, will function based on their own programmatic documents and whose leaders will sit in the CPSU Political Presidium (the name is provisional for now).

I do not, of course, presume to list every aspect of renewal contained in the platform. In the course of general party discussion we will, of course, expect our republic's communists to come up with proposals on reforming the entire CPSU.

These points should be viewed through the prism of actual problems in Estonia; we must think of amending the draft to make sure that our goals are served better. Let us not forget that in addition to the above-mentioned points other, incompatible ideas are also contained in the draft. But I am certain that the basis for constructive debate has been established. In three weeks, the next CPSU Central Committee plenum will take place and present the draft of the new CPSU Program.

I would like to say a few words about historical memory. True, our party's past is full of errors. It is also true that we know it very poorly. This is why many communists were shocked when they came into contact with the

pages of party history which hitherto had been zealously concealed. Many communists asked: should a party with such a past be trusted? We must understand those people and how they feel. But it is another matter when such statements are made by party or state figures, by historians, lawyers or social scientists who themselves were involved in shaping our social consciousness, either acting on orders, or out of conformism, or for reasons of career advancement; when such people publicly throw away their party cards and declare that their eyes opened only now. You know, I want to ask the new parties which such people are now so eager to join: do you think they are honest with you? Do you think they will remain honest even when they suddenly find that they are not big shots in your party?

And one more thing. True, the Estonian Communist Party is now going through the purifying fire. Yet...

If it keeps the majority of economic managers in the republic, scholars, politicians, honest workers and peasants, those who are driven not by personal interest but by concern for our common future;

- if the new Estonian Communist Party puts forward a concrete program of action which can be overseen by the people and which defines a clear strategy for solving in nearby years the current crisis without concealing that everyone will be going through very hard times;
- if in the spirit of true democracy the principles of all our in-party organizational activity are restructured, if every communist in any position is answerable to the people and membership in the party gives no advantages;
- if everything is like this, the people may give us its mandate of trust. We learned our bitter lessons. Now, appointing our members to any post we are literally forced to demand integrity, professional competence and sacrifice of private interests and ambitions.

In recent years, the main thrust of Estonian Communist Party activity has been to defend and represent the interests of Estonia and the Estonian people in Moscow. The Estonian Communist Party is trying to do everything in a balanced manner and take political realities into account, but also be consistent. The Estonian Communist Party has deliberately taken upon itself the momentous goal for the republic to ensure the transition of Estonian society to a democratic and parliamentary law-based state where the party itself has no constitutional or other advantages over other parties.

Along with protecting the interests of the republic, we have made every effort to harmonize special interests of the two ethnic communities in Estonia and have sought solutions that would not infringe on the vital interests of any group. We consider this approach basic and intend to follow it in the future, since we are convinced that a new Estonia can not be built by cramping the interests of other ethnic groups.

The lack of clear and open policy toward nonindigenous population has caused many difficulties following the 11th Estonian CP Central Committee plenum. This has brought to life a group of politicians who gave voice to the vague sense of alarm among the Russian-speaking population, especially workers. They scored their political points by rejecting everything new that emerged in Estonia.

Based on historical experience, one can say that leaders who build their policy on stirring the fears and emotions of the masses have no future. The people will see sooner or later that it has been drawn into a political game where the priority is not its true interests but personal ambitions of the politicians. The sooner its eyes open the better. Our goal is to build a safe Estonian home where everybody, regardless of nationality, is happy.

The Estonian Communist Party has given up attempts to rule everything and everyone in society. We decided that our future as a political party is tied to cooperation with all movements and parties who want to democratize society.

Social thought has gone through changes in the past year and a half that could not even have been predicted. We all know that the policy of perestroika began with slogans of glasnost, pluralism and tolerance, but at the time it was hard to imagine how it would be carried out. In an early reaction to the toppling of the partocratic monopoly on truth, the internal pendulum of society swung in the opposite extreme, and in some cases new assessments were based on old methodology. Those who were on top yesterday were declared crooks and the other way around, those who were new in political life were seen as pure, regardless of actual deeds and views of various individuals involved. In essence, it was stalinism turned inside out. Today, we are gradually starting to rid ourselves of this childhood disease, even though relapses still occur, especially during election campaigns. Today, we have come to realize that public life can not develop based on one or another monopolized truth but is a result of diverse development paths; there can be several such paths, but none can be declared the sole correct or clearly useless one.

Ideas presented today for discussion to you and to the people as a whole are not uniquely correct proposals but various points of view. It is now our common task to try to compare and debate those points of view and thus arrive at identifying fundamental differences. Let us try now to find common ground between various positions and the common cause that could be developed further. Let us do so with tolerance and in the spirit of party comradeship.

What would have happened yesterday if a similar meeting were offered two fundamentally different plans? Supporters of one would have immediately left the auditorium through one door, and those of the other through another. A dialogue would have been impossible, nor would there be a search for constructive

solutions. Today, however, we are hoping for a dialogue and I do not think that it is a vain hope. This process of search and calm discussion of various paths must form the methodological basis for today's debate and future discussions. This hope rests on the fact that our party has never been and never will be built on ethnic discord.

The overwhelming majority of communists in the republic are united in their understanding that we can not go on with our old ways. Thus, we have an objective common ground for discussing the role and function of the Estonian Communist Party. But it is not so simple, for differences of opinion and different visions of the scope of the planned changes in society and party are becoming more and more clear.

The so-called radical part of the Estonian Communist Party sees in the fact that the party lags behind the wishes of the majority of Estonian society not only its personal impotence to change the situation drastically but also perceives more profound social roots. In other words, it puts the blame for the difficult situation of the Estonian Communist Party on the current structure of political power and the resultant impotence to change the situation. As a condition for imbuing sovereignty of the republic with real content, it sees the need to change the current status of the Estonian Communist Party or, in essence, to declare it independent.

Sociological polls of Estonian Communist Party members have shown that the overwhelming majority of ethnic Estonians (up to 90 percent) and 30 percent of non-Estonians want to see the Estonian Communist Party independent. This is a fact that must not go unmentioned.

We have embarked on a difficult but irreversible path to democratic, independent statehood. Taking into account the interests of the majority of the people is necessary for all political forces active in Estonia, and the Estonian Communist Party can not, and must not, be an exception.

We must put our name on the political map of Estonia in the conditions of a multiparty system, with the parliamentary struggle stemming from it.

At the same time, the Estonian Communist Party includes another group, who also recognize that we can not go on as before and whose program contains two points: the Estonian SSR absolutely must remain in the renewed USSR federation and the Estonian Communist Party must remain part of the CPSU. People have tried to avoid any compromise and calm debate on these issues, but today one would want to hear from speakers what resources the party and society have to offer other solutions. This subject requires a balanced discussion.

Moreover, some communists think that until changes at the higher level have occurred, we must continue to follow programs and directives in force in the CPSU. They recognize that the republic party organization must have its own plan of action, but it must be fully in line

with the general party directive and must primarily address local practical issues.

What can be said about this?

Independence for the Estonian Communist Party should not be understood in a oversimplified way, i.e., by contrasting it with the CPSU and its progressive wing. On the contrary, independence for the Estonian Communist Party implies the party defining itself as a political force. Otherwise, ties based on mutual respect and equality with the CPSU that is undergoing renewal are simply inconceivable. This means that the process of marshalling perestroika forces implies freedom for the Estonian Communist Party to choose its allies as well as area and extent of cooperation. The right of the Estonian Communist Party to make independent decisions will not be threatened under this constructive approach. I want to stress once again that secession is not a goal in itself but a necessary step for political cooperation. To progress we need not secession by any means but something more: cooperation with all progressive forces, mutual understanding, calm and political wisdom.

Some communists see radical change in the status of the Estonian Communist Party as a violation of their concept of unity of the CPSU and therefore an attempt to undermine the unity of the state. Misunderstanding is often fed by mutual distrust which has lasted for decades, historical injustice which has not yet been recognized and righted and a one-sided and distorted view of the future of social renewal in general.

We must understand that the scope and rate of perestroika processes are different in different regions of the USSR. Not to take this fact into account would not only be politically nearsighted from the point of view of democratization of society, but simply fatal. Thus, our republic has reached the point which requires a rapid shift to radical perestroika in the party itself.

Inaction cannot be justified by any talk of slowness of perestroika in the CPSU. Otherwise, the Estonian Communist Party will inevitably slide into the camp of perestroika opponents.

When we analyze social processes both in the Soviet Union and beyond its borders, we clearly see that we are dealing with a general crisis of communist Utopias, not with impotence or inaction of some party or organization. This creates the general background for the perestroika process, which is also complemented by the loss of old economic levers. Social processes are objective!

This point of view should be used to assess the different draft platforms submitted to the conference. I would probably express the view of the majority of the participants of this forum that these documents are not yet final. Especially since the CPSU platform for the 28th congress has become known, and it should also inspire new ideas in conference participants. I believe and hope that the conference will make substantive changes in these documents. All this creates a stronger foundation

for the future in-party discussion. Until the party finds courage to make fundamental changes in its own home, the faith of the people in perestroika and the party will continue to slide. We must do so, since there is no other way.

'Free Estonia' Association Program Published
90UN0992A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 6 Feb 90 p 1

[Program: "Tolerance, Competence and Cooperation: Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Association "Vaba Eesti" (Free Estonia)"]

[Text] I. The Role of 'Vaba Eesti' in Current Political Life

Estonia is moving toward independence. That is the greatest desire of the Estonian people and the foundation for our work. We are gathering around us those who realize the importance of this goal and are prepared to travel the road to it in such a way as to achieve a free, viable Estonia with the fewest possible losses and in the shortest possible period of time. As we recognize various paths to independence, we do not claim a monopoly on the truth. We stress the need for and importance of utilizing the Estonian people's social and historical experience to achieve this goal. We feel that as we reestablish a civil society in Estonia we must refrain from sweeping rejection and destruction of existing structures and mechanisms of social regulation; this could merely cause society to swing from one extreme to the other. Estonian independence should be achieved without social upheaval or violence, through negotiations and with respect for human rights and civil rights, for the rights of the Estonian people and of all the other ethnic groups living in Estonia.

We regard the current situation in Estonia as the justification for the establishment of our association; today efforts to impose a single version of the truth on people, political confrontation and excessive politicization of all decisions and problems threaten the unity of the people and the effectiveness of the steps taken by us. This prevents other peoples and states from understanding what is happening here. What we need now is serious work, not infighting; we need action and results in regard to realization of our people's best interests. We want to unite people of various nationalities who are prepared to participate in a real and competent way in resolving the important problems facing Estonia, people who wanted to and were capable of doing their jobs well even under difficult, unfavorable circumstances.

Our union does not aspire to unite the various social movements; it is an association of people who for the sake of achieving the highest goals are willing to be tolerant toward others and their differing political beliefs, who are striving to find a fruitful path for progress based on compromise. There are CPSU members in our organization, there are persons who were formerly members of that party, and there are non-party

members. We understand that in the past serving Estonia's interests often entailed carrying a party card; as a consequence of this a substantial portion of those who were the bearers of our people's intellectual energy and its most capable representatives were party members. Naturally our paths diverge with those joined the CPSU and then through their actions or their inaction harmed Estonia and her people. The efforts presently being made to prevent that organization from falling under the control of individuals who continue to think in the old way and deny Estonia's political interests are necessary, and we support this sort of action, which is rooted in a sense of guilt and responsibility.

In our ranks there are also many of the founders and present activists of the many people's movements in Estonia which are striving for democracy, whose highest goal is to create a democratic society in a free Estonia.

Among our members are participants in the citizens' movement which is attempting to convene an Estonian Congress, and there are also those who are skeptical of that movement. We feel that the role of the Estonian Congress in reestablishing Estonia as a sovereign state will depend upon how democratically its delegates are elected, how representative its members are, and what kind of decisions it makes.

At the same time we can also understand the mistrust on the part of many non-Estonians in regard to the citizens' committee movement, because positions which deprive hundreds of thousands of Estonia's current residents of a say in their fate could lead to a dangerous confrontation. We are seeking allies among those people and appeal to them to show understanding toward the Estonian Congress as a manifestation of the will of a large segment of Estonia's native population.

The "Vaba Eesti" democratic movement is striving to establish a democratic society in Estonia which will be based on the free self-determination of the people; the ethical basis for this aspiration is tolerance, and the basis for rule is competence and responsibility to society and its members. "Vaba Eesti" is striving through political and economic reforms to create in Estonia a life of human dignity and security, to protect human rights and civil liberties, and to prevent any kind of monopoly on power or totalitarianism.

"Vaba Eesti" regards voluntary joint efforts by the citizens of Estonia to reestablish the Estonian State based on the principles set forth in the peace treaty concluded between the Estonian Republic and Soviet Russia on 2 February 1920 as the means of achieving these goals.

II. The Fundamental Goals of "Vaba Eesti" and Their Realization

The fundamental goals of "Vaba Eesti" are as follows:

1) definition, creation and realization of the political and economic preconditions for Estonian independence;

2) reestablishment of Estonia as a subject of international law, and its involvement in the realization of the idea of a common European home through establishment of good-neighborly relations and cooperation with all the countries of Europe and with all the countries of the world, including the union republics which presently comprise the USSR;

3) formulation of an Estonian nationalities policy based on human rights, commonly recognized standards of international law and civil liberties, and recognition of and guarantees for the rights of all ethnic communities in Estonia;

4) active participation in the organization of elections to organs of state authority and the drafting of legislative acts pertaining to the status of people's deputies, nomination of candidates for deputy and the formation of organs of state authority; the objective of all these things is to ensure competence, responsibility and stability in the way the society of the future Estonia will be governed;

5) reliable information for the citizens of Estonia regarding the economic situation and the possible consequences of all political and economic reforms, with the goal of creating a situation in which the people have a choice and are involved in the making of all vitally important decisions;

6) expression of active and open displeasure with deception, personal ambition, suspicion and intolerance in Estonia's political affairs;

7) realization of joint efforts by all the ethnic groups residing in Estonia to solve Estonia's problems, and opposition to those forces which represent great-power chauvinism and a fervently nationalistic way of thinking;

8) clear-cut dissociation from people whose hands and consciences are unclean, and the taking of legal steps against those individuals who were personally involved in decisions and acts directed against the Estonia people or were actively involved in the criminal implementation of Stalinist-Brezhnevist policy in Estonia;

9) focusing of the creative energy of all honest people on solving the problems of the future Estonia.

III. The Programmatic Theses of 'Vaba Eesti'

The objective of "Vaba Eesti" is a democratic, multi-party political system based on separation of powers and free expression of the people's will. This system will be based on a correlation between the rights and responsibilities of the individual and contractual relationships with others, and a balance between self-government and central authority.

"Vaba Eesti" recognizes the right of each person to choose his or her party allegiance and rejects any pressure in that regard, but party interests should not be placed above the people's overall interests.

A free press is a guarantee of a democratic state system. It is based on the right of publications to have their own political line and the right of journalists to have their own opinions. Yet at the same time legislation is needed to protect the aesthetic foundations of society, as well as the honor and dignity of citizens in the event that willfully false information is disseminated about them.

The Law-Governed State

The objective of "Vaba Eesti" is to strive to create a secure and just state system. Every citizen of Estonia should be protected from infringement on his or her person and legitimate interests.

In order to achieve this it is necessary to ensure the strictest observance of law and order and the inevitability of the apprehension and punishment of criminals.

A law-governed state cannot be established by ignoring bad laws, else it will merely serve to introduce new ones. The state and politicians should set an example of respect for and compliance with laws.

Protection for both state and private property should be exercised on an equal basis. "Vaba Eesti" approves of all the humanitarian principles of penal policy in a democratic society, including the statute of limitations on crimes. "Vaba Eesti" deems mass repressions to be a crime against humanity on which there is no statute of limitations.

Nationalities Policy

A genuinely free and secure Estonia is possible only through close cooperation with the people living in Estonia who recognize the right of Estonia's native population to self-determination. "Vaba Eesti" is working to achieve that sort of cooperation and is striving to create preconditions and guarantees for this.

"Vaba Eesti" feels that Estonian society should guarantee human rights and civil liberties to all its citizens regardless of their nationality. A democratic Estonia should within its territory provide opportunities for the development of all ethnic groups' national cultures.

The society of free Estonia will be responsible for the fate of all the people living here. Toward this end we must have civil tranquility.

Unity and Cooperation

The goal of "Vaba Eesti" is to avoid fragmentation of Estonian society into numerous parties carrying on petty feuding among themselves. "Vaba Eesti" strives to achieve cooperation between all the citizens' movements, organizations and parties which have Estonian independence among their goals. Only the solidarity of our people and cooperation among its leaders can save Estonia and ensure the survival of its people. Any act which attempts to divide society in Estonia or objectively tends toward that outcome lends support to those forces which do not recognize the Estonian people's right

to self-determination and want to perpetuate the present ideology and power structure, who have led us down a dead-end road of national and economic development.

It is clear that without radical democratic reforms through the entire Soviet Union and without dismantling of the monolithic empire our objectives could prove illusory. Therefore we regard the democratic organizations and movements in Russia and the other union republics which hold principles similar to our as our allies, and we will work to develop active collaboration with them.

Our position presumes good relations with our neighbors.

Cooperation with our countrymen living outside Estonia will be one factor in the rapid development of Estonian society.

Social Policy

"Vaba Eesti" regards our people and the intellectual potential of the people, as the most valuable resource for Estonia's development. The future of Estonia lies in preservation of its culture, a progressive educational structure and science-intensive production.

The goal of "Vaba Eesti" is a stable family, so that mental warmth and protection will be extended to children, the elderly and the handicapped.

"Vaba Eesti" defends freedom of conscience and strives for cooperation with the church for the purpose of restoring the values of our people's moral ideals.

"Vaba Eesti" will be the initiator and supporter of efforts to protect and restore the Estonian environment and our entire biosphere.

Economic Policy

"Vaba Eesti" regards IME [Self Managing Estonia] as the path to the building of a democratic society and the preparation of its economic foundations. "Vaba Eesti" regards as correct realization of the principles of liberal economic policy, aimed at creation of a market economy.

In addition, "Vaba Eesti" deems it essential to avoid crises during the process of economic realignment which could substantially worsen the people's economic situation and result in greater social injustice.

The Army

"Vaba Eesti" is working to achieve a nuclear-free Northern Europe and a demilitarized Estonia. The first steps on this path are as follows:

- gradual reduction in the number of Soviet Army troops stationed in Estonia;
- creation of national-territorial military units;

- creation of a system for alternative military service;
- the swiftest possible drafting of legislation regulating military service.

Political Culture

The foundation of political life is a great sense of responsibility on the part of politicians, their honesty to their people, and respect for dissidents and political opponents.

"Vaba Eesti" supports all who oppose the introduction of Stalinist and Brezhnevist methods into our new policy, regardless of the ends toward which they are employed. Propaganda inciting new witch hunts for "enemies of the people" and sowing mistrust and suspicion toward entire large groups of people is unacceptable in our new political atmosphere. The policy of "Vaba Eesti" is not to search for opponents, but rather to win allies.

"Vaba Eesti" regards as essential the common responsibility of all influential political forces in Estonia for the people of Estonia and their future. "Vaba Eesti" values those political and social figures who are capable of foreseeing the possible political consequences of their political declarations and steps, who possess the ability to avoid social confrontations and turmoil which could slow down our democratic development.

A hallmark of political culture is the ability to acknowledge one's own mistakes, and the ability to renounce personal ambition for the sake of noble common goals.

It is just as unethical to speak on behalf of the people without being empowered to do so as it is to fail to use this authority when elected people's deputy.

Elections

"Vaba Eesti" supports the kind of elections which will result in organs of power being staffed by competent, trusted and responsible individuals, the kind of people about which the voters have had an opportunity to judge not just on the basis of their words, but also on the basis of their actions and their past history.

"Vaba Eesti" deems it very important that political life be revitalized and capable political leaders found in all regions of Estonia. We value an honest election campaign and feel it is beneath our dignity to look for ways of weighting elections in our favor.

"Vaba Eesti" feels that it is essential to observe the principle of balance between the people's democratically elected legislative organs and a strong executive branch. Therefore we support direct election of the head of state, *uye*zd elders and city mayors.

"Vaba Eesti" opposes attempts to supplant the people's freely elected organs of power with any parallel structures or to curtail their functions or boycott elections to them, because these things could cause divisiveness in Estonian society.

* * *

The democratic association "Vaba Eesti" (Free Estonia) is open to all who support and share the principles stated above.

We can only triumph through competence, tenacity, tolerance and cooperation.

Estonia-USSR Account Book Started

*18150131A Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian
30 Dec 89 p 1*

[Release: "The Press Bureau of the Estonian People's Front Announces"]

[Text] On December 29, the Estonian People's Front, the IME [Self-Managing Estonia] Problem Council and the Estonian Planning Committee started compiling the "Estonian and USSR Account Book" that would contain analyses, calculations, evaluations and back-up materials regarding economic and political relations between Estonia and the Soviet Union from the 1920's to the 1980's. These materials would form a basis for negotiations to be held with the USSR regarding Estonia's statehood, based on the principles inherent in the resolution of the USSR congress of deputies passed on 24 December, 1989 regarding "The political and legal evaluation of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939" and the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet's resolution on evaluating the events of 1940.

Under the leadership of recognized scientists and well-known personalities, task forces were formed to come up with research materials along the following lines:

- 1) Development of Estonia (economic potential and standard of living), as compared to adjacent regions (Russian Federation, Scandinavia etc.) for the years of 1920, 1940, 1960 and 1989.
- 2) The absence of economic and social factors that could have led up to a revolutionary situation in 1940.
- 3) Analysis of the 1920 peace treaty between Estonia and the Russian Federation, and of the economic negotiations accompanying it; the course of compliance, analysis of other agreements made between 1920 and 1939.
- 4) The [military] base agreement of 1939, and its course of compliance.
- 5) The November, 1940 price reform, and its-economic consequences.
- 6) The forced expropriation of holdings, and their subsequent turning over to the Soviet Union in 1940 and

1941. Activity of the Executive Committee of Nationalization. Description of properties taken over.

7) World War II war damages in Estonia, and Estonia's share of reparations paid to the Soviet Union.

8) Seizing of the Estonian SSR territory (beyond Narva and part of the Petseri region), and the unilateral changes made in the state boundaries.

9) Balance calculations regarding distribution of the national profit between Estonia and the Soviet Union. Analysis of property relations. The transfer of national profit through price and taxation policies. Estonia's share in investments made in other Union republics.

10) Analysis of the over-industrialization policy, its effect on the population processes and the social condition.

11) Breaking down the economic structure of an independent state, creating economic dependence.

12) Destruction of farms, forced collectivization of agriculture and over-forced production.

13) Destruction of people, deportations, and cases of people forced to leave Estonia. Resulting decline in the socio-economic potential and the quality of the population.

14) A violent disruption in the continuity of independent statehood, question of the legitimacy of power since 1940.

15) Economic and legal arrangements with Estonia for land and other property at the disposal of the Soviet army.

16) The mechanics of arriving at the current demographic situation. Effects of same on the Estonian nation.

17) The condition of resources of the Estonian Republic (gold reserves, among them) in other countries.

18) Stepping up of state Russification policy in the late 70's and early 80's.

Task forces were also formed for setting up organizational channels for gathering memoirs, conducting sociological research, and for involving Estonians abroad in the preparation of the account book.

Lithuanian Commission on Military Service of Lithuanian Citizens

90UM0443A Vilnyus SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
22 Feb 90 p 2

[Legislative enactment: "Enactment of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR on the Status of the USSR Armed Forces in This Republic and Military Service by Citizens of the Lithuanian SSR"]

[Text] Guided by the 7 February 1990 enactment of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet entitled "On the 1939 Soviet-German Treaties and Abrogation of Their Consequences for Lithuania," which declares the 21 July 1940 Lithuanian National Parliament Declaration of Accession to the USSR to be unlawful, inasmuch as it fails to express the will of the Lithuanian people, and to be therefore null and void, and which further declares that the 3 August 1940 USSR Law on Acceptance of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is unlawful and is therefore not legally binding on Lithuania, the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic hereby resolves:

1. To note that the presence of military forces of the USSR on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR is without legal foundation.

2. To form a government commission (list of membership annexed) and to instruct it to prepare by 1 April 1990 proposals pertaining to the status of the USSR Armed Forces in the Lithuanian SSR, as well as pertaining to military and alternative (labor) service by citizens of this republic, and to submit them to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR.

3. To declare that any actions by the USSR Armed Forces which could hinder or impede agencies of government authority and administration of the Lithuanian SSR in the performance of their constitutional functions shall be considered interference in the internal affairs of the Lithuanian SSR.

4. To direct Military Commissar of the Lithuanian SSR A. Visotskis to submit proposals pertaining to the recall of citizens of the Lithuanian SSR who are performing military service in the Transcaucasian Republics.

5. To direct Prosecutor of the Lithuanian SSR V. Barauskas not to turn over materials pertaining to criminal matters to the Military Procuracy of the USSR in regard to citizens of the Lithuanian SSR who are serving in the USSR Armed Forces and who leave their military units as a result of acts of violence carried out against them, without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR.

A. Brazauskas, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR

L. Sabutis, Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR

Vilnyus, 14 February 1990

Membership of Commission

Barauskas Vidutis—Prosecutor of the Lithuanian SSR.

Bichkauskas Egidyus—special investigator, Office of the Prosecutor of the Lithuanian SSR, USSR people's deputy.

Vinkus Antanas—Minister of Health of the Lithuanian SSR.

Visotskis Algimantas—Military Commissar of the Lithuanian SSR, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR.

Zhilinskayte Vitaute—member of the Lithuanian SSR Union of Writers, member of the Central Board of the Lithuanian Union of Women, deputy chairman of the Commission on Republic Youth Military Service Affairs under the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR.

Zabarauskas Vatslovas—Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Lithuanian SSR.

Ignotas Pyatras—Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR.

Kuris Pranas—Minister of Justice of the Lithuanian SSR, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR.

Laurinkus Mechis—senior scientific associate at the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Law, USSR people's deputy.

Laurinchukas Albertas—member of the Lithuanian SSR Union of Journalists, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR.

Matsaytis Alfonsas—First Secretary of the Central Committee of Lithuanian Komsomol, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR.

Olekas Yuozas—senior scientific associate at the microsurgery problems laboratory of the Faculty of Advanced Medical Training at Vilnius University, USSR people's deputy.

Sabutis Lyudvikas—Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR.

Stankyavichyus Laurinas—Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Security of the Lithuanian SSR.

Shadreyka Valeriyonas—Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Bar Association, chairman of the Commission on Republic Youth Military Service Affairs under the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR.

Yasukaytite Vidmante—member of the Lithuanian SSR Union of Writers, chairman of the Lithuanian Union of Women.

Statement to Estonian Residents on Demilitarization of Estonia

90UM0443B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by A. Ryuytel, I. Toome, and V. Vyalyas: "To the Residents of Estonia"]

[Text] The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR, the Government and the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee have taken a number of sequential steps to demilitarize the territory of Estonia and ultimately to achieve a nuclear-free North. Meetings between republic leaders and representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense commenced in Moscow on 5 February and will soon be continued in Tallinn. The purpose of these meetings is to settle at a governmental level the status of Soviet Armed Forces military units in Estonia and to resolve issues connected with military service by youths from Estonia.

We are concerned by relations between the civilian population and USSR military personnel stationed in Estonia, relations which have recently become strained, a situation which could greatly complicate progress in scheduled talks and achievement of the stated goals. Elements denouncing the reestablishment of our sovereignty are deliberately attempting to exert influence on Armed Forces personnel, but there has also been an increase in the number of instances of abusive treatment and harassment of military personnel and actions taken by certain authorities which are contrary to the law. Creation of artificial difficulties for the families of military personnel in their daily lives is contrary to the principles of a democratic society. Such politicization of problems connected with the military contains a serious danger to the resolution of Estonia's present problems. This can be avoided only if we treat Soviet Armed Forces officers and enlisted personnel with tolerance. After all, we want the same kind of treatment for soldiers of Estonian nationality who by force of circumstances are stationed on the territory of other union republics.

Let us give some thought to all this, and let us avoid unworthy behavior along the road toward a democratic state governed by rule of law, behavior which can also lead to dangerous consequences.

Latvian Place in Federation, Confederation Assessed

90UN1214A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 21 Feb 90 pp 1, 3

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences Vladimir Bepalko: "Between Two Extremes: Federation or Complete Independence?; the Views of a Technocrat"]

[Text] The thesis, that "the Latvian people, just as many other citizens of Latvia, want complete state independence," is now often heard as an axiom or an assertion that does not require proof. Moreover, it is automatically assumed that this is possible only upon withdrawal from the USSR. I don't think I have the right to decide what any nation wants or does not want; but the practical experience of society shows that any nation must first have normal conditions for developing its own culture, traditions and language, and the possibility of being the masters on its own soil. This is truly an axiom, and as an end does not require proofs.

When choosing the means for realizing an end, it is important not to confuse their positions. This can be shown in a simple example. For all these years we have been building socialism; but you see, socialism is not the end, it is only a means. As a result we have come to the point that, "The concrete means expressed in the classics (Marxism) for the choice of building materials for a new society have taken up the position of its ends, and these ends were shunted off somewhere on the periphery of ideology and political practice. In the same manner, the progress of the new society commenced to be measured not in terms of the extent to which it had overtaken the old with respect to production effectiveness, standard of living or development of democratic institutions, but in terms of socialization of property, forcing out the market with the Plan and individual farming with collective farming, and so on." (A. Izyumov, "A Task in Three Operations," LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 27 December 1989). And that is how the society came about, the illogic of which we ourselves marvel at.

We shall try to analyze the situation, based on a decision-making model consisting of three inseparable parts, typical for technical systems: the end, the means for achieving it, and limitations on the choice of means.

LATVIA OUTSIDE THE USSR. I have always read about the Latvia of the 1920's and 1930's with great interest, but it is surprising that there is almost no mention of what was around it then. Around it on the one side was a fragmented Europe, lurching toward World War II; and on the other side was the USSR, which was satisfied with its own calico and kerosene. During World War I the fronts passed through Latvia and laid waste to it, but this fate befell other countries of Europe as well, to one degree or another. One cannot say that Latvia's economy was rapidly flourishing under the conditions of Tsarist Russia, but it was a market economy, and the people knew what they were doing in that economy. Thus, Latvia's economy had the opportunity to walk in step with the other countries of Europe, which made its economy competitive. The real conditions also provided the means to reach the end: the complete independence of Latvia. Of course this means did not fall into their hands by itself; they had to fight for it: but the important thing is, that complete independence for Latvia was entirely possible in such circumstances, and it became a reality.

If one examines our situation today, completely different, **DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSITE** conditions prevail:

- * the present trend in Europe is toward convergence of states: to wit, the plan for creating a European Confederation;
- * the USSR's domestic market is tending toward openness, and Europe is showing obvious interest in ties with the USSR;
- * critical lags in technology, lack of a market structure and the inability of the people to work in such structures make

Latvia's competitive entry into the Western market practically impossible; and the largely warped economy which has come to pass is clearly oriented toward the Eastern market.

Logically, it is completely obvious that these **antithetical conditions must also produce a decision other than complete independence**, since complete independence and withdrawal from the USSR means breaking ties with the East, as well as inability to subscribe to the West's system of division of labor; that is, an incomprehensible natural economy, which no one will accept or understand. As we already know full well, failure to resolve economic problems inevitably involves political distortions in other spheres of the life of society as well.

All these thoughts boil down to one thing: complete independence, understood as restoration of the first republic, is impossible, no matter how much one wishes for it. It is true, one must say, that there is one instance in which one need not necessarily take the real conditions into consideration, if complete independence is made an end in itself. In this case, there would truly be a great deal of room for building abstract historical-legal structures, and there's nothing so terrible about that, until the impetuous desire appears to rough-hew the realities of life in order to squeeze them into these abstractions. Theoretically there is no particular difference between those who in the good old days, to satisfy the plan, divided the workers of the land into kulaks [rich peasants] and bednyaks [poor peasants], and those who are presently trying to divide the residents of Latvia into true citizens and those who are not. And they are doing this not because they are bad people, but because the people living in Latvia right now are not those sober-minded people of the 1920's and 30's, but people who are to a certain degree infected with the bacilli of neostalinism; and this is terrible because we already quite often automatically try replace the ends with the means, and wind up with pseudo-ends; and even a normal person cannot comprehend the incomprehensible.

At the present time one also encounters the following thoughts: We want to withdraw from the USSR, but preserve economic and other ties. At the same time one must very clearly comprehend that the strength of economic and ecological interrelationships, the definite role of the Baltic in the world military confrontation, and the degree of blood relationships and other ties are such, that calling such independence complete would be only a formality, whereas in reality it would be something else. The desire to preserve these ties must have clear-cut and unambiguous legal formulation; otherwise the idea of a Latvia outside the USSR would be very much like the idea of a man who has thrown his comrade to the wolves. This subjective factor is already being felt, and were it given room to develop, the ties could be brought to naught. A greater or lesser flow of those desiring to leave Latvia, which is inevitable because of insufficient experience in democracy, will only aggravate that effect. It is also completely obvious that by withdrawing from the USSR

and weakening a progressive minority in the Armed Forces of the USSR, we are in principle sawing off the branch of perestroika on which we are sitting.

All the preceding is not intended to frighten anyone with the gloomy prospects of full independence, but comes from a desire to help overcome certain stereotypes. One can understand people for whom the pictures from the past are attractive (the moresos, because they paint them using only a palette with bright tones); but, one must proceed from the fact that the future always has tones of the unfamiliar and even the alien.

LATVIA WITHIN A FEDERATION. We have become convinced, based on the experience of the last 50 years, that even a federation is not viable as a form of state structure, since the center to which part of the rights of the federation members has been delegated, has constantly drifted from federative principles to those of a unitarian state, and has been unable to create effective mechanisms for regulating relations among the republics. Apparently, such a principle of state structure in general is possible only given a **certain critical mass of homogeneity** of the entities forming the federation, or else there will always be a tendency to drift toward a unitarian state. As we can see from the development of events at present, to the extent that there was homogeneity in the USSR, it was more likely to be artificially imposed, than there actually was and is objective homogeneity. Aside from the obvious differences in the levels of social and economic development of the republics, the transition of the Baltic States from the ideals of socialism to the ideals of their path in the 1920's and 30's has made a great contribution to the increasing degree of heterogeneity. And without complex theories it is clear that belief in what was perhaps not the best variant, but a variant that was already tried, in the 1920's and 30's, is much greater than belief in renewed socialism, of which nothing is intelligibly known. That which is understood under a renewed federation apparently entails voluntarily delegating a more limited amount of rights to the center and makes the federation more democratic; but this nevertheless does not change its essence. It must be acknowledged as a fact, that the entire preceding experience of the Baltic States is set against delegating any rights at all, in any form at all, which also negates the federation as a means of further development.

A CONFEDERATE LATVIA. One can briefly summarize the above as a certain impasse: **Withdrawal from the federation is necessary; withdrawal from the Union is lacking in reality.** However, from my own point of view, the European trend toward convergence of states and the clear trends in the USSR toward centrifugal effects meet at a single point, called confederation (By definition, a confederation is a community of states which, as distinguished from a federation, do not delegate their rights to the center, but closely coordinate their actions in certain areas). It is completely obvious that a united Europe, carefully considering a boundless Soviet market for sales and a rich source of raw materials, does not need a Latvia without close ties with the USSR. The availability

of cheap manpower, good facilities for production of consumer goods for the USSR market, and developed communications make the Baltic States an ideal buffer between the eastern and western markets. As far as the degree of independence is concerned, it must correspond with this function as a buffer. **A confederation simultaneously combines the legally-established natural aspiration of the Baltic States to independence, and their desire to not break the ties that have evolved.** At the same time the shape of Latvia is transformed in a completely different way: it becomes like a friend, who takes upon himself the common concerns. As distinguished from independent states, which may or may not have close ties among themselves, the members of a confederation, guided only by their own laws, nevertheless are obliged to coordinate their actions in the agreed spheres. At the same time there must be clear-cut mechanisms for organization of such coordination. The relations which actually exist right now in Europe serve as an example of economic confederation relations, in which strict quotas for production of certain products promote the strong interdependence of their economies. Naturally, the dialog on specific legal and economic mechanisms must be led by specialists and not dilettantes.

As the Second Congress of USSR Deputies showed, a number of other republics are also gravitating toward a confederated union to one degree or another. The center may also be convinced of the constructiveness and compromise of confederation status for the Baltic Republics, primarily on the basis of pragmatic considerations: After all, the Baltic Littoral could operate as a bridge between Europe and the Union only if a new economic mechanism which corresponds to this function is given room to operate.

Such an approach would undoubtedly also influence the solution of other problems of the development of society. It is doubtful that there could be much discussion of candidates for citizenship in such a Latvia. The status of military units in such a Latvia would be defined as "non-occupational," and the basis for their withdrawal would not be speculative discussions, but the real processes of disarmament, and so on; but this is elaborating on the subject and is beyond the scope of the article.

Currently it is popular to accuse the forces in the NFL [Latvian People's Front], which stand for withdrawal from the USSR, of extremism; while those in the Latvian Communist Party who stand for federation are being accused of betraying the interests of the people. It seems to me that we should be grateful to both of these points of view for delineating the bounds within which the golden mean is found, around which, as we all know, the truth is occasionally found.

It just seems to us that we are making a choice among the variants of federation, confederation and independence. But the end for us is to understand the fact of the place History has dealt us, and the struggle for it. The fate of Latvia in recent decades has been complex; one could simply say that God has turned His back on Latvia.

Right now History has given us a chance, but this chance is only for the wise; for the stupid it is only an occasion to add to the already-full chest of its unhappiness.

Latvia's Independent Komsomol Rules Published

90UN1214B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 14 Feb 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Rules of the LKSM of Latvia"]

[Text] The Leninist Communist Young People's League of Latvia is an independent socio-political youth organization, which expresses, defends and realizes the interests and rights of its members.

The Komsomol of Latvia shall build mutual relations with the All-Union Leninist Komsomol [VLKSM] with the rights of an organization which itself defines all the norms of its internal activities.

The provisions of the VLKSM Rules on its central organs shall be an exception.

The Latvian Komsomol shall organize its activities in accordance with the Constitution of the Latvian SSR, on the basis of the present Komsomol Rules and Program, and shall have its own symbol.

I. Organizational Structure of the Latvian Komsomol

1. The Youth League shall consist of members which voluntarily unite in primary organizations, and those in the respective rayon (city) organizations which comprise the Komsomol.

2. Primary organizations shall be created on the basis of production-territorial, professional or functional bases, with no less than three Komsomol members who desire to unite with a given organization.

Primary organizations created on a professional or functional basis may, if the Komsomol members wish, unit with rayon, city, or other territorial associations, as well as republic associations (sections, associations, unions and the like) with the right of representation in the corresponding Komsomol committee.

All primary Komsomol organizations shall have equal rights, both in their own activities, and in the formation of higher administrative organs. Rayon, city, republic and other organizations on a professional or functional basis shall possess the rights of rayon or city Komsomol organizations.

3. The following principles lie at the basis of intra-league relations:

—the ability to elect all administrative organs, from top to bottom: The procedure for holding elections shall be determined by the participants in the meetings, conferences and congresses themselves. Direct election of any administrative committees of the Komsomol, the election of committee membership, and so on

may be secret (closed) or open. In connection with the elections, those taking part in them may nominate any number of candidatures. An unlimited number of candidatures shall be entered in the voting lists;

—accountability of the leading organs and their members before their elected organizations: at least once a year Komsomol committee members shall conduct sessions of accountability for their activities in the organizations which elected them, with an expression of their vote of confidence. In case of a vote of no-confidence by the majority of the organizations, new elections shall be held ahead of schedule;

—respect for majority and minority rights: The interests of the majority shall be guaranteed by its right to speak in the name of the entire organization, and by the mandatory nature of the decisions taken for all Komsomol organizations, provided they are not in conflict with the Rules of the Latvian Komsomol; the position of the minority in the life of the organization shall be considered, and it shall have the right to appeal to public opinion and strive to implement its proposals, right down to setting up an independent primary organization.

4. The Latvian Komsomol shall give priority to the primary organization, which is the basis for the Young People's League.

Primary organizations shall have the right:

—to work out their own programs and platforms of actions, provided they are not in conflict with the Program and Rules of the Latvian Komsomol;

—to define priority directions, forms and methods of action, their own structure and leading organs, and to have their own budget;

—to independently resolve all questions associated with membership in the Latvian Komsomol.

—to nominate their own representatives to higher Komsomol organs and to take part in their selection in accordance with established procedure, and if necessary recall them from the leading organs; and,

—to carry out economic and publishing activity in accordance with legally-established procedure, and to be a juridical person;

A primary organization shall be established by decision of a meeting and shall be registered at the higher organizations. A primary organization shall cease to exist if there are fewer than three Komsomol members in it.

II. Higher Organs of the Latvian Komsomol

1. The higher organs of the Latvian Komsomol shall be: in the republic, the congress; in the rayon and city, the conference or assembly; and in the primary organization, the assembly or conference.

2. The Latvian Komsomol Congress shall:

- be held at least once in two years, and shall be convened by decision of a plenum of the Latvian Komsomol Central Committee, or upon demand of primary organizations comprising no less than one-fifth of the total membership of the Latvian Komsomol;
- adopt the Program and Rules of the Latvian Komsomol, and introduce amendments to them;
- form the leading and controlling organs;
- approve the provision on Latvian Komsomol control and inspection commissions;
- determine the status of mass information organs and confirm their leaders; and,
- elect the Latvian Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary (for a term of no more than two complete convocations).

3. In the period between congresses, the activities of the Latvian Komsomol shall be guided by a plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee.

Upon decision of a Central Committee plenum, a conference may be convened for introducing amendments to the Program and Rules of the Latvian Komsomol, and for the examination of urgent political and internal questions.

4. The Latvian Komsomol Central Committee Plenum shall:

- coordinate the work of Latvian Komsomol organizations;
- realize the right of legislative initiatives;
- approve the decisions of plenums of rayon and city Komsomol organizations for recall and special election of members of leading and controlling organs;
- examine and approve the budget of the Latvian Komsomol, and the budget of republic control and inspection commissions of the Latvian Komsomol;
- choose the first secretary of the Latvian Komsomol Central Committee in case he is replaced between Komsomol congresses. In this case the decision shall be put into effect if no less than two-thirds of the Central Committee membership vote for it;
- upon the proposal of the Central Committee First Secretary, elect the secretariat of the Latvian Komsomol Central Committee to carry out the ongoing work and supervise the staff of the Latvian Komsomol Central Committee;
- elect and define the authority of the Latvian Komsomol Central Committee Bureau, for leadership during the period between Latvian Komsomol Central Committee Plenums.

5. Conferences of Rayon or City Organizations shall:

- be convened by decision of a plenum of a rayon (city) Komsomol committee or by primary organizations comprising no less than one-third of the total membership of the rayon (city) organization; a rayon (city) conference or assembly shall be conducted at least once in every two years;
- form and define the functions and authority of its subordinate committees;
- determine the amount of membership dues transferred to the rayon (city) Komsomol organization, but not less than the norms stipulated in the Rules of the Latvian Komsomol;
- elect organs for controlling the activities of the organization, and establish the procedure of their work; and,
- elect representatives to the Latvian Komsomol central organs, and if necessary recall them.

Republic and rayon (city) electoral organs of the Latvian Komsomol shall enjoy the right of a juridical person, and shall have their own press and bank account, and shall enjoy the right to publish.

6. Assemblies of primary organizations shall be convened as necessary; accounting and election assemblies shall convene at least once a year, or by decision of no less than one-third of their members.

7. Controlling Organs. The system of control of the Latvian Komsomol shall embrace members of the Young People's League, assemblies, conferences and the Latvian Komsomol Congress, as well as Komsomol committees elected by them and the control and inspection commissions, in the process of ensuring uniformity of decisions with the higher Komsomol organs and their execution.

Control and inspection commissions of primary, rayon and city Komsomol organizations and the Republic Control and Inspection Commission shall be formed as permanently-operating organs of control, and shall be elected at a session of the higher organ of the Latvian Komsomol at the corresponding level. Control and inspection commissions of the Latvian Komsomol shall operate on the basis of the Statute on Control and Inspection Commissions in the Latvian Komsomol, approved by a congress of the Latvian Komsomol; and in their activities shall be answerable only to the higher organ of their level, which elected them.

Functions of the control and inspection commissions of Komsomol organizations include monitoring the activities of all organs of the Latvian Komsomol at the corresponding levels, the apparatus subordinate to them and created at their level or with their participation, at enterprises, institutions and organizations, in accordance with the Statute on Control and Inspection Commissions in the Latvian Komsomol.

III. Membership in the Latvian Komsomol

1. Any young person under the age of 30 living in Latvia, who acknowledges the Rules and Program of the Latvian Komsomol, who takes part in their realization in one of the primary organizations, and who pays membership dues, may be a member of the Latvian Komsomol.

2. A member of the Latvian Komsomol shall have the right to:

—choose the primary organization in which he is enrolled and take part in its work;

—nominate, elect and be elected to Komsomol organs;

—appeal for the support of the organization for realization of his own interests, and for defense of his legal rights;

—freedom of speech and criticism in the affairs of his primary organization, and of any organ of the Latvian Komsomol;

—personally participate in examination of questions of his activities;

—receive information at the disposal of any organ of the Latvian Komsomol;

—be a member of and take part in the work of any political and social organizations and movements, the activities of which do not conflict with the Rules and Program of the Latvian Komsomol; and,

—voluntarily leave the Komsomol, after presenting written declaration to the primary organization and returning his membership card.

3. A member of the Latvian Komsomol shall be obliged to:

—observe the Rules and carry out the Program of the Latvian Komsomol;

—pay his membership dues;

—show concern for the prestige of the Latvian Komsomol;

—be patient with those expressing a different opinion and defending views different from his own; and,

—promote mutual understanding among the nations.

4. Reception to membership in the Latvian Komsomol shall be on a voluntary basis.

Procedure for reception:

—the applicant for membership in the Latvian Komsomol shall present a personal declaration requesting acceptance;

—the question of reception shall be decided at an assembly of the primary organization by simple majority vote;

—on the basis of the decision taken, the primary organization shall present the applicant his membership card.

5. The decision on discontinuing membership in the Latvian Komsomol shall be taken by the primary organization on the basis of:

—the individual statement of the member of the Latvian Komsomol;

—in accordance with reaching the age-limit for membership in the Latvian Komsomol; and,

—in connection with expulsion from the Latvian Komsomol.

A member of the Latvian Komsomol shall be expelled from the Latvian Komsomol for failure to observe the Rules of the Latvian Komsomol, upon decision of an assembly of the primary organization, by simple majority vote.

Persons expelled from the Latvian Komsomol shall have the right for sixty days thereafter to submit an appeal to the higher Komsomol organs.

IV Material-Financial Base of the Latvian Komsomol

1. The property of the Latvian Komsomol shall consist of the material and financial assets of the primary organizations, Komsomol commissions, and economic and budget formations subordinate to the Komsomol.

2. The financial assets of the Latvian Komsomol shall be derived from membership dues; income from publishing, tourist-excursion and similar kinds of activities; and deductions from the profits of economic enterprises, state investments and similar sources.

3. Membership dues to the Latvian Komsomol shall be established by the rayon and city conferences of the young people's league:

a) for workers—not less than 5 rubles per quarter; for those with no income, 1 ruble per quarter; or,

b) not less than one percent of one's monthly income.

Persons joining the Latvian Komsomol shall pay induction dues, respectively, as follows:

a) in the amount of the quarterly dues; or

b) fixed (for workers—5 rubles; for those without income—1 ruble).

Note: A disability pension shall not be counted as part of one's monthly income.

4. Procedure for expenditure of assets of each primary organization shall be determined independently with the condition that up to 70 percent of the dues shall remain at the disposal of the primary Komsomol organizations.

5. Members of the young people's league who are on vacation or on maternity leave shall not be required to pay membership dues for the given period.

6. A primary Komsomol organization may establish additional dues, the amounts and procedure for payment of which shall be established independently.

March 1 Latvian Supreme Soviet Session Information Report

90UN1217A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
2 Mar 90 p 1

[LATINFORM Report: "Fifteenth Session of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Eleventh Convocation"]

[Text] On 1 March the work of the 15th Session of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, the 11th Convocation, continued. Of the 319 deputies of the Supreme Soviet, 252 deputies assembled in the hall of the Political Education Building of the Latvian CP Central Committee. Invited to the session were members of the government of the Latvian SSR who are not deputies of the republic Supreme Soviet, People's Deputies of the USSR from the Latvian SSR, chairmen of rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies and their executive committees, leaders of social organizations, including first secretaries of party raykoms and gorkoms, leaders of agencies, and other responsible officials, officials of the republic Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers associated with the questions examined at the session, and officials of the Latvian SSR State Committee on Television and Radio, and the press.

Republic Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Gorbunov opened the morning meeting of the session. He proposed beginning the discussion with those questions of which the discussion had begun prior to the break in the work of the session.

One such question was, "On Alternative (Labor) Service." Republic Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman, Deputy L. Bartkevich, was given the floor to report on the commission's work on the draft law.

Speaking next were USSR People's Deputy Yu. Zakis and People's Front Duma member E. Repshe. Just as at the previous Supreme Soviet session in February, there was disagreement on the question of the periods of alternative service. It was proposed to make them equal to the periods of actual service, and for those who graduate from higher academic institutions, to reduce them to 12 months. However, the majority of the deputies came to the conclusion that such periods cannot be accepted as equal and they cannot serve as a criterion for a draftee. After clarifying certain other points, the Law of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, "On Alternative (Labor) Service," was passed.

The Supreme Soviet once again took up the questions, "On the Latvian SSR Draft Law, 'On Introducing

Amendments and Supplements to the Latvian SSR Housing Code,' and 'On Partial Suspension of Effectiveness on the Territory of the Latvian SSR of Certain Decisions of the Government of the USSR on Questions of Distributing to Certain Categories of Persons, Privileges in Providing them Living Space.'" From the report of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers Administrator of Affairs K. Litsis and the deputies' remarks it became clear that, on the examination of these questions as a whole, consensus was reached with the military men taking part in the work of the commission. The session adopted the law and the resolution on these questions by absolute majority vote.

Upon the report of V. Miller, deputy chairman of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Legislative Proposals, the Supreme Soviet adopted the resolution, "On Putting into Effect the Law of the USSR and the Resolutions of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Territory of the Latvian SSR." This resolution ratified the USSR Law, "On Introducing Amendments and Supplements to the USSR Law, 'On Cooperative Societies in the USSR,'" and a number of resolutions of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The next question on the agenda to be discussed was, "On Putting into Effect the Law of the USSR of 23 December 1989, 'On Constitutional Oversight in the USSR,' on the Territory of the Latvian SSR." Speakers were USSR People's Deputy Yu. Boyars and Deputies A. Berzinsh, P. Masalitin and G. Zemribo. The third point of the resolution gave rise to discussion, which expressed the impossibility of including a representative of the Latvian SSR in the USSR Constitutional Oversight Commission, since the first point does not recognize the right of the state organs of power of the USSR to implement oversight over the Constitution and laws of a sovereign republic. However, real political action demands elementary knowledge about that which will take place in the committee. Therefore the resolution was adopted with an amended version of the third point.

The session passed Laws of the Latvian SSR, "On Introducing Amendments and Supplements to the Criminal, Criminal-Process and Corrective-Labor Code of the Latvian SSR," and "On Introducing Amendments and Supplements to the Latvian SSR Code on Marriage and the Family and to Certain Other Legislative Acts of the Latvian SSR."

The Supreme Soviet resolved to extend the authority of the Latvian SSR Supreme Court until the new membership of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet is elected.

The session relieved certain people's judges of the Moskovskiy and Kirovskiy Rayons of the City of Riga before expiration of their term.

Next, upon a report by Latvian SSR Justice Minister V. Skudry, questions were examined on the Latvian SSR Draft Law, "On Amendments to Articles 152 and 155 of the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Latvian SSR," on the Latvian SSR Draft Law, "On the Oath of

Judges and People's Chairmen of the Latvian SSR," and on approving the clause on disciplinary liability of judges, and on recall and relieving judges and people's chairmen of the Latvian SSR before expiration of their term. The corresponding documents and text of the oath were adopted.

Latvian SSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman, Deputy L. Bartkevich, presented information of the Latvian SSR government on measures taken to carry out the government program for ensuring the functioning of the Latvian language in state, social, cultural and other spheres. Adding to and discussing this information were Latvian SSR ministers of public education, internal affairs, health-care and trade A. Buylis, B. Shteynbrik, E. Platkais and R. Salputra; and, A. Lazdynsh, chairman of the republic State Fuel and Energy Committee. Adopted unanimously was a resolution in which, specifically, the republic Council of Ministers promised to continue work on practical realization of the government program for assuring the study of the state language. Special attention must be paid to study of the language in academic institutions, and also by officials at organs of state power and administration and those officials of institutions, enterprises and organizations who by virtue of the type of work they do, must continually communicate with citizens.

People's Judges of the city of Yurmaly and the Moskovskiy Rayon of the city of Riga were confirmed.

Next Latvian SSR Supreme Court Chairman, Deputy G. Zemribo, spoke on the question of supplementing Article 11 of the Latvian SSR Law, "On the Legal System of the Latvian SSR." Taking part in its discussion were republic Gosarbitrazh Chief Arbitrator G. Narkevich, Deputy A. Berzinsh and USSR People's Deputy V. Skudra. A law was passed according to which the position of a judge is incompatible with membership in political parties or socio-political organizations.

The session heard a report by Deputy V. Miller, chairman of a commission formed by the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium for legal analysis of the election held for chairman of the executive committee of the Riga City Soviet of People's Deputies. Discussion of this question was begun.

On 2 March the session will continue its work.

March 2 Latvian Supreme Soviet Session Information Report

90UN1217B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
3 Mar 90 p 1

[LATINFORM Report: "Fifteenth Session of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Eleventh Convocation"]

[Text] Discussion continued on 2 March on the report given by Deputy V. Miller, chairman of the commission formed by the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium for a

legal analysis of the election held for chairman of the Riga City Soviet of People's Deputies. Immediately after the concluding speeches at the 1 March evening session by Riga City Soviet Deputy Chairman M. Gavrilov and City Soviet People's Deputy Ya. Dinevich—Riga City Soviet Chairman A. Teykmanis, USSR People's Deputy A. Kautsen, Riga City Soviet Deputy A. Belaychuk and Deputies V. Kalnberz and M. Raman joined in the discussion. During the course of the discussion of this controversial situation, various opinions—sometimes contradictory opinions—were expressed, and legal explanations were heard.

The amendment to the laws adopted on local self-government states that in case the established number of deputies do not show up for a session, the session shall be convened again, and shall be competent if no less than half the elected deputies take part in it.

The resolution, "On Election of the Chairman of the Riga City Soviet of People's Deputies," also adopted at the session, specifically states: "In consideration of the defects which occurred in the course of the election of the chairman of the executive committee of the Riga City Soviet of People's Deputies in terms of procedural questions, which gave rise to differing analyses of the principle of secret balloting among one part of the deputies and refusal to take part in the voting, we recommend that the Riga City Soviet of People's Deputies hold repeat elections, or vote again for the ispolkom chairman."

Next, approval was granted for a commission to work out measures for restoring Latvian economic and political independence.

In response to a question from one of the deputies, USSR People's Deputy I. Bisher described in detail the 27 February meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev and six people's deputies from the Baltic republics.

At the concluding meeting of the 15th session, which wrapped up the work of the 11th Convocation of the Supreme Soviet, the Latvian SSR Draft Law "On Banks," was examined first. Professor E. Zelgalvis of the Latvian University, chairman of the commission for drawing up the draft law, delivered a report on this question. Taking part in discussion of the draft were Board Chairman of the Latvian Republic Bank of USSR Vneshekonombank A. Kerre, USSR People's Deputies I. Bisher and Yu. Boyars, and Deputies G. Zemribo and A. Praude. The Law on Banks was adopted after the discussion.

Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretary I. Daudish provided a legal analysis of the decision of the session of the Daugavpils City Soviet of People's Deputies of 22 February 1990, on holding a referendum in the city on the question of the sovereignty of the Latvian SSR. Taking part in discussion of this question were Deputy V. Zharkov, and USSR People's Deputies A. Tsurulis and A. Plotnieks. By majority vote the session overturned the decision of the Daugavpils City Soviet of

People's Deputies on holding a referendum-survey in the city on the question of the sovereignty of the Latvian SSR, as not in accordance with the law.

Next, on suggestion of the republic Council of Ministers, the session adopted a resolution on regulating import and export of goods to and from the Latvian SSR.

The deputies' questions and concerns were answered.

The Supreme Soviet sent a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev and Dmitriy Yazov, requesting that they do not permit deployment on the territory of the Latvian SSR, troop contingents withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact nations. The session also adopted an appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet, requesting not to use young men from Latvia, drafted for a term of military service, in resolving inter-ethnic disputes in other regions of the country.

A. Gorbunov delivered the concluding speech at the session. He thanked the deputies of the republic Supreme Soviet, the 11th Convocation, for their bountiful work in this transitional period in the life of Latvia.

Bisher on Gorbachev-Baltic Deputies Meeting

90UN1217C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 6 Mar 90 pp 3-4

[LATINFORM Report: "Speech by USSR People's Deputy I. Bisher"]

[Text] Esteemed Deputies! Permit me to begin with a slight digression, which is nevertheless very closely tied to the main thing I want to say. And that is obviously the latest session, in which you took part. For you are completing a major step in your work. This has been a difficult time, a time of great changes and great transformations, in which you had to dash some of your own beliefs, re-evaluate a great many things, and acquire the ability to operate in completely new circumstances. We all know how the elections took place, when you became deputies, and who actually chose them. But, in spite of that, during the days of national awakening, at the moment of the reform and restructuring of the state, when the people came to the forefront of the political arena, you nevertheless found in yourselves the strength to listen to its voice, to act in accordance with its summons, and to pass the laws which the majority needed. And therefore, I, as an elector, want to say to you, thank you very much.

Of course, you were subjected to criticism also. But you shall keep your place in history because you took principled decisions—the Declarations of State Sovereignty and that of an Independent Republic. These were most principled decisions, and just let anyone try to denigrate them. You have expressed your will; and now, it is up to the government, to the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and up to us, the USSR People's Deputies, whether these decisions will be concretely fulfilled or not.

All that has been said is interconnected with that which is now taking place in Moscow, and with what we are

doing there as USSR People's Deputies. You see, we too have a mandate from the people. At the same time, we are trying to coordinate our activity with the decisions which you have taken. And therefore, on the first day of the present session, when the agenda was being discussed, deputies from Lithuania and Estonia presented initiatives in accordance with the declarations of independence which their parliaments had passed—to begin direct talks with the USSR Supreme Soviet on realizing these declarations. In our republic such a declaration had not yet been adopted; therefore, we were unable to officially present such a demand. But Deputy Yu. Boyars nevertheless expressed his support, believing that in the near future, in two days, you would also be discussing this question. And he was not mistaken; you actually did adopt this declaration.

These declarations have principally changed the political situation in our country and our relation to all the processes which have already commenced in our republics. The highest leadership of the USSR paid heed to these invitations for direct negotiations, and preparatory work to conduct these negotiations has already begun. In this connection the USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman has requested that I offer suggestions on what our platform at these negotiations might look like. At that moment I was obliged to reply that I could express only my own personal point of view, since I did not have authority from you, and the Supreme Soviet had not yet expressed its attitude. And I presented him my own proposals, stressing that this is my own personal point of view. We acquainted the deputies of Lithuania and Estonia, who had the appropriate authority, with these positions. They believe that my personal suggestions are in line with the positions of their republics, as ideas which might be made the basis of our negotiations.

And then, on the 27th during the session, Comrade Gorbachev turned to me and asked me to organize a meeting with representatives of our three republics, at which he wanted to discuss a number of questions. He invited two representatives from each of the republics. It was quite difficult to set it up on such short notice, since he wanted to hold the meeting right after the session. After consulting with the deputies taking part in the session, with the majority of them at least, from the numerous candidates from our meeting, M. Vulfson and I went to the meeting. Lithuania recommended Deputies Vilkasa and Prunskene; and Estonia—Lauristin and Nugisa. As a result, the meeting took place. At the meetings we discussed the questions on how it would be possible to define the future status of our republics, in accordance with those declarations which you and the parliaments of the neighboring republics passed; and, the question on how to define the status of our republics if the resolutions of 1940 are acknowledged to be invalid.

The situation might be different, and various decisions could be taken. There could be a federation, perhaps a confederation, and there could be treaties on close ties; but in all cases with political independence. And finally, completely independent states, not tied by any treaties.

Comrade Gorbachev proposed that we renew the federation with all the broad rights, in which our republics could be given special status. And we, on the basis of the decisions which you took, believed that it is first of all necessary to restore the independence of our states as a subject of international law, and that this is a fundamental question. And after restoration of this independence, obviously we would conclude a treaty on close mutual ties with the USSR on questions of preserving the common market, economic as well as foreign policy relations, and preservation of common communications. And the same goes for many other questions of interest to us, on the basis of the appropriate treaties. And obviously appropriate treaties must be concluded with respect to the stationing of USSR Armed Forces on our territory, their numbers, their disposition, and their principal status.

At the same time we believed, both sides, that we must establish guarantees for the citizens so that tensions do not appear, so that a situation is not created which might upset the citizens, change their status, or lead to any kind of discrimination, not to mention questions of their deportation and so on, which in recent times certain political figures are increasingly spreading. We believe that in this case the republic must accept totally concrete obligations, and it should take upon itself from the USSR all those totally concrete obligations which the USSR accepted with the ratification of the Vienna Declaration and in accordance with other international agreements. We must ensure benevolent examination of the requests of all permanent citizens of the republic who desire to take our citizenship, if they accept the obligations to serve the interests of our republic. At the very same times we must ensure that there is no discrimination against those persons who desire to retain USSR citizenship, in order that there might be no discrimination against them in the economic or social respect, and in order that the right of free movement and establishment of ties be preserved.

Of course, we did not resolve these questions during this dialogue. They obviously must be resolved in subsequent talks. We must not even think of this meeting as negotiations. This was to a certain extent a prelude to negotiations, in which the positions of the parties would be made clear, in order that they might work out their platforms in greater detail.

The second principal question concerned the means of achieving our goals and how to define our further status. We suppose that this status could be established in direct negotiations with authorized representatives of our Supreme Soviet, and conclude the appropriate agreements which would then be ratified by the parliament of our republic and the higher organs of state power of the USSR. Comrade Gorbachev at that moment adhered to the view that first of all a law must be passed on withdrawal, then we must go through the entire process of withdrawal; and then we may set about concluding new agreements. Well, we expressed our objection, that this divorce process is not acceptable to us, for we did

not make such a marriage. Therefore, probably a special status should be defined. Furthermore, after such a divorce process, sometimes the former marriage partners do not want to talk, and a situation might develop in which there is no further desire to conclude a new treaty. This, I think, would not be advantageous for either side. Some kind of unifying feature must be retained.

This process, obviously, might take place in the near future. And in this connection I would like to refer to the report made by my colleague, the honorable Mr. Boyars, who said yesterday that were I in that position, our independence would take place in the course of six years. But I have never defended such a point of view, neither in my articles nor in my speeches, nor even in private conversations. No, it is just the other way around. When the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was discussing the draft law on the procedure for withdrawal, which was drawn up at the CPSU Central Committee, and which they wanted to send to our Supreme Soviet—I criticized that draft, which stipulated a six-year period; criticized it and tried to ensure that the Supreme Soviet Presidium would not approve the draft; I did not accept it and sent it to commissions for study.

Speaking of my own opinion, I think it would be exceptionally fine if we could make a completely new analysis of the 50th anniversary of 21 July and mark this day in a new situation. However, I understand that this does not depend upon us alone. This depends upon our common work, to the extent that it goes well, to the extent we are wise, and capable of compromise and agreement. Therefore I believe that even today we must be prepared, and we must have authorized people who could carry on negotiations in your name. Of course, it is necessary that they be confirmed by the new Supreme Soviet. But it will not convene for about three months. But during this time we must have people who would be authorized, who could begin negotiations, in order that the appropriate proposals and the appropriate analyses might be introduced to the newly-elected Supreme Soviet.

[A. Gorbunov] Permit me to clarify. You stated that the deputies of Lithuania and Estonia were authorized. Who gave them their authority?

[Bishers] They had already adopted these declarations, to which they could refer, which defined their position in 1940, and the path which these republics plan to take. At that time we did not have a declaration, it had not been adopted. And at our meeting with Comrade Gorbachev, we were defending those positions which you took at your preceding sessions, after adopting the Declaration on Sovereignty. We did not depart at all from the conclusions which you made in this declaration.

Gorbunov Closing Remarks at Latvian Supreme Soviet*90UN1217D Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 6 Mar 90 p 1*

[LATINFORM Report: "Gorbunov Speech at Conclusion of the Work of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, the 11th Convocation"]

[Text] In wrapping up the work of the final session of the present convocation of the Supreme Soviet, I do not intend to give an exhaustive account of what we've done together. For only time and the people of the republic can provide a true evaluation of this work. However, certain conclusions must be made. And they may prove very useful to Latvia's new parliament.

No matter how complex was the political situation in the republic in the past two years, the Supreme Soviet was able to avoid a state of crisis in the highest organ of state power, that is, in the Supreme Soviet itself. And crisis situations, as we recall, did mature and could have emerged more than once: if only, for example, while we were adopting the Law on Languages, re-examining Article 6 of the Constitution; while discussing the Declaration on Sovereignty, and a number of other instances.

We were able to keep the crises from entering the parliamentary meeting place, it turned out, by means of civility—the capacity to hear out and try to understand opposing opinions, and the capability of formulating a third point of view out of two irreconcilable points of view. And this third viewpoint was not at all a mechanistic compromise version, but often expressed the point of view of the silent majority of society.

I must say that this is a difficult path—to reflect the often contradictory aspirations of the public in the decisions of the parliament. It would be much simpler to stand on extremely radical positions, with the primitive argument: either "yes" or "no." A parliament, if not analytically, must often intuitively seek the optimally realistic middle way—if it wants to try to reach the comprehension of the silent majority.

Our Supreme Soviet, although it too was elected according to the old principles, in the last year and a half, in my view, has operated in the spirit of the democratic parliamentary system, and has tried to express the will of the electors and honestly carry out its mission. Very likely it will be the first and last parliament in the history of Latvia which operated with no factions. Parliamentary factions in a democratic society are a normal phenomenon, they are nothing to be afraid of. But we do not yet have a democratic society. We have only proclaimed its principles and have reoriented its priorities, and now we are taking our first steps toward a new Latvia.

On the political pallet of our republic, one can see clear expression of the national coloration. The new parliament should always bear in mind that the growing

political confrontation in the conditions of Latvia could grow into a national confrontation at any moment. In such a situation, when passions overshadow reason, no matter what kind of progressive ends this or that movement was pursuing, confrontation does not provide an opportunity to reach them. On the contrary—it directly detracts from the public's interests.

We should continue to welcome those social organizations, in which national concord is a fundamental part of their activities.

At present, in the days of the election campaign, certain candidates for deputy, as we see, are nevertheless taking the easier and simpler way: appealing only to the people's national feelings.

The citizens of Latvia are examining the contours of the new parliament with great hopes. But optimism in our society is intertwined with apprehension. Naturally, every person has the right to defend his closely-held ideological values and principles. However, in our situation, when manipulation by political phrases can aggravate a national confrontation, bringing evil upon everyone, one must give more thought to the quest for points of contact.

And last, the idea of independence has captured our minds. Both the miners and the republics want to manage themselves, and see the fruits of their own work. Everyone is trying to live like a human being.

The Union cannot exist any longer in the current form. Unfortunately, the republic's Supreme Soviet and People's Deputies of the USSR have been unable to achieve equal rights with the other union republics, and no mechanism has been set up to realize equal rights.

We do not need to destroy the Union at all; what we need to do is begin to organize it as a union of sovereign republics. Life itself shows the form in which its future model will develop. As long as Moscow does not shift from talking about sovereignty for the republics, to specific deeds—until then, no kind of referendum will ensure political stability in the republic. It is not an easy thing to form a great democratic state from an authoritarian power. However, it is clear that the old stereotypes will sooner or later be unable to withstand the progressive ideas.

As we prepare to complete our terms of office, we can be pleased with the harmony which has prevailed in our work, thanks to the patience and fraternal support of all the deputies.

I want to thank our assistants and our consultants, and the specialists in various branches, who worked very hard to make sure the Supreme Soviet of the present convocation carried out its functions in a businesslike way. I am grateful to the members of the Supreme Soviet Presidium for their intensive efforts, and the responsibility and energy they invested in them.

And to the new parliament, our best wishes for fruitful work in achieving the realization of popular rule and the unification of the people, and in their service to them.

And now, we shall hear the State Hymn, "God Bless Latvia!"

Decentralized Tariff, Customs Policy Questions Discussed

904A0254A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
1 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by N. Gusev, chief of the Latvian Republic Custom-House: "Customs Border Today and Tomorrow"]

[Text] The historical experience of international society reveals that customs work, in addition to defense and foreign policy, applies also to those spheres in which the interaction of states, within the framework of a different type of unions and associations, is most close and in federated states is included in the exclusive competence of the federation.

At the same time, under conditions in which the republic is converting over to economic independence, customs work must be augmented to a substantial degree by new content, that is, it must be given the opportunity to participate in the formation of all-union customs policy. Moreover, in the sphere of foreign economic activities the effectiveness of use of customs duties and other fees imposed upon imports or exports, or in connection with them, should be taken into account; control over the transferring abroad or from abroad of payments for imports or exports; the regime for internal legislative documents which regulate the importing and exporting of goods and the taxation (internal) of imported goods.

International trade-economic relations among countries—participants in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—clearly underscore the fact that one means for raising the effectiveness of customs regulation is that of simplifying and standardizing existing customs legislation, establishing a regime for unilateral inspection and others. As is known, the USSR has undertaken a course aimed at merging with GATT. Thus, in pondering the place of republic customs in the all-union picture, we must remember that in ignoring the mentioned trends and creating intermediate customs "borders" (including in a literal sense), the republic may encounter the problem of a loss of a favorable regime, a reduction in economic profit and growth in expenses for the mechanism of customs regulation.

Today we are hearing more frequently recommendations for transferring the customs organs from the federation over to the republics. Moreover, such a transfer is being mentioned in a very general manner, with no specifics being furnished regarding the future status of the republic's custom house. In one instance—a minimum program—a possible organizational resubordination to the republic of the Latvian republic and Ventspils custom

houses, in the absence of acquisition of the republic right of adoption of its own tariff and customs legislation. And in the second instance—a maximum program—a transfer to the republic of all powers in the sphere of customs operations, including the right to adopt its own customs tariff and customs legislation on other matters. Or as raised in the task established by the republic's Council of Ministers—the development of a draft law on the customs service in the Latvian SSR.

But the organizational resubordination of custom houses to the republic can lead to growth in the size of the state apparatus and in the number of Council of Ministers subunits, since a need will appear for creating an administration or department for state customs control within its structure and thus the organs of authority will be duplicated. For us, this is directly fraught with a weakening of interaction with the customs organs of the union and those located on the territories of other republics. The danger of a different interpretation of customs directions will increase sharply and there will be an increase in material expenditures, including for a possible rewording of the documentation in the Latvian language. All of this can lead to a disintegration of the unified technology for exercising control over the territory of the USSR and hence—a direct road to a sharp drop in its effectiveness, especially in the case of transport freight.

The program is implied to a maximum degree considerably more often. But here one should note immediately the existence in the future of a solitary customs rate and customs legislation on other matters that signifies the appearance of an isolated customs territory. That is, customs borders must pass between our republic and other republics. From the standpoint of customs houses, this signifies that the goods of one republic, shipped across such borders to the territories of other republics, must be viewed as being foreign goods, that is, subject to customs duties, import taxes and other fees. It bears mentioning that legislation in this regard is already under preparation in the republic.

The advocates of this concept are placing great hopes upon the fact that in this manner exported goods will be subject to various quantitative limitations. But let us examine more closely exactly what this maximum variant will mean for our USSR and the Latvian SSR, as a sovereign republic. From the union standpoint, a single union market will simply cease to exist. And from the standpoint of our republic, short-term benefits may obviously be realized as a result of having protected our own internal market. But at the same time, Latvia, as already mentioned repeatedly by many economists, with the long-term interests taken into account, may be deprived of a number of important advantages, which it is presently receiving as a result of inter-republic barter and precisely—guaranteed deliveries of raw materials at sufficiently low prices and a ready market for finished products, a majority of which are non-competitive on the international market. The prospect of moving out onto the international market in the near future is still being

viewed by practically all scientists as unrealistic. And if this is true, then the carrying out of the plan as conceived threatens even more serious economic crises.

Based upon the above, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the centralization of customs work at the present time is a prerequisite for the formation of a much-needed all-union market, one of the basic principles for its functioning and an indicator of its existence.

Certainly, it is not enough to defend the inadvisability of decentralization of the customs system. A need exists for constructive proposals for improving customs work during the course of the reorganization being carried out, especially given the fact that the republic is converting over to economic independence. An obvious need exists for the republic participating in the development of a customs tariff and for approving the rates for customs duties for consumer goods sent by postal mail or transported by persons crossing the state border. Such participation could be ensured by the inclusion in the established manner of representatives of the republic in a state customs-tariff council, the creation of which is called for in the draft law on USSR customs rates. The republics could develop independently a strategy for concluding international agreements on customs operations affecting their interests and they could also participate in the development of plans for such agreements through their representatives.

The creation of a republic administration for state customs control is deemed advisable. It could develop recommendations and undertake measures aimed at improving customs control and it could organize customs institutions. The republic must be given the opportunity to participate informally in the formation of an all-union customs policy.

A considerable portion of the customs income and receipts from other import taxes, the introduction of which is planned during further restructuring of the mechanism for carrying out foreign economic operations, must be added directly to the budget of the Latvian SSR (in some instances in international practice, the distribution of income from import taxes reaches 50 percent in favor of members of the federation and 50—for the center).

A far-flung network for state regulation of foreign economic exchange is in operation in all states. Its central element—a customs-tariff system. In reorganizing the administrative system for foreign economic relations, we inevitably draw the conclusion that our customs-tariff policy will be the principal lever for regulating them.

Moldavian Party Leader Views Reform Needs

90US0595A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
27 Feb 90 p 2

[Interview with P.K. Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, conducted by special correspondents A. Morgun and V. Okunev: "Breakthrough Toward New Ideas"]

[Text] Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic—We need political solutions which provide answers to the questions which have been raised not only with regard for present-day realities but also based on new ideas, on political foresight and on rapid and decisive action. Such in general outline was the concept of the speech at the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum of P.K. Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee. The need for continuation of this discussion and the development of some of the ideas expressed at the plenum has arisen.

Our interviewee is P.K. Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee.

[Correspondents] Petr Kirillovich, an ability to work in anticipation of events is, it would seem, becoming a determining facet for the party's successful activity under current conditions. How from this viewpoint may we evaluate the CPSU Central Committee Draft Platform adopted at the meeting?

[Luchinskiy] I believe that this is a considerable step forward. To a certain extent this document—it could not be otherwise—is a reflection of all the problems which have accumulated in society. At the same time I would define it as revolutionary and geared not only to the present but to the future also. And one further merit: the draft is realistic and accurately reflects the position not of the "right" and not of the "left" but of the center.

[Correspondents] In what precisely is this manifested?

[Luchinskiy] In its basic guideline: the processes occurring in society cannot either be artificially held back or artificially accelerated. And in the platform generally there are many standpoints associated precisely with work performed in anticipation. It is important only not to leave them at the level of declarations unsupported by action—there is with us, unfortunately, such a "tradition," which has been fostered over decades. We usually display a rare ability to mobilize only after something has already happened somewhere, after the thunderclap. It is then that we build up vigorous activity. We have to abandon this stereotype. The party's reaction to this process or the other in society must be swift and instantaneous. And necessarily at the level of practical action.

For example, at the plenum both I and other speakers dwelt on the question connected with a union treaty. It was a question of finally filling the concept of federation with new, restructuring content. I see one solution here: the creation of a union of sovereign states on the basis of a new union treaty. The plenum's final document thus says, incidentally: the CPSU deems essential the development of the treaty principle of the structure of the union.

I erred in thinking that actions would follow at once: why would the plenum not organize a commission and not instruct it to formulate the corresponding bill? This would have been showing initiative and working in anticipation! This, unfortunately, did not happen. Again

a kind of tradition. I involuntarily recalled how once, having adopted the CPSU platform on interethnic relations, we introduced thereto such a concept as national districts. But no trouble was taken to explain what was understood by this. We are spinning things out once again....

In a word, many new ideas and thoughts are being engendered in the party and they are being received with interest in society and could work in anticipation of events. But... we are realizing them extremely slowly and are for this reason failing to achieve the set goals.

There is much debate in the Supreme Soviet in connection with the bills on land and on property. And I wonder: why did the party not propose a referendum on these issues? Would such an initiative not have earned it authority in society? I am profoundly convinced that there are problems which can and should be solved only by way of general referendum. I refer primarily to the social and economic aspects of our life. In this way we would not only be enlisting the people in real political life but we would avoid growing confrontation in society. After all, the varied approach to this problem or the other summons into being various movements; and conflicts, which go to extremes, begin. If all this is superimposed on our as yet extremely weak democratic forms—after all, we essentially lack such traditions as yet—is it any wonder what we have currently?

[Correspondents] Consequently, it is not enough to proclaim an interesting idea, it is important to realize it in good time. Otherwise it will be taken up and used for their own, frequently selfish, ends by other forces?

[Luchinskiy] Just so. And for this reason it is extremely important to enlist in party work competent people—too much is done in our country, alas, by dilettantes. We need to learn to react precisely and instantaneously to what is happening around us. If a problem arises in society, it is essential that specialists immediately engage in a study of its economic and social roots and propose versions of a specific solution thereof. Only thus. But inasmuch as we are not doing so, a whole circle of people frequently forms around this with whom this simply cannot be solved in this way.

[Correspondents] But, as far as we know, the Moldavian Communist Party has already done some things in this respect. A special group, whose functions include an analysis of the political situation in the republic and the forecasting of possible situations, has been formed and is operating in your republic.

[Luchinskiy] We have such a group, and quite a flexible one at that. We proceeded in forming it from the fact that society is in need of qualified recommendations more than ever now. And for a political body this is simply essential. I cannot imagine serious political work without this.

[Correspondents] But in the majority of republics the central committees and the obkoms [oblast party committees] somehow manage without this....

[Luchinskiy] This is why we often find ourselves trailing behind events. Of course, our group has not been in existence long, but in one sphere it is working quite efficiently. I refer to the struggle against rumors. A direct telephone line has been organized on which people can obtain reliable information on this question or the other. Having systematized the data, we know the kind of rumors which will be rapidly doing the rounds of the republic and we quickly organize countermeasures: we promptly provide the pertinent information in the press and on television. A trifling matter, you say? Well, recent events in Dushanbe began with rumors, incidentally....

This group in our republic includes lawyers, journalists and economists. They also undertake forecasting, having preliminarily studied the data with the help of the staff of the corresponding institutes and competent specialists. This recommendation or the other is born on the basis of in-depth work: such and such a question, for example, needs to be studied urgently for it could become the source of social or interethnic tension.

One further group in the Central Committee deals with work with letters and proposals which we receive. What was the old method? Everything was distributed by department. But a person has, after all, most likely applied there. He expects something different: that the party official will visit the scene, investigate the situation and assemble people or those who are to solve the given question. This is what the group does, contributing to the enhanced authority of and trust in the party authorities.

[Correspondents] New things have, as we can see, appeared, but the structure has remained the same. Still the same chain: instructor-sector-department. Is this not preventing restructuring?

[Luchinskiy] It is, of course. And we are moving toward abandoning it. There is much that I envision differently here: a group of Central Committee secretaries and mobile groups of experts and consultants attached to them. People knowing how and wanting to work. And not only from the apparatus, what is more. I see the enlistment in the work of specialists in this branch of learning or the other and in this set of problems or the other, on contract, as making great sense. Entrusting to them the elaboration of findings and recommendations and the study of problems. In a word, if we set ourselves the goal of working in anticipation of events, it is necessary to seek nonstandard approaches to its achievement. And to act, that is the main thing, to act! Ridding ourselves of the old, out-of-date ways also.

[Correspondents] It is surely extremely important here to be somewhat more precise in our definition: what legacy are we abandoning?

[Luchinskiy] By necessity. Cadre policy, say. Just think, not so long ago there were 1,600 persons on the Central Committee schedule. There remain 360. As before, too many, in my view. Is this not why we so often go wrong on cadre issues?

[Correspondents] We involuntarily recall here the events in Volgograd, Tyumen and some other oblasts, where the local party leadership was forced to resign. It also generally points to the level of cadre policy.

[Luchinskiy] I shall dwell on Tyumen. Could the crisis in this oblast party organization be called unexpected? After all, the question of the first secretary and his style of work did not arise yesterday but approximately 2 years ago. Why was it necessary to spend so much time defending him and evading responsibility? I frankly cannot take this in, and I have been in party work a long time. So the Central Committee has, alas, a direct connection with the situation which has taken shape in Tyumen.

[Correspondents] So even here, at this level, we are lagging behind as well?

[Luchinskiy] Dreadfully, what is more. And not only in the above-mentioned regions. Have not events in Moldavia, in the Baltic republics and in the Transcaucasus occurred in accordance with the same script? Do you remember when the question of a change of party leadership arose there? Only when the ferment and mass discontent with the policy it was pursuing both among the communist rank and file and among nonparty persons had begun. We arrive at the need for a solution, and a radical solution, only when the tension reaches crisis point, when there is no other solution. And what is most infuriating is this: why cling on to a worthless leader until the last gasp? Merely because he once got himself onto the party schedule? Under today's conditions we have to pay dearly for such a cadre approach by the party—in trust therein on the part of the people. It is appropriate here to recall the words of M. Montaigne: "I would rather a person quit work sooner than the work quit him."

[Correspondents] And it is evidently not only the Central Committee but also the whole party which should concern itself with ensuring that the question is put precisely thus since the platform even speaks clearly about the power of the party masses as the basis for the profoundest democratization within the CPSU.

[Luchinskiy] And it is a question, furthermore, of radically reforming activity in this field. Whereas in society we are moving toward a democratic state based on the rule of law, in which every voter, voting for his deputy, subsequently maintains a standing and strong connection with him, this is not the case in the party as yet. Therefore the task which is set to start with is that of

ensuring that all communists have a real and equal right to participate in the formation of party committees of all levels and also in the formation of the fundamental political decisions which they adopt. How is this to be ensured? By way, I believe, of the creation of party electoral districts. The responsibility of the member of any party committee to his electorate would grow immeasurably. Visiting the party organizations more often and knowing by what they live—does this harm a party leader? We here in the Central Committee, for example, believe that it is essential for all of us to be on the party register in the work force. And the first steps have already been taken: the head of the Socioeconomic Department is now on the register at the Tractor Plant, my assistant, in the History Museum. The process has begun and it will continue at all levels of party authority. I am sure that this will contribute also to a change in communists' attitude toward the so-called apparatchiks.

[Correspondents] Credit where credit is due: the republic party organization, it transpires, is not only capable of expressing new ideas but is also attempting to implement them. Is not even the lack of independence, about which there has been so much talk recently, impeding matters here?

[Luchinskiy] It is. The communist parties of the union republics need independence like air. I spoke about this at the plenum, incidentally. Not everyone has understood me even here, in Moldavia. There have been rebukes that I am, allegedly, against the unity of the CPSU virtually. It depends what is understood by unity. I have been involved in party work not only in Moldavia but in Tajikistan also. And I have to say that this has been work under entirely different conditions. This is why I am opposed to unity which is a synonym for rigid centralization. If we are moving toward an alliance of free independent states, the republic communist parties must unite on a qualitatively new principle—the ideological community of aims and tasks recorded in the common program and rules. But may the Moldavian Communist Party not have its own program besides? After all, a whole number of problems is specific to Moldavia. This is not, as some people believe, to undermine the fundamental principles of democratic centralism. It is simply necessary to immediately and clearly distinguish what is the prerogative of the central party authorities and what can and should even be decided locally.

The idea is, in my view, a sound one, but we have, alas, been raised in a spirit of mutual suspicion. And no sooner is it a question of the independence of the republic communist parties, and a vigilant comrade immediately appears: they want to quit the CPSU. We are in this way losing what is most important—time. But had we begun to talk about the granting of such independence earlier, we would not now, I believe, have, specifically, the situation which has come about in the Lithuanian Communist Party. United does not mean identical, this needs to be firmly grasped. The resistance of the

conservatives to this idea comes from the old understanding of the party's aims and tasks. I, however, am calling for us to look to the future, if, of course, we are indeed speaking in earnest about the building of a democratic society. If we are indeed moving out of the tunnel toward the light. Let us therefore be done with mutual suspicion. And not reject any idea out of hand but, taking advantage of every opportunity, sit at a single "round table" and work out mutually acceptable solutions and principles which will help us remain together from good will and without compulsion.

[Correspondents] But is it not difficult reaching agreement today? We have the impression at times that there are several parties within the CPSU simultaneously.

[Luchinskiy] I agree. And I spoke about this also at the plenum: the spread of opinions is currently very extensive. But we need to get over this. How? Once again I insist: without hurrying events, but not lagging behind them either. And not deciding everything at the top but merely in consultation with people, with the communists. Such as, making progress by the day, not to let events drift and not allow their development to take its own course.

[Correspondents] And how through this prism to evaluate the situation taking shape in Moldavia? How to work in anticipation of events here?

[Luchinskiy] We need to meet with people more often and ascertain the factors causing interethnic confrontation. We have hitherto lagged behind greatly here. Take if only the question connected with the official nature of Moldavian. The decision there was dragged out and demarcation on a nationality basis began, of which at a certain stage extreme forces availed themselves in their own interests also.

The way out of this situation lies only in dialogue. Only the calm elucidation of fundamental positions may prompt the adoption of the sole correct decision. And in this respect also Moldavia's communists will assume the role of consolidating force.

We have agreed in principle with the representatives of all opposed movements to sit down immediately after the elections at the negotiating table. We simply have to do this. Last Sunday, specifically, there was a kind of rehearsal for this: republic television showed a meeting of representatives of seven public movements, including the People's Front and Unity. People themselves understand that the time of ultimatums is over and that negotiations are an objective necessity. This is a reassuring fact!

[Correspondents] The turbulent events of political life are at the epicenter of party work. This is natural. But let us not forget here those who, despite all the upheavals, are today also honestly and conscientiously going about their business—feeding and clothing the country.

[Luchinskiy] Correct also. We have lost our heads somewhat in the stormy collisions and crises great and small. And we have somehow entirely forgotten about the working man. And yet it is he, as before, who supports everything in this raging and fierce world. But I address this rebuke for the most part, you will forgive me, to you media people. But there is no escaping this for us party officials either. Only with one condition: this must not be done by the old "tried and tested" methods and forms. If we succeed in finding support among these very working people, we will thereby also resolve to a considerable extent the problem of the stabilization of society and a reduction of social and interethnic tension. And, after all, it is these goals which are pursued by the CPSU Central Committee Draft Platform, one of whose main sections is, incidentally, called "At the Center of Party Policy—Man".

Ivashko, Others Discuss Proposals for Party

90UN1081A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
4 Feb 90 pp 1-3

[RATAU report on meeting of commission for collation of proposals for the party rules and elaboration of the Ukrainian Communist Party Draft Action Program in connection with preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress: "The Times Demand Action"]

[Excerpts] This was a concerned, businesslike, specific discussion. A discussion which was held on 1 February of this year, which the press has reported. Various opinions, entirely opposite at times, were expressed. Passions seethed. But it could not have been otherwise. It was, after all, a question of the fate of the party and the fate of perestroyka. Of the paths by which the renewal of the CPSU as a whole and the Ukrainian Communist Party in particular should proceed. What should the focus be in the period of preparation for the 28th Party Congress? What needs to be done in order to compel the magnificent word of the party to shine anew.

Prefacing this collective search for the truth, V.A. Ivashko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, made observations on the currently turbulent maelstrom of political life; the ambivalent and, in places, contradictory processes which are occurring; the differing positions of one person and social group or the other which are being ascertained increasingly. Of course, this is also making its mark on the life of the republic's party organizations. This is why, considering the situation in the country, there is an urgent need on the eve of the CPSU Central Committee plenum, which will study the draft platform of the Central Committee for the congress, to confer on the conceptual approach to the elaboration of party rules, the time to convene the next congress and so forth.

A report on the proposals of the republic's communists for the CPSU Rules was then delivered by S.I. Gurenko, member of the Politburo and second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. In the

course of the debate in the republic on the place and role of the party at the current stage, he said, there has been particularly active discussion of questions concerning the new CPSU Rules. This is understandable. For this document should contain the basic principles of the structure and activity of the party. And the main thing—whether our party remains Leninist and communist or becomes a party of a different type, for example, social democratic, which some people are talking about now—will depend on what they are.

The party authorities and the mass media are receiving hundreds of letters containing proposals pertaining to the new CPSU Rules. Alternative drafts are even proposed in a number of cases. Much that is of interest is being expressed at meetings with secretaries of the party committees and elective activists which are being conducted in the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee.

What, in the main, is the essence of all these proposals?

First, as concerns the structure of the new rules. The majority of communists and party committees agrees that they should contain only the radical, fundamental principles obligatory for all party organizations. Renunciation of inordinate regulation would extend the rights of all party components, afford them greater scope for initiative and stimulate the transition from a passive-executor position to creative assertiveness. Such a democratic document could serve, if necessary, as a basis for the formulation and adoption by the union republic communist parties of their own rules, in which all-party provisions would be specified with reference to local conditions. However, as far as decisions on individual, specific issues, which could change rapidly depending on the situation, are concerned, they should be determined by documents and sets of instructions adopted at all-party and republic conferences and plenums.

The following viewpoints are expressed concerning the preamble to the rules: removing it altogether; taking the preamble to the current rules as the basis and rewording it considerably with regard for the demands of the times; preparing a new preamble, making it specific and without empty declarations, which would express concisely the essence of the new party rules. I believe, the speaker pointed out, that the third option would be the best.

There are proposals for a change in the structure of the rules. Thus the Odessa Obkom [Oblast Party Committee] proposes that questions of CPSU membership, including admission to the party, be set forth in the first section, and the rights and duties of a CPSU member in the second. The Kiev Higher Party School believes it expedient to set forth in the first section of the rules questions of membership, but in the second, formation of the party ranks. Some communists are proposing that the third section be split in two: "Intra-Party Democracy" and "Organizational Structure of the Party". Proposals for a reduction in the number of sections of the rules through the amalgamation of individual sections or their exclusion altogether are being submitted.

Summing up the entire diversity of opinions, the speaker emphasized that the structure of the rules might, it would

appear, be as follows: preamble; CPSU membership; formation of the composition of the party; intra-party democracy; organizational structure of the CPSU (primary organizations; rayon, city, district, oblast, and kray party organizations, union republic communist parties, the party's highest authorities); communists and state, public and public-political organizations, formations and movements; party resources. We could thus have six sections instead of 10.

Second, on questions of membership it is proposed to increase to two or three years the length of total work and public activity of the sponsors and nominees. Some people consider it necessary to abolish the candidate's term of probation inasmuch as this provision has not, in their opinion, secured the necessary purity of the party ranks. Others, on the contrary, are demanding that the candidate's term of probation be increased to two or three years, as was formerly the case. The second secretary of the Central Committee surmised that it probably needs to be preserved as it is, with the right of extension, if necessary. To broaden the range of communists who might make recommendations we could agree with the proposal concerning a reduction in the length of party service of sponsors to three years.

There are the following proposals: exposition of the rights of the party member, and then, his duties (now it is in the rules the other way around). The rights of the citizens come first in the USSR Constitution, incidentally. At the same time, on the other hand, to increase the initiative and assertiveness of communists there should be a broadening of their rights. Specifically, say, to accord the right to quit the party upon application, to submit proposals to all party authorities, to obtain information on the activity of the party authorities and so forth.

It has been emphasized that the list of duties of a party member currently incorporates much of what applies to all citizens of the USSR. Logic, on the other hand, demands concentration on the duties of the communist to the party organization and his party comrades. It might be pointed out here that the member of the CPSU must not be a member of other political parties and political organizations. And it is on the whole necessary to do some work on the correlation of rights and duties in the rules.

It is proposed to introduce as a new provision one on the encouragement of communists who have distinguished themselves in party work and to establish the title of "CPSU Veteran" and also to accord party organizations the right, after a decision of the obkoms and kraykoms [kray party committees] and the union republic communist party central committees, to conduct the social and political certification of communists.

Third, the majority of the proposals support the guiding principle of the organizational structure, life, and activity of the party—democratic centralism. At the same time proposals are submitted for strengthening its democratic thrust and to reflect the rights of the minority

during decision-making, glasnost in the work of party authorities and freedom of opinions and debate.

The speaker went on to say: I would like to dwell on a question around which there has been much argument. This is the question of the rights of the minority. Some letters point out that the minority should have the right to criticize decisions which have already been adopted by the majority and, availing themselves of this, to insist on a reexamination of contentious issues in their organization or in higher bodies. It is hard to conceive of the practical fulfillment of such a provision, but an effective, precise mechanism for a solution of this question is very much needed.

Proposals are being received concerning defining the principle of democratic unity as the guiding principle, which would, primarily, afford an opportunity to create associations of communists on platforms within the framework of the program and rules and also various factions in the party. In our opinion, the speaker emphasized, this could lead to the erosion of the organizational foundations of the CPSU and even to its division.

Demands are being advanced for the democratization of the procedure for electing delegates to congresses and conferences in order that the primary party organizations and the communists themselves have the decisive say. The majority here prefers direct secret elections of delegates from several candidacies by territorial and production party district. Such a procedure, in the speaker's opinion, would seem the most democratic. However, it should be considered that in this case the gorkoms, raykoms [city and rayon party committees] and obkoms and the highest authorities of the corresponding party organizations—the conferences—would be excluded from the delegate selection process here. The delegates themselves would be responsible merely to the temporary formations—the districts—that is, essentially to no one.

The following compromise version is proposed in this connection:

Nominating the candidates for delegate in the primary organizations and then discussing the candidacies at city and rayon party conferences and in the press and, subsequently, at oblast conferences, according the latter the right to nominate additional candidates. The election process would further develop as follows: The oblast conference would break off work to discuss the whole list of candidates in the party organizations and the mass media, after which it would reassemble to vote. Of course, there should undoubtedly be more candidates than there are seats.

Finally, there figures among the proposals the combined method, so to speak: In the city and rayon organizations where the numbers of communists are greater than the prescribed representation quota to elect delegates at city and rayon conferences; from the rest, at oblast party conferences. But there is one indispensable condition: In

all instances the candidates for delegate should be nominated in the primary organizations and discussed extensively both in them and in the press. The primary organizations in which the numbers of communists are in excess of the prescribed representation quota could be accorded the right to elect delegates to the CPSU congress directly.

Considering that the elections will be conducted with a multiple choice of candidates, proposals are being submitted for the candidates who obtain the largest number of votes, but more than half, to be deemed to have been elected.

The procedure for the election of secretaries of party committees of all levels, secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee included, is being debated in lively fashion also. Many people propose that they be elected by whole congresses and conferences. In our opinion, S.I. Gurenko said, this may be done in the primary party organizations, where the elected leaders are constantly under the supervision of the party collective. As far as the rayon, city, and higher components are concerned, however, direct elections would place their secretaries beyond the supervision of the committees, which could hamper the process of renewal of party cadres, complicating the procedure of their replacement considerably.

Fourth, the opinion that renewal and democratization in the party will depend to a decisive extent on enhancing the role and assertiveness of the primary party organizations is being expressed. It is in this latter that the rights and duties of each communist are realized to a considerable extent. For this reason it is proposed that a number of rights and powers which are as yet the prerogative of the higher party committees be delegated to the lower party component, namely, participation in the formation of the party's executive authorities and determination of the directions of their activity (including the nomination and discussion of the candidacies of party committee secretaries and apparatus officials in the primary party organizations); adoption of the final decisions on admittance to the CPSU and departure from the party and the examination of personal cases (as of 1 January this year, incidentally, an experiment involving granting the primary party organizations the right of final decision on admittance as CPSU candidates has been conducted in Kiev's Shevchenkovskiy Rayon, Cherkassy, and Kharkov Oblast's Lozovskiy Rayon); regulation of internal procedures, including the forms and methods of realizing the decisions of the higher authorities, the timing of meetings and record-keeping; determination of its structure; formation and use of its own budget within the prescribed quotas (it is proposed to considerably increase the proportion of membership dues remaining at the disposal of the primary organizations).

There is also the following viewpoint: The primary party organizations may be formed independently, and the gorkoms and raykoms should only register them. What can we say in this connection? It would seem to us that

depriving the party committees of the right to form party organizations, supervise their work and guide them could essentially lead to the total loss of their role as organs of political leadership.

Fifth, many proposals pertaining to the organizational structure of the party are geared to an extension of the independence of the union republic communist parties. This is particularly topical now in connection with the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress.

But what is the essence of our approach to this question? It could be formulated as follows: While adhering to the CPSU Rules and Program, the union republic communist parties are autonomous when deciding all questions of their practical activity, including formulation of the policy line corresponding to local conditions and choice of tactics of implementing all-party decisions.

It is proposed that all this be reflected in a special section of the rules governing the union republic communist parties and their status. The most essential points which could be provided for in this section are, in our view, as follows: the structure and executive authorities of the union republic communist parties are determined by their congresses or central committee plenums (for example, the creation or abolition of gorkoms and raykoms, the election of a bureau or politburo of the central committee and so forth); for the solution of most important questions of party life the republic communist parties may conduct debates and referendums; special plenums or conferences of the CPSU even are convened on the initiative of one-third or more republic communist parties; all questions of the promotion and transfer of personnel are decided in the republic communist parties; the numbers and list of staff of the party committees are determined by the executive bodies of the republic communist parties; for the purpose of practical verification of new organizational provisions going beyond the framework of the CPSU Rules the republic communist parties may conduct the appropriate experiments; the republic communist parties independently decide questions of the creation and activity of organs of the press, party, and ideological establishments and educational institutions; the rate of deductions for the all-party budget of the resources received from membership dues, publishing activity, and other sources are determined by the republic communist party central committees following coordination with the CPSU Central Committee; the republic communist parties may practice direct relations both among themselves and with foreign parties.

I am convinced that such an approach not only corresponds to the need for the renewal of the party and the democratization of its life but also fits fully within the context of an expansion of the republics' economic independence and a strengthening of their sovereignty and the infusion of the principle of soviet federation with new content.

At the same time, and this is very important, the rules must provide for an effective mechanism of defense of the ideological and organizational unity of the CPSU, that is, precisely determine the principles and rules on which this unity is built, and methods for influencing those who violate them.

We believe that the proposals of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee pertaining to the independence of the republic party organizations, which have already been forwarded to the CPSU Central Committee, reflect quite fully the position of the communists of our republic on this issue.

Sixth, the proposals concerning the highest party authorities emphasize the need for a precise delimitation of the functions of congresses, conferences, and plenums of the Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo, Secretariat and general secretary. Some comrades propose the establishment of the office of party chairman, endowing it with representational functions, and the formation not of a politburo but of a presidium of the Central Committee, enlarging it considerably through the inclusion of representatives of the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia, all the union republic communist parties, and party veterans.

Now about the structure of the party apparatus. Some people are disposed toward a considerable reduction in it through the elimination of the sectoral departments, and others through the elimination of all departments altogether. The latter believe that the central structural component of the party committees should be commissions on the main directions of work and, under the auspices of each of them, a small working group of consultants. But the experience of the work of the commissions has yet to justify itself, and forms and methods which would make them permanent bodies have yet to be found. Perhaps they will be such in the future, but as yet the proposed solution would, in our view, be premature. It is also proposed to record that all the rules of current Soviet labor legislation extend to the party apparatus.

Seventh, concerning the party's control authorities, some communists believe it essential to create in the party a system of control and auditing commissions elected at congresses and conferences simultaneously with the party committees. They should not possess executive functions but would be obliged merely to keep an eye on the communists' compliance with the requirements of the party rules and their observance of party discipline, monitor the budget and hear appeals. Fewer of the proposals support the creation separately of party and auditing commissions elected at congresses and conferences, that is, propose continuation of the current situation.

Eighth, to speak of such a question as the party's relations with state and public organizations and independent activity movements and formations, the position here is unequivocal. Everyone believes that the party

should operate by political methods and should not substitute for the soviets but ensure for them the fullness of power, prevent petty tutelage and interference in the affairs of the unions and the Komsomol [Communist Youth League], and display concern for an enhancement of their role and authority via the communists working there.

The view that the CPSU should enlist in active participation in the revolutionary renewal of all progressive representatives of public movements and formations and conduct a dialogue with those which operate on a socialist basis is shared.

And, finally, the last point. A great many proposals are being received concerning the procedure for the formation of the party budget and the use of resources in the party organizations. As far as the primary organizations are concerned, we are talking about a radical, fundamental revision in which all questions connected with the formation and use of the party budget would be resolved not from the top down, as now, but from the bottom up. In other words, it would be expedient to establish at all levels, starting with the primary party organizations, economically substantiated rates of deductions from resources obtained from membership dues and other sources. The same resources, which would remain at the disposal of the party committees and organizations after these deductions, could be spent by the latter independently for their own needs.

To speak, however, of specific proposals pertaining to formation of the budget and the use of membership dues, I would mention the following: a considerable increase in the proportion of party membership dues for use by the primary organizations for their needs, which would enable them to implement various measures, render material assistance to the communists who need it, pay full-time officials, make extra payments to part-time secretaries and so forth; at the application of a non-working pensioner communist a primary party organization should have the right to fully or partially exempt him from the payment of party membership dues; dues should not be withheld from scholarships, compensation for length of service and from the sum totals of income and other taxes; the party committee and primary party organization should examine proposals pertaining to the budget and approve them and also render account of the year's results on its fulfillment; it is necessary to revise the scale of party membership dues downward.

L.M. Kravchuk, candidate of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, spoke for the working group on elaboration of the draft action program of the Ukrainian Communist Party in connection with preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress. Reporting the main fundamental approaches in order that they may be agreed upon and specified and that scope for further work may thereby be afforded, he emphasized that the following determining positions had been made the basis of the draft program.

This must be an impressive theoretical and political document. While taking as a basis the fundamental propositions of the policy course of the CPSU, the program must be purely ours, Ukrainian, and geared to the needs of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the people of the Ukraine and in the interests of perestroika in the country as a whole, unity, and the strengthening of the federation and the alliance of all nations and nationalities. The working group proceeded from the fact that the party's course toward the real sovereignty of the union republics (in a renewed federation, of course), the maximum independence of the national communist parties and the correct political solution of this question requires a new comprehension of the situation and determination of their own political and economic programs and mechanisms for their practical implementation. From this arose the need to comprehensively substantiate the Ukrainian Communist Party's position on the ways to extend and really support the economic and political sovereignty of the Ukraine on the basis of the concordance of the rights and duties of the republics and the center.

Evaluations and generalizations have already been made and wording has already been formulated in this respect. We were helped here, the speaker emphasized, by the decisions of the last Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum and the clearly determined position of the republic, which was declared at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies—a position of unity and community at the state and party levels. This is an important point.

Further, the working group considers it very important that the preamble to the action program clearly define the Ukrainian Communist Party's attitude toward the strategic course of perestroika. After all, it is well known what kind of ideas are making the rounds currently and that various positions on the concept thereof and our party ideals exist. We emphasize the objective need for perestroika and the fact that it corresponds to the fundamental interests of the Ukrainian people, opens the way to the embodiment of the ideas of socialism, democratic, humane socialism, but socialism, and provides for the unification of all constructive, progressive forces of society. We speak of the need for a creative approach to the principles of perestroika and a critical analysis of its consequences. We also emphasize the responsibility of the Ukrainian Communist Party for the implementation of perestroika in the republic with regard for its economic, technical, scientific, and spiritual potential and the actual, specific conditions of different regions of the Ukraine.

We consider it necessary to state here, however, that the theoretical basis of perestroika is Marxism-Leninism and the experience of the CPSU and that we treat revolutionary theory and practice as a living organism, which can only be of use when it is continually developed, perfected, and creatively applied. We are opposed to dogmatism, a totalitarian approach in theory and command, administrative and authoritarian methods in

practice; we support freedom of the individual and man's spiritual development, and all material possibilities, legal safeguards and the entire legal mechanism should be subordinated to this.

The action program specifies, in accordance with the democratic status of society, the rights and duties of citizens of all categories and the tasks pertaining to an improvement in their material position. The following categories are highlighted individually: low-income, women, war and labor veterans, the youth.

We consider it necessary also to distinguish health care as a distinct problem and formulate the tasks which the Ukrainian Communist Party advances here.

Considering the seriousness of such questions as the plan and market, property, the principles of distribution, social justice, environmental protection and the revival of national cultures and languages, the working group deems essential the precise formulation of the Ukrainian Communist Party's position and the tasks pertaining to their solution.

Pressing problems which need to be solved immediately, primarily socioeconomic, environmental and scientific and technological, are distinguished as a special subsection.

An important place in the program is occupied by questions connected with interethnic relations. Proceeding from Lenin's principles of nations' self-determination, we formulate approaches and a position toward the republic's right to choose the form of arrangement of its national life and the symbols of statehood and its full right to determine the directions of the development of culture and all of spiritual life. We would like if only to outline the approaches to the formulation of the mechanism for realizing the constitutional right to the republic's self-determination under conditions, of course, of the close ties which have taken shape over the decades. And at the same time, on the other hand, we oppose separatism and show the advantage of a unification of efforts and use of the possibilities of the union complex.

We believe that it is worth showing the Ukraine's place in the union and the mutual responsibility of the union and republic authorities during the exchange of the products of labor, determination of the prospects for the development both of the republics and the country as a whole, the participation of the parties, the use of resources and potential and so forth.

We formulate our understanding (under the conditions of the new federation) of patriotism and internationalism and their correlation and relationship and our responsibility for the unification of people of all nationalities, prevention of interethnic conflicts and the maximum satisfaction of the cultural and spiritual requirements of all national groups residing in the Ukraine.

It was pointed out that the working group would aspire to outline the position of the Ukrainian Communist Party concerning the republic's place in the international arena and its right to enter into direct economic relations with foreign countries, exchange information and have its own diplomatic offices, primarily in countries with a populous Ukrainian diaspora.

All problems concerning the place and role of the Ukrainian Communist Party in the life of the republic are posed in a special section. What are the main, fundamental propositions here? We proceed, the Central Committee secretary said, from the fact that the Ukrainian Communist Party adheres to the same theoretical and political positions as the CPSU and defends them and, taking them as a guide, formulates its own political course and determines the forms and methods of work. We determine the Ukrainian Communist Party's attitude toward its history, distinguishing the difficult pages and dissociating ourselves from the deformations of socialism and party life which were perpetrated in the past.

It is important also that the republic Communist Party will operate within the framework of a legality identical for all, not laying claim to any advantages or monopolism and advocating dialogue with all forces adhering to the positions of a renewal of socialism. Like other public and political organizations and mass movements, it will participate in the management of state and public affairs and nominate its representatives for the soviets of people's deputies and other state authorities. The Ukrainian Communist Party, the speech emphasized, operates within the framework of the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and does not assume state command powers. It operates by the political and democratic methods inherent therein via members of the CPSU, seeing as its main task the consolidation of all forces for the acceleration of perestroika. It proceeds here from the fact that its authority is determined by its political position on topical, pressing problems of the present day and practical actions pertaining to their solution and is not decreed by law.

The Ukrainian Communist Party advocates the sovereignty of the soviets, a delineation of functions, a constructive rethinking of its role in society and a reorientation toward democratic forms and methods of work and proceeds from the fact that the people's will is the sole source of power, and their fundamental interests the sole purpose of the organs of power and party policy.

The speaker reported that the draft action program will formulate the paths of the further democratization of party life and a restructuring of the forms and methods of activity and an enhancement of the role and a broadening of the rights of the primary party organizations.

Such are the main fundamental positions recorded in the draft. Work on them continues. Following the CPSU Central Committee plenum, the wording will be assessed once again and the approaches compared, after which it

will be submitted for examination by the commission and the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo.

[passage omitted]

I believe that there is no more important task for us today than the defense of perestroyka, which was begun at the party's initiative, and that the defeat of its ideas would be a most palpable blow for our society, and not just for the party alone. And the revolutionary transformations can only be defended by new radical, bold steps, a renewed federation, a renewed party, a strong state based on the rule of law and a tangible improvement in people's life, was how G.I. Revenko, candidate of the Politburo and first secretary of the Kiev Obkom, began his speech. The current political situation testifies that the country is in danger. The serious interethnic conflicts against the backdrop of the intensifying economic crisis, fundamental differences between the republics and the center, the decline in trust in the institutions of authority, lack of respect for the law and the deformation of ideological and moral reference points are essentially posing the question of the fate of our multinational state and the constitutional system itself.

A delineation of political forces is under way under conditions of real political struggle. The voice of that part which is foisting on everyone the opinion that the CPSU has compromised itself once for all and which is attempting to supplant the party in office is being heard increasingly loudly. For this reason I am sure that without an in-depth comprehension of all that is happening in society and an elaboration of the principles and approaches to the functioning of the party which are dictated by the situation we will not cope. This is all the more important in that many communists have ceased to believe in the possibility of self-realization within the framework of the present party relations. A kind of numbness among some party officials has set in. Personnel policy is becoming increasingly eroded.

If we are of the opinion that we need a profoundly renewed party, the political platform must unequivocally declare an uncompromising departure from what is today discrediting us and pulling us back—Stalinism and its dictatorial-type centralism, the suppression of any dissidence and the blind execution of orders; from hardened, inert principles of the structure and functioning of the CPSU; and we must abandon many dogmatic teachings which are dominating us.

And the creative unfettering should, I believe, be manifested primarily in the party's theoretical work. Not resting content with the fact that we have the concept of perestroyka, we must in our program document candidly answer the question: What kind of socialism are we building, for all that; toward what kind of socialism are we moving; what will it do for Soviet people?

Understandably, the party will be able to emerge from the crisis of public confidence only by having surmounted the economic crisis. In this respect I have to

express fears that the document which is being drawn up might not negotiate the significant shortcoming which, in my opinion, is being revealed in the practice of perestroyka—the priority of political transformations and changes in the superstructure and half-baked measures in the decisive sphere—the economy.

It stands to reason that without fulfillment of the special measures which have been scheduled for economic recovery we will simply not survive. But even now we need to see what comes after them. Only the market? The opinions of many communists and working people of the oblast amount to the fact that it is dangerous to confine ourselves to a single-option solution. It is essential to perseveringly continue the search for our own path of the country's economic development. It is here that pluralism and the competitiveness of the boldest radical ideas and theories need to be manifested more than ever.

Nor can the party's renewal be viewed in isolation from the formation of a state based on the rule of law. Recent events show that the party cannot evade such a difficult, but necessary business as legal support for perestroyka and the observance of legality in all things. On the other hand, it must continually make its activity conformable to the current rules of law.

Without having determined our position conclusively on Article 6 of the constitution, the speaker declared, we will gradually get lost on the question of the legitimacy of the party authorities and the soviets and be unable to answer where there is no managing without the party and where it is becoming involved in what is not its business. At the same time, however, he proposed that there also be, among other things, a law regulating the activity of all public organizations, including the CPSU, and correlation of the new provisions of the party rules with the rules of law on freedom of belief and the press and others.

It seems to me, the speaker continued, that while insistently implementing the regulations governing the political power of the working people, we are lagging dangerously behind in providing constitutional guarantees for the foundations of our socialist system and a strengthening of state structures. And this is being felt increasingly keenly. "If you cannot today feed us fully, then, at least, reliably defend us"—people are even asking the question this way, and asking it in expectation of decisive action.

A political party cannot function in full-blooded fashion without having determined to a nicety its relations with the state authorities and the mass organizations. It is necessary to highlight as an important area of the party's work the formation at all levels of strong soviets which really express the wishes of the population of a given region and the implementation of party policy through the communists working in the soviets, which, it would seem, is very much not the desire of certain political forces.

We cannot look on indifferently as the unions and the Komsomol seek their new role and the mass independent activity movements attempt to establish themselves at any price. It is essential at the all-party, all-union level to make a political analysis of the essence, composition, and thrust of the various people's fronts, which are in a number of places becoming alternative authorities: Whether they really express the wishes of the vast majority of their people or whether they are spontaneous formations in which aggrieved, discontented, and corrupt people thirsting for power are increasingly inserting themselves.

And now about the party's internal life. It can only be rendered unfettered, fully open and full-blooded on the basis of those same unfettered, democratic rules. To achieve this the present, practically inoperative rules need to be renewed fully, beginning with party membership. It is necessary to have done with the representative approach to the formation of its ranks and the regulation of literally all actions of the party organizations and each communist. At the same time we cannot leave loopholes permitting individual party members currently to have one foot in the CPSU, and the other in a politicized organization which does not share the party's aims and tasks. It is also necessary to eliminate such a paradox as a person joining the party voluntarily, but not being able to freely leave it.

We are also unequivocally in favor of a new reading of the principle of democratic centralism and the establishment of the power of truly the party masses. This should determine the procedure of the electivity and accountability of the party authorities. The elections of party leaders should be direct, secret, and multiple-choice for all. It must not be a situation where the superior is always right and the minority cannot dispute the opinion of the majority. Under the conditions of providing the union republics with full sovereignty it is important to stipulate the status of their party organizations, affording full freedom of action and creativity within the framework of the uniform CPSU Program and Rules. There should be just, proportional representation of the republic organizations in both the Central Committee and the Politburo.

Life itself rejects Section X of the rules, which enshrines the monopoly right of the CPSU Central Committee to dispose of party resources. It is necessary to fully disclose the party budget and form it fundamentally differently, from the bottom, from the primary, city and rayon party organizations, and unflinchingly approve it at a Central Committee plenum. It is a matter of honor for us to determine clearly, in accordance with our own conscience, our position in respect of privileges and benefits in the party not by the power of the Supreme Soviet but by our own decision.

We have, G.I. Revenko pointed out, to prepare and conduct an exceptional congress, pivotal in all respects. Ambivalent, contradictory processes upsetting ideological and organizational unity are growing in the party

organizations. For this reason we support the timing of the congress being brought forward, but not, unquestionably, to the detriment of the quality of the preparation of documents. We believe that the congress delegates need to be elected by the most democratic path—secretly, from alternative candidacies and by party district.

It is perfectly understandable that the CPSU does not have the right to proceed toward this congress without having rid itself of those who are frightened of difficulties, are hastily hiding their party cards and are unwilling to fight for a renewed party. For this it is essential prior to the congress to conduct the reregistration of all party members on the basis of the new political platform, and after the congress, possibly, an exchange of party papers. As far as the report and election campaign is concerned, we feel that in order for it to be full-blooded it needs to be conducted after the congress, on the basis of the new program and statutory decisions.

[passage omitted]

In his speech V.K. Mamutov, deputy director of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Industrial Economics Institute (Donetsk), expressed proposals pertaining to the CPSU Rules and touched on the problem of property. Concerning Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, the scientist reminded that when it was adopted the talk was not about it being necessary to consolidate the party's leading role. The emphasis was put elsewhere: The party was obliged to act within the framework of the law. This was recorded in the final paragraph of the article. And if we now do away with Article 6, as is demanded in places, will the party, then, once again operate outside of the framework of the law?

For this reason the question needs to be put on a broader plane: concerning political parties in general. The content of our rules will depend on this: whether we preserve one party or whether we consider that there should be at least two.

If, however, we conclude that it is necessary to leave just one party, we will need to give thought to how to structure its central authorities. I, for example, believe that since we wish to ensure a separation of powers in the state, we should cater also for a separation of powers in the party's central leadership approximately on the following pattern: There should be a Central Committee, and we need to restore the Central Control Commission and have a party central organ. And let the Central Auditing Commission remain as it is in order to verify financial activity. We could then, with regard for the party structure, structure the separation of powers in the state.

Having then touched on the problems of stratifying the party into so-called left and right, the speaker reasonably observed: I consider those who are called left to in fact be the right for the social democratic deviation was always considered and is now considered more to the right than the communists. And, continuing his thinking, he concluded: If we say that we are devoted to socialism and

that it is a question of its renewal, not liquidation, we can only have a party adhering to socialist positions and confessing socialism.

Closely connected with this is also the question of property. What is the basis for the pursuit of a strong social policy? The economic power of the state. And how to ensure this power? With the aid of public or state property.

And in the course of the debate here how is the question put continually? That we have bureaucratized this property, made it the property of the apparatus and so forth. That there currently figure in the constitution of our country state (public) and kolkhoz [collective farm]-cooperative property, but that it should be a question of public (state) property. There have also been specific proposals concerning a strengthening of the role of the representative authorities in the solution of questions of the administration of property.

Yet we take the draft Property Act, and there is no concept of public property there, and state property has been shoved into Section IV. On the other hand, there are at least four channels by which private property may be legalized. And this at a time when, at the last session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, N.I. Ryzhkov was declaring that the proposal concerning the introduction of private ownership had been turned down. Why play cat-and-mouse?

It is sometimes said: What are you frightened of, let us introduce private ownership. In fact, it already exists—look at the Cooperative System Act. There is, certainly, no need to be afraid but nor should we labor under a delusion, hoping that it will be controlled. It is even now unclear in many cases who is controlling whom.

And the final question which has arisen in the course of the discussion—the timing of the congress. We need, it seems to me, to be sure of our position here. What do we want from the congress, what kind of decisions? After all, holding elections and preparing a congress mean a very big campaign. Where are the assurances that it will not turn out as, say, has been the case with us: Some people would place big hopes in a congress, a conference, a plenum and would expect something improbable, but the improbable did not occur.

Having then shared his impressions of how people abroad, in the GDR specifically, are reacting to the interethnic conflicts occurring in our country, V.K. Mamutov addressed the members of the CPSU Central Committee present at the commission meeting: We once again expect you to decide something or other at the upcoming plenum and that you will adopt, although small, nonetheless specific measures to ensure the controllability of the ongoing processes.

I agree with the principle of the broadest democratization of the party and party life, Yu.N. Yelchenko, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine,

declared. But I am against democratic euphoria and am not afraid here of the label of anti-perestroyst or stagnationist for I am profoundly convinced that we have entered a lengthy period not simply of assaults—attacks on the CPSU. We should see that this is a component of the world political process.

The mafia is undoubtedly against the party. But there are also other internal forces (and, I believe, more dangerous forces will develop) which the party is impeding by the fact that it is for genuine people's power, while they need their own elite power.

And outside forces? Have the imperialists really abandoned their strategic aims in relation to socialism?

This why the party must in its program and rules have strong political immunity. I see as this immunity the preservation in the life of the party of the principle of democratic centralism. Such as Lenin conceived of it. The rules (like the CPSU Program) must contain precise political pointers concerning the ideological unity of party members. Without this the party will constantly be in danger of ideological stratification and division. It is necessary in this connection to clearly formulate the proposition to the effect that the CPSU exercises its role not as a federation of parties of the union republics but as a single political force.

It is necessary also to speak about the Stalin business and its consequences. The Stalin times were a political phenomenon which led to virtually the total deformation of the Leninist theoretical and practical plan of building socialism in our country.

Speaking of glasnost and information in party work and collegiality and a collective approach in decision-making, the speaker pointed to the importance of formulating a mechanism for such decision-making and advocated the election of delegates to the congress from party districts. The composition of all party authorities, he emphasized, should be confined to such a framework as ensures that they be efficient and flexible bodies.

The speaker also proposed that the program documents include a provision on party members and their role and place in politicized associations and movements and the emphasis that the CPSU operates by political methods of influence not only through the communists but also through determination of the political position of the primary party organizations and party committees of all levels.

[passage omitted]

In the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress, V.F. Shevchenko, head of the Kiev Higher Party School Department of History of the CPSU, emphasized, priority significance is attached to the renewal of the party's ideological and theoretical platform. However questions of the timing of the congress, the structure and procedure of the elections, party admission and others are decided, priority significance is attached to the answer to the

question of how the party conceives of the present state of society and its development prospects and the former's place and role in this process. Lenin's warning that organization without ideological content is a nonsense holds good today also.

Knowledge and consideration of what is positive in the party's historical experience, as well as the frequently bitter lessons which ensue from it, will help solve these problems. Of course, there are no analogies in history but it does help reveal the genesis of both our achievements and miscalculations and failures and helps us find a solution to problems of the present day. Documents of the upcoming party congress should emphatically condemn and dissociate themselves from the Stalin times, voluntarism, stagnation phenomena, and the deformations and losses connected with them. At the same time, there are things to take with us down the road of the future from the history of our party and many illustrious pages there.

For the first time the founders of scientific communism substantiated the need for and the role of the phenomenon of the political party. The resurrection in full of the original Marxist-Leninist concept of the communist vanguard, purged of subsequent extraneous features and deformations and free of dogmatic perception, and the creative use and enrichment of it with regard for historical experience and contemporary realities will make it possible to correctly determine the role of the party and its functions.

Historical experience may also help us understand the status of the Ukrainian Communist Party within the CPSU, correctly and soberly evaluate what has been gained and its struggle for a better portion for the Ukrainian people, and comprehend the lessons of the past and, taking these as a basis, find the right paths into the future. We need to legislatively enshrine in the republic constitution and the new rules the place of the Ukrainian Communist Party in the political system of our society.

Permanent significance is attached to the creative use of the theoretical legacy of V.I. Lenin. I would like also to call attention to the practice of socialist transformations of the 1920's. The theoretical propositions of the platforms of the CPSU and the Ukrainian Communist Party should depict the basic regularities of social development and the main problems of the present day. A definition of property is of paramount significance among them.

It is important that the documents of the upcoming congresses of the CPSU and the Ukrainian Communist Party set forth as fully as possible the political aspect of their activity and strategy and tactics and the driving forces of their realization and the diverse approaches in political work: persuasion, dialogue, polylogue, the art of compromise, parliamentary tactics and so forth.

Speaking of the directions of the democratization of the party, the scholar pointed to the expediency of providing

in the rules for the election at congresses and conferences of party control authorities, which would play the part of the opponent of a party committee in formulating and implementing policy. It is necessary to restore also the Leninist understanding of the party and state apparatus as a totality of members of elective bodies (from party group organizers through members of the CPSU Central Committee), not paid officials.

[passage omitted]

Summing up the work of the commission, V.A. Ivashko said:

We must preserve the dignity and strength of our Lenin Party. This is a guarantee of the building, if such a term is permissible, of genuine socialism in our country, such as we have not as yet had.

Switching to affairs in the republic, he recalled that the Ukraine was a big state, a state whose potential—natural, production, intellectual, human—was not being used with the efficiency with which it should be used to ensure a living standard which the Ukrainian people deserve.

Of course, this is a consequence of Stalin's distortion of the socialist idea and the establishment of what is today called the command-administrative, I would say more departmental, system, and the way out of this situation lies on the paths of the real sovereignty and economic independence of the republic. The way out lies in the introduction of what in N.I. Ryzhkov's concept was defined as a controlled market. The way out lies in the erosion of the departmental structure, rigidly centralized, and in the development of the republic national economy with the use of all the possibilities available to us. Although there are many difficulties also for the most important base sectors—the coal industry and metallurgy—are old sectors, old in all respects: both in terms of the timeframe of their existence and in terms of the state of production capacity, production capital, and so forth. This is the first important position.

Of course, in order to accomplish these immense tasks a strong political party, our party, is needed. Guided by the program principles and assignments of a single strong CPSU, we should move toward an independent party which has its own policy conditioned by our particular features and which has an opportunity to perform organizational work, create its own organizational structures and so forth. This is, I would say, the second position, fundamental, it seems to me.

The third fundamental position is that of the greatest democratization of party life, particularly in the primary party organizations—the basis of the party. Why is it at them that our adversaries are striking? Because if you do away with the primary party organizations there is no party. All the rest is a debating club formulation of the question. We need to insist on this and afford the party masses in practice complete independence in deciding

questions, within the framework, of course, of the party's program documents and its rules.

We have also to abandon the ferroconcrete hierarchy. There should be no chiefs and subordinates in the party. There should in the party be an atmosphere which may predominate only among the like-minded and in which there has to be debate, arguments, and clashes of opinions and where compromise and consensus are found. In a word, the communists should live as do normal people under normal circumstances and say what they think, not the other way about. Only thus may the party be suffused, I would say, with life.

You recall that in Stalin's times the term "discussion" virtually meant disorganization in the party. I do not know how our esteemed scientific associates speak but I see nothing wrong in discussing one issue or another. On the contrary, just look and compare the people of 1985 with the people of 1990. These are completely different people. They are very highly politicized. It is bad thing only that in some of them this borders on low political culture, low education and low knowledgeability, of which advantage is sometimes taken by not the best forces.

I have already had occasion to speak about this. And I return once more to this question—of the immediate introduction of the market. Here we have official data pertaining to Yugoslavia, where a transition to a practically free market occurred nine months ago. What did they do—they introduced a free market for everything, and the state controls only 14 percent of retail prices. What has happened in this time? What has happened is what had to happen. First, the market was immediately adjusted, that is, supply and demand there have now been fully balanced. There is as much on the market of everything as you could wish for. But why? Because prices have increased 26-fold.

But, tell me, could we go this route? We may talk as much as we like about forms of ownership, but we in the republic, and in the country too, most likely, give over 60 percent of accommodations to people free. So I would like to ask the supporters of this private property: What happens down the road?

I work at a state enterprise, you, at a private one. Will we enjoy equal rights when it comes to acquiring accommodations free of charge or not? No. Because none of the private operators give any thought to providing for anyone. We are seeing this now in certain cooperatives. There is a very good cooperative, a construction cooperative. It works efficiently and soundly. It pays twice or three times as much as in a state construction organization. But, tell me, does it invest money in training construction worker personnel in the vocational-technical school or not? It does not. It avails itself of the graduates of the state vocational-technical schools. And does it invest money in the development of its construction materials depot? No. Of course, when one spends no

money on anything, one may pocket more for oneself. Everyone needs to understand this.

And now in respect of the election of conference and congress delegates. People have various approaches here. If we take elections by district, say. There will be a quota, for example, of one delegate to the congress per 4,000 communists or one per 3,800. In the rayons there will be 1,200, 1,400, 1,800 and 30,000. Where there are 30,000 it is simpler. But what about where there are fewer? I, for example, get the following questions: "I, as a communist from the Kherson region, have a right to know and influence whoever will represent the Kherson Oblast party organization at the congress. But I am, to put it crudely, herded into a district, and I will be lumped with a single delegate."

I therefore believe that the most democratic thing would be, for all that, within the framework of the rules, to accord the oblast party organizations the right to discuss and decide all matters connected with the election of delegates. But the CPSU Central Committee plenum has the final say.

And one further question, which, perhaps, should be incorporated in the program documents and in the Ukrainian Communist Party Rules, if we decide to create such. It is a question of international relations. It has been the case that for many years, aside from representation along the lines of the United Nations and certain other international organizations, the Ukraine has not been represented in the international arena. Now such associations as the "Ukrimpeks" have in recent months been created in the republic. We have concluded also that we need to create, if not a ministry, then a state committee for foreign economic relations. Whoever practices relations obtains money, foreign currency. Why should we be giving it to anyone, not using it for the needs of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian state?

The "Ukrintur" firm, which will deal with tourist relations, was set up last year. After all, the rivers are ours, the water ours, the hotels ours, and the people ours, and the money should be ours.

The creation of a republic customs service has already been negotiated. So the customs will be ours also. Corresponding work is being performed along the lines of automotive communications also. I believe that the creation of our offices overseas is in prospect.

I believe, V.A. Ivashko went on, that we must take to the CPSU Central Committee plenum the concern which has been expressed here on questions of the management of the state and the effect of inoperative laws.

A decisive step forward in this direction, in our republic included, of course. Have I understood this right?

Voice from the floor: Yes!

One further proposition, very important. It is a question of a return not in words but in practice to the Leninist

concept of the party. Whatever this concern: definition of its type and organizational structures or procedure of functioning.

We need to have complete clarity also in respect of the correlation between the party and the state, the party and power, the party and the law, rather, the law and the party. It ensues from the comrades' statements that a law on the party is not at all perceived as being something all that democratic.

Now, about the existence of many parties. We have already spoken about this. I do not believe that anything can in any way impede the creation of some party or other. This is virtually a reality. This means living people, and they have their own political ideas, at least. But I am leading up to the fact that our state is socialist and that no one in the world has yet advanced a better idea and that only the parties which adhere in this way or another to a socialist platform have a right to exist, and we need to emphatically rebuff those who would like to lead our great power by paths other than the accomplishment of socialist ideals.

Our discussion has been prolonged and interesting. Many valuable opinions have been expressed. I believe that the CPSU Central Committee plenum will define its position in respect of the political documents which we will then discuss in our party and, proceeding from this, adopt the appropriate decisions.

But we need to prepare for the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum and not delay it. I believe that our commission also will have more intensive work to do in this connection. For otherwise there will be simply no coping with the big tasks confronting us.

New Party Proposed in Ukraine

90UN1365A Kiev *LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA* in Ukrainian No 10, 8 Mar 90 p 3

[Published appeal: "Appeal to Peasants, Workers, and Intelligentsia of the Ukraine"]

[Text] People of the Ukraine! Of all social strata, peasants and those who have linked their destiny with the village have remained the most socially unprotected and undefended. They receive the lowest pay for their hard labors, they are least provided with adequate services and housing, the children of peasants represent the smallest percentage among students enrolled at higher educational institutions, the peasant is the least adequately provided with medical care, and the peasant has the least opportunity for cultural and intellectual development.

Peasants! Who is defending your interests?

To a certain extent—nobody. It is therefore high time to establish an organization which is familiar with the life of the peasant and the rural intellectual, with their

problems and aspirations, and which is ready and willing uncompromisingly to defend their interests.

The Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party, which will place universal human values above class values and which will work on the revival of national agriculture with various forms of economic management and ownership, can become such an organization.

An initiative group for the establishment of such a party is functioning in Lvov. We appeal to all those who share our view on the utility of such a party to present their suggestions pertaining to its future basic documents (Bylaws [statut] and Program), care of the following address: 290056, Lvov-58, Vulytsya 700-richchya Lvova [700th Anniversary of the Founding of Lvov Street], 63. Initiative Group; telephone: 52-12-19.

* * *

Ihor Rafayilovych Yukhnovskyy, academician, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences; Yosyp Semenovych Parubochyy, chairman of the Kolkhoz-Agrofirm imeni Ya. Halan, Radekhovskiy Rayon; Volodymyr Vasylyovych Shcherbyna, chairman of the Progress Kolkhoz-Agrofirm, Brodovskiy Rayon; Serhiy Petrovych Orlyuk, member, USSR Union of Journalists; Petro Ivanovych Sikorskyy, principal, Uzlovoye Secondary School; Roman Pavlovych Kuzmych, general manager, Vynnykivske Agricultural Trade Enterprise; Petro Vasylyovych Muzychka, worker, PMK-188, Radekhov; Roman Petrovych Soloviy, tractor brigade leader, Kolkhoz-Agrofirm imeni Ya. Halan, Radekhovskiy Rayon; Borys Sydorovych Pylypchuk, director, Sukhovilska Medical Clinic, Brodovskiy Rayon; Roman Ivanovych Trynko, rector, Lvov Agricultural Institute; Bohdan Mykolayovych Dudzyanyy, chairman, Ukrayina Kolkhoz, Yavorovskiy Rayon; Ivan Stepanovych Zhdan, brigade leader, Zhovtnevyi Sovkhoz, Pustomytovskiy Rayon; Roman Yosypovych Kravtsiv, rector, Lvov Veterinary Institute; Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Velychko, director, Scientific Research Institute for Agriculture and Animal Husbandry in the Western areas of the Ukrainian SSR; Leontiy Antonovych Dunets, chairman, Committee of Agroindustrial Organizations in Lvov Oblast; Yaroslav Stepanovych Pidstryhach, academician, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences; Vasyl Volodymyrovych Kotsyuruba, director, Skolevskiy Sovkhoz, Skolevskiy Rayon; Petro Mykolayovych Basarab, chairman, Svitanok Kolkhoz, Zhidachevskiy Rayon; Dmytro Vasylyovych Moroz, chairman, Kolkhoz imeni Lenin, Nesterovskiy Rayon, USSR people's deputy; Stepan Mykolayovych Khomyn, chairman, Kolkhoz imeni 17 September, Stryyskyy Rayon; Stepan Oleksiyovych Popadyuk, farm machinery operator, Kolkhoz imeni 17 September, Stryiskiy Rayon, USSR people's deputy.

* * *

The initiative group is submitting draft bylaws of the Peasant-democratic party for consideration by all citizens.

Ukrainian SSR Peasant-Democratic Draft Charter

90UN1365B Kiev *LITERATURNA UKRAYINA* in
Ukrainian No 10, 8 Mar 90 p 3

[Text of draft bylaws [statut]: "Draft Bylaws of the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party unites within its ranks, on a voluntary basis, honest, hard-working, public-spirited representatives of village and town: peasant farmers and workers, persons in the field of culture, education, and health care, scientists and writers.

The ultimate goal of party activities is to build a Ukrainian popular state of democratic socialism, in which universal human values will prevail over class values, with political pluralism in place of class struggle, in which various forms of ownership and a market economy will be established.

The party shall operate for the most part according to volunteer principles and shall endeavor to secure equal rights for all parties, societies, and organizations in delegating their representatives to the legislature and local soviets, shall oppose monopoly of power by the party-governmental administrative apparatus, and shall seek establishment of the institution of presidential authority in the Ukraine.

The party shall direct its efforts toward the social, ecological, spiritual and intellectual rebirth of the nation, Ukrainian agriculture, toward establishment of an ethnic Ukrainian school system ["national school"], and establishment of a high level of culture, educational awareness, services and amenities. In these undertakings it shall join its efforts with the school, the church, with other educational structures and public organizations which ground their activities on humanistic principles.

The Peasant-Democratic Party is an expression of the popular will in specific historical conditions: it is a party of profound democratic reforms, spiritual rebirth, social justice, glasnost, and pluralism.

The content and methods of its activities shall correspond to the national-cultural features of the Ukrainian people and other peoples of the Ukraine and shall constitute a logical continuation of deep-rooted historical processes of the formation and development of the Ukrainian State.

I. Rights and Obligations of Party Members

A citizen of the Ukraine who acknowledges the party's Program and Bylaws, who works at his job in an exemplary manner, who is an active participant in the national revival, and who is an exemplary family person, may become a member of the Peasant-Democratic Party.

A party member is entitled:

- to elect and be elected to party bodies and to take part in the activities of party meetings, conferences, and congresses;
- to nominate candidates for election to local soviets and to the Ukrainian Parliament, to engage in election campaigning in conformity with the Law, and to take part in determining election campaign tactics;
- to take part in drafting the party's Program and Bylaws [Statut].

A party member shall also have the right:

- to open expression of his views and opinions on all matters pertaining to party affairs;
- to freedom of conscience;
- to defend his honor in the primary party unit;
- to defend his rights before an independent court;
- to fraternal support and assistance, both moral and material, by the primary party unit and central bodies;
- to critical evaluation of his own performance, of members of the primary party unit, and of the party leadership;
- to offer personal financial assistance to the party by means of voluntary dues and contributions;
- to take active part in sociopolitical organizations (societies, unions) the content of the activities of which is in conformity with humanistic ideals;
- to free and unrestricted resignation from the party;
- to check and verify all intellectual, financial, and economic administrative activities of all party organizational structures.

II. A Party Member Has The Obligation:

- to know well the party Program and Bylaws and to be guided by them in his activities;
- to be honest, fair, and to show integrity in interrelations with fellow party members and with representatives of other parties, associations, unions, and organizations;
- to work daily on self-improvement and self-education, to be distinguished by moral purity, honesty and truthfulness, and to be an exemplary family person;
- to take a civic-interest position in the affairs of his workforce and community, to support folk traditions and customs, to nurture his native tongue, and to campaign actively in support of the environment;
- to foster strengthening of friendship among peoples;

- to consolidate all strata of the population, to seek compromise solutions to all issues, which will satisfy the spiritual, intellectual and material needs of people of all religious faiths, nationalities and ethnic groups;
- to respect the spiritual and intellectual choice of each and every party member, through his actions to foster the development of all religious denominations, and to treat religious believers with respect;
- to make every effort to promote the development of agriculture, the national school [Ukrainian-language school system], and to assist them to the extent of his ability;
- to offer assistance to children's and youth organizations in their formation on a platform of national rebirth.

III. Organizational Structure of the Party

1. The primary party units [oseredky] constitute the foundation of the party and shall be formed in the locality of residence of party members.

The highest body of the primary party unit is the meeting [sbory], which is convened as necessary or at the request of the members of the primary unit.

For the conduct of current business the primary party unit shall elect a committee, headed by the primary unit chairman, for a term of two years. Election of the committee and its chairman shall be conducted on an alternative basis [offering a choice of candidates], by secret ballot, at a meeting of the primary party unit. The committee chairman and members shall work on a volunteer basis, regardless of the number of members in the primary party unit.

The primary party unit:

- shall accept new party members and decide matters pertaining to continued party membership;
- shall take part in drawing up the party Program and Bylaws;
- shall nominate candidates for election to parliament and local soviets;
- shall conduct educational work with its members and work actively in the area of national-cultural rebirth.

2. Primary party units shall be united in a rayon party organization, the highest body of which shall be the party conference [konferentsiya], which shall be convened annually.

Current party business shall be handled by a committee headed by a chairman. The rayon committee shall be formed of the chairmen of primary party units and shall serve for a term of two years. The chairman of the rayon party organization, his secretary and the treasurer shall be elected at a conference by secret ballot, with a choice

of candidates, and shall receive monetary compensation from the party for carrying out the duties of their elective office.

The rayon party organization shall publish a newspaper, which shall be answerable and accountable solely to the conference.

3. Rayon (oblast) party organizations shall be joined into an oblast (republic) party organization, the highest body of which shall be the conference (congress [z'yizd]), which shall be convened annually (quadrennially).

Day-to-day party business shall be handled by a committee, headed by a chairman. The oblast (republic) committee shall be formed of the chairmen of rayon (oblast) party organizations and shall serve for a term of two (four) years. The chairman of the oblast (republic) organization, his deputies (four), the secretary and treasurer shall be elected at the conference (congress) by secret ballot, with multiple candidates, and shall receive monetary compensation from the party for carrying out the duties of their elective office.

The oblast (republic) party organization shall publish a newspaper, which shall be answerable and accountable solely to the conference (congress).

Quotas for representation at the conference (congress) shall be established by the appropriate party committee.

4. During the time between conferences (congresses), meetings of the appropriate committees shall be held for the purpose of discussing important matters pertaining to the activities of party organizations.

5. The party's representation of deputies to local and republic soviets shall be accountable only to the party congress or conference.

6. Following are the principal duties and obligations of republic, oblast, and rayon party organizations and their executive bodies:

- drafting of a program of activities covering a given period, and introduction of amendments to the Bylaws;
- oversight over program implementation via reports by deputy groups presented at conferences and congresses;
- rendering of assistance to educational and cultural institutions in implementing programs of national-cultural rebirth;
- an accountability report on the activities of the party committee and spending of party funds.

7. It is not mandatory to adhere to administrative-territorial divisions when establishing party organizations.

IV. The Party's Financial and Physical Assets

1. The party shall be funded by voluntary membership dues and donations.
2. The Peasant-Democratic Party shall contribute 50 percent of collected funds to the charitable-purpose funds on its territory.

Dissatisfaction With Kharkov Oblast Leadership Discussed

90UN1025A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 22 Dec 89 p 2

[Interview with M. M. Huzhva, chairman of the Audit Commission of the Kharkov Oblast Party Organization and first secretary of Moskovskiy Raykom, by M. Bidenko: "Kharkov: Will There Be a Change in Leadership?"]

[Text] [Bidenko] Mykola Matviyovych, rumors are going around Kharkov that obkom [oblast party committee] first secretary V. P. Mysnychenko has resigned, and that he was forced to do so in the tradition of palace coups. It's said he was approached by a group of city raykom [rayon party committee] first secretaries who demanded that he resign. Since you're one of those secretaries, could you please tell us what actually happened.

[Huzhva] There was no "plot." Rumors to that effect are pure folk creativity growing out of the lack of enough party information plus the anticipation of radical changes.

The arrival of the first secretaries was not in the least unusual. We often get together there to discuss very important issues, such as plans for the coming year, preparations for elections to the Soviet, and so on.

During such discussions there has been frequent criticism of the obkom leadership and all its secretaries, including V. P. Mysnychenko. The time when it was awkward to tell unpleasant truths is long past. If we want to be decent, we have to be the first to tell leaders about shortcomings in their work style and about the opinions of rank-and-file communists and the labor collectives. And lately, the opinions in the primary party organizations concerning the obkom leadership have not been in its favor.

I repeat, there was no "one-day coup." Obviously, however, the criticism had reached a certain limit, because Vladyslav Petrovych himself said that it would be worth while to replace the first secretary in order to improve the work of the oblast party organization. Now he's taking part in the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

I'd like to emphasize that the question of replacing the leadership has to be decided by an obkom plenum, not some group of people. Keep in mind that V. P. Mysnychenko is a member of the CPSU Central Committee

and the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. The opinion of those organs also needs to be taken account of.

[Bidenko] Can all the failures of a big party organization like the Kharkov Oblast organization be linked to one person? And should we now expect the resignation of the whole Buro, since it is the collective organ of an unsuccessful leadership?

[Huzhva] The question of resignation is a reasonable one, but it too must be decided by a plenum. Members of the obkom are not indifferent to the opinions of the oblast's communists, which need to be studied now. The replacement of leaders is a natural and necessary process. For example, I have been serving as a first secretary for 10 years. Sometimes, party members ask whether Huzhva is going to stay on for a third term. No. At the 19th All-Union Party Conference I myself voted that elective positions should not be held more than two terms in a row.

But what does "failure" mean? Different people interpret it differently. It's true there have not been many successes in the oblast during the period, but neither were there any major failures. Failures in the national economy coincide with failures in the economy of the whole country. After all, the oblast is integrated with all other regions and sectors.

It's true that our economic development could have been more effective in the period, and Kharkovians' life could have been better. We should have revised normative contributions to all-union and republic funds and insisted that above-plan consumer goods be kept in Kharkov. The obkom has failed to stand up for the social interests of the peasantry. More attention should have been paid to planning and the structure of production.

As far as personal responsibility is concerned, it's the same as all over the country—and in the rayons (including our own Moskovskiy), the oblast, and in Moscow. A great deal is linked to the top man himself. The good is not always as well noticed as the bad is, and quickly vanishes from memory.

A leader is a leader; he must meet higher standards. Nonetheless, one person cannot decide everything, be on top of everything. What is necessary is an apparatus that can study life in all its manifestations and supply the leadership with reliable (if not always pleasant) information. That is one task the obkom apparatus has clearly failed to cope with.

Perhaps such decisions would not have been so painful, and the work would have gone better, if more attention had been paid to personal criticism at obkom plenums. The time for bold statements from the speaker's stand is long gone, but it was not often that anyone spoke about the first secretary's shortcomings to his face. As the chairman of the Audit Commission, I have a sense of personal responsibility.

[Bidenko] What are the basic complaints against the obkom first secretary?

[Huzhva] There are no specific complaints against him as a person, unless you count assertions of insufficient exactingness toward his subordinates and officials. We mentioned shortcomings in the Buro's work. A lot of good decisions have been made, but too many of them have remained on paper. Another thing: There used to be considerable talk about privileges and benefits to obkom officials. Now many of them have been abolished. Oblast Hospital No 1 has been transferred from the Oblast Medical Commission to the Oblast Health Department. The number of discount passes to sanatoriums has been reduced substantially, with more of them being given to the labor collectives. Obkom pressure on the soviets and the social organizations is weaker. But all these changes have come slowly. The pace of perestroika is slow, and reluctance to give up the old ways is making people irritated. That's the kind of things we spoke earnestly to V. P. Mysnychenko about.

[Bidenko] The election of a new leadership, of course, is the prerogative of the obkom plenum. Nevertheless, could you make a prediction as to who is going to head the obkom? I have heard it said that there are no popular leaders in Kharkov or the oblast who might be able to put forth constructive programs. It seems that was also confirmed by the last elections of USSR people's deputies, when Kharkovians gave two out of every five seats to Muscovites.

[Huzhva] You know, when things are going bad people tend to lose faith in local public figures and practically expect a Messiah to come and help. It may be that the election of truly popular figures like Ye. O. Yevtushenko and V. O. Korotich was a manifestation of the hope that, since they work in the Center, they will bring Kharkovians' problems more quickly to Moscow's attention and get something done. Time will tell whether that hope is justified.

I don't want to predict who the candidates for obkom first secretary will be, because that post is not yet vacant. But if the question comes up, anyone who has anything to do with his election ought to confer with the primary party organizations and heed people's opinions. The election itself must be democratic, secret, and must certainly involve alternate candidates. I'd like to see not only the election of the first secretary but also the principled selection of new cadres for work in the apparatus, because, I repeat, although the character of the top leader determines a great deal, it does not decide everything.

Kharkov Voters Refuse Deputy's Resignation

90UN1393B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 3 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by TASS correspondent L. Zamyatin: "A Deputy's Resignation is Not Accepted"]

[Text] Kharkov—The news that L. Sukhov had applied to leave the Supreme Soviet and relinquish the office of USSR people's deputy frankly stunned his electorate in Kharkov. After all, they had laid such hopes in him. All the more so because the deputy had conducted himself quite actively; he spoke at congresses and sessions, and had introduced more than a few sensible proposals, clarifications, and expressed comments upon this or that law under discussion. He thus defended the interests of his voters. And suddenly...

"No, not suddenly," Leonid Ivanovich explains his decision at a meeting with toilers from the transportation machine building plant imeni Malyshev. "Over the year of the USSR Supreme Soviet's work, we have adopted a number of important laws, including the law on land and property. In my opinion, there is also unfinished work. But our chief misfortune is that these laws, like others, are not working with full force in the provinces. Thus, I, your deputy, am guilty here. But I am most depressed by the fact that this year, I did not realize a single point of my pre-election program."

Machine builders R. Samoylov, I. Sechkarev, I. Vasilenko, and others who spoke at the meeting noted that many foreign parliaments may envy the battle readiness of the current Soviet parliament. The service of their people's deputy is in this as well.

The plant workers resolved to fully approve the activity of Deputy L. Sukhov, to express trust in him and to ask him to continue his work in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Not only in Kharkov, by far beyond its borders was there refusal to support the resignation. Hundreds of telegrams and letters from various corners of the country have been sent to the deputy in recent days. Here are a few of them. "I follow your deputy activity carefully. Everything is correct, workmanlike. Keep it up!" Metal worker V. Nikolayenko, Omsk. "I urgently request of you, in the interests of us simple people, do not leave the body of USSR people's deputies." Teacher Sukovatitskaya, Moscow.

So, the voters did not accept the resignation of Deputy Sukhov.

Ukrainian Official Discusses OVIR Restructuring

90UN0938A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 18 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Militia Colonel V. K. Tkachenko, deputy chief of the Ukrainian SSR MVD Administration of Maintenance of Public Order, by RATAU correspondent: "Going Abroad: Problems Remain"]

[Text] The country has passed a number of new documents which lift the present restrictions and prohibitions against travel abroad. Normative acts are being made fully consistent with international treaties, and vigorous efforts are underway to implement the Vienna Accords. A draft law is being prepared entitled "On Procedures

for Citizens of the USSR To Leave and Enter the USSR." On its first reading, its main provisions won the approval of deputies to both chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet. At the request of the RATAU correspondent, restructuring in the work of the republic's OVIR [Visa and Registration Department] is discussed by Militia Colonel V. K. Tkachenko, deputy chief of the Ukrainian SSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Administration for the Maintenance of Public Order.

[Tkachenko] Processes of relaxing regulations that govern leaving and entering our country are putting their stamp on the practical work of the Visa and Registration Service with regard to the issuance of permits and documents. Radical changes have been made in the exit questionnaire—the number of questions has been reduced to the minimum. Character references, certain items of information, and agreements have been eliminated. The periodicity of trips abroad has been abolished. For temporary trips to socialist countries on a non-visa basis, foreign passports have been replaced by special supplements to internal passports. Now, foreign passports remain with their owners. A brief list of the reasons for temporary refusals has been drawn up. These apply primarily to persons who have knowledge of state secrets, those subject to criminal prosecution, and also persons who have uncompleted material obligations.

[Correspondent] Volodymyr Kostyantynovych, do you anticipate further simplifications in leaving and entering our country?

[Tkachenko] First of all, plans call for issuing foreign passports for temporary trips abroad without prior invitation. Fixed lengths of time will be established with regard to the secrecy of information known to the applicant constituting grounds for refusing permission to leave the USSR. Citizens will be given the right to appeal to the courts to settle disputes of a material nature that arise among members of a family—those who are leaving and those who remain—because the latter frequently withhold their consent for the applicant to leave on account of material claims against him, drag their feet, but never explain or give grounds for their complaints. At the same time, the family of the applicant is inconvenienced because people unthinkingly quit their job, sell the furniture, and pack their things. Soviet citizens will be given the right to travel abroad on private business relating to their professional activities and so on.

[Correspondent] A lot of people tend to think that passing laws will solve all problems relating to leaving the USSR, that it will be a panacea for all the troubles experienced now by the visa and registration service. How optimistic is that prognosis?

[Tkachenko] I have to say that in addition to legislative questions we need to deal very soon with a large number of other problems, including cadre, material, and economic matters. A paradoxical situation has developed: on the one hand, formalities regarding trips abroad are

becoming simpler, and dealing with questions of that nature is becoming easier. However, lines are growing longer and citizens' dissatisfaction is increasing, deadlines for reviewing documents are not being met, and it's a real battle to exchange currency in the banks. It's the same thing with getting rail and airline tickets. Why is that? In my opinion it's because the new, democratic laws are not backed up by the country's material and financial potential. As evidence of this let me cite a few examples.

Because of the unprecedented increase in the work volume, Gosznak's factories cannot keep up with the printing of exit document blanks. With practically no change in the permanent personnel, it has become extremely difficult for the OVIR Service to carry out all the obligations placed upon it in a timely and effective manner. Consider, for example, that in 1986 we reviewed 50,000 applications for private trips abroad; in 1989 the figure was 1.4 million.

It is a colossal workload, of course, and the staffers' resources are not unlimited. Moreover, the working conditions for the staffers and the reception of citizens in many oblasts, especially Lvov, Odessa, Volyn, Kirovograd, Khmelnytskyi, Sumy, and Nikolayev, and in the city of Kiev, are not up to today's standards and are making a bad situation worse. The republic MVD and the local MVD administrations have repeatedly begged the ispolkoms [soviet executive committees] of oblast Soviets of People's Deputies to help the OVIR Service solve the problem. So far, however, no practical steps have been taken along these lines. This despite the fact that local budgets took in about 25 million rubles via the OVIRs as state revenues for the issuance of foreign travel documents in 1988; last year the figure was over 60 million rubles. But not a single ruble went to meet the needs of the service.

The situation was aggravated by the shortage of foreign passport blanks. At present the republic needs 500,000 such documents. But they are being delivered very slowly by the factories of Gosznak, just a few at a time. The OVIRs in the oblasts have only a few dozen blanks, while applicants to travel abroad number in the tens of thousands. And more and more citizens every day are expressing the desire to travel abroad. Last year, for example, 5 million applicants were received on that account.

[Correspondent] What is the solution to the situation that has developed?

[Tkachenko] So far the OVIR Service remains the sole object of criticism of angry applicants. And it's just not fair. OVIR staffers' workday is already loaded to the maximum, and receiving hours have been extended. What is needed, however, is radical measures and help from all-union and republic organs of the MVD. A great deal is being done in the country to improve public consumer services. I don't think our service will be neglected.

One way out of the situation that has developed, as we see it, is to decide to allocate monies annually from local budgets to meet the needs of the OVIR Service, a certain portion of state revenues collected for drawing up and issuing foreign travel passports, visas, and special supplements. Perhaps 2 to 3 percent. These monies would be used to equip reception rooms and offices, recruit additional manpower to serve the public, prepare various kinds of informational materials and standard questionnaire and application blanks, and so on. Right now we

need a minimum of 500 additional staff. We are counting on the understanding and support of the organs upon which solutions to these problems depend. I should like to note, self-critically, that units of OVIR also commit various infractions sometimes. We react in a principled manner to all deviations from normative requirements and are getting rid of dishonest persons in the service. When it comes to serving the public, OVIR staffers are obligated to treat the requests of every person with the utmost respect. This is our direct official duty.

Belorussia's Justice Minister on Public Demonstrations

90UN1258A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 18 Feb 90 pp 1,3

[Interview with Belorussian SSR justice minister Valeriy Tikhiney, doctor of juridical sciences, by a Belorussian Telegraph Agency correspondent, date and place not specified: "The Law Must Be Respected"]

[Text] The present situation in the country, including that in our republic, is characterized by an increased level of citizens' political activity. This is reflected in meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations, during which the search for constructive solutions is frequently accompanied by violations of public order, and citizens' rights and interests, as well as the requirements of the law, are ignored. Sometimes the processes taking place profoundly shake the vital foundations of large groups of the population; these processes take the most diverse forms. In this regard the editors have been receiving letters which ask us to provide more information about the legislation which regulates these public occurrences.

A BELTA (Belorussian Telegraph Agency) correspondent met with the Belorussian SSR minister of justice, Valeriy Tikhiney, doctor of juridical sciences, and asked him to answer readers' questions.

[BELTA] Valeriy Guryevich. Some people blame perestroika for bringing anarchy and disorder to the country. What is your view of this problem?

[Tikhiney] Democratization is the essence of perestroika; it is the core of it. It is only through democracy that radical transformations are possible in the economy, in the social sphere and in the political system. But the slogan "More democracy!" is not, as some people understand it, a call for license. Perestroika has nothing in common with dissoluteness, willfulness and irresponsibility.

Time has breathed new life into certain rights and freedoms which up to now would seem to have to have been lying dormant in our country. People have become more socially active; they want to live more uninhibitedly, more freely.

But all this must be within the framework of democratic procedures; it must be within the framework of legality. Legislatively we should define more clearly the forms in which the social activeness of our citizens may be expressed. I suggest that we must proceed from the premise that democracy cannot exist outside the law, for democracy outside the law is anarchy. And some people are pushing us toward this in a persistent manner. Political pluralism and the right to hold differing opinions has nothing in common with violation of the law.

It seems to me that our democracy needs protection. It must not be abused, or used for inhumane purposes. In our country (as in any civilized society) the correct

relationship must be established between rights and obligations. If we talk, as we now do frequently, about rights and freedoms and underestimate obligations, then the first thing which we will do, whether we wish it or not, is strike a blow against citizens' rights and freedoms. There are no rights without responsibilities, just as there are no responsibilities without rights. More democracy always means more responsibility as well.

[BELTA] Many questions are raised with regard to the holding of meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations. By which legislative acts are they regulated?

[Tikhiney] The USSR Constitution and the Belorussian SSR Constitution guarantee to citizens the freedom to hold meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations. This is ensured by granting to the working people and their organizations the use of public buildings, streets, squares and other places.

The procedure for organizing and holding meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations is regulated by the 28 July 1988 Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and by the regulations established by the 4 April 1988 Ukase of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium (with changes and additions introduced by the 15 August 1988 Ukase).

In addition, for purposes of ensuring public order and protecting citizens' rights and interests during the conduct of mass events the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on 15 August 1988 adopted the "Ukase Concerning Responsibility for the Violation of the Established Procedure for the Organization and Conduct of Meetings, Rallies, Street Marches and Demonstrations," in accordance with which changes and additions have been made to the Belorussian SSR Code Concerning Administrative Violations of the Law and to the Criminal Code of the Belorussian SSR.

[BELTA] In order to hold a meeting, rally or other mass event who can submit an application and to which organ? What is the procedure to be followed?

[Tikhiney] Citizens who have reached the age of 18 and who are authorized to do so by the labor collectives of enterprises, institutions and organizations, by the organs of cooperative and other public organizations, or by individual groups of citizens may appeal for consent to be granted to the working people and their organizations for the use of buildings, streets, squares and other public places to hold meetings and rallies, etc.

The application for a site and a time to hold a mass event is submitted in written form to the ispolkom [executive committee] of the local soviet of people's deputies no later than 10 days before the proposed date. It must contain the purpose; form; site for the event to be held or route of the march; the beginning and ending times of the meeting, rally, street march or demonstration; the approximate number of participants; the last names, first names and patronymics of the authorized persons (the organizers); their place of residence and

work (or study); and the submission date of the application. When necessary, data concerning expenses for holding the meeting are appended to the application.

[BELTA] What procedure has the existing legislation established for the consideration of applications to hold mass events?

[Tikhiney] In the rayon, city, rayon in the city, settlement or rural settlement, permission is granted by the executive committee of the rayon, city, rayon in the city, settlement or rural soviet of people's deputies, and in an area of two or more administrative-territorial units it is granted by the highest executive and administrative organ.

The executive committee considers the application and reports no less than five days before the time indicated in the application to the authorized persons (organizers) concerning the decision taken. It has the right, when necessary, to propose to those making the application a different site, time or conditions for holding the event.

The executive committee forbids a meeting, rally, street march or demonstration if its purpose contravenes the USSR Constitution, the Belorussian SSR Constitution or Soviet laws, or if it threatens public order and citizens' security.

A rejection by the executive committee of the local soviet can be appealed within a five-day period to a higher executive and administrative organ, whose decision is made within a 10-day period and is final.

[BELTA] Is the procedure for holding meetings, rallies and other mass events regulated by law?

[Tikhiney] The executive committee must ensure the necessary conditions for the conduct of the meeting, rally, street march or demonstration. And the organizers and participants at these events are obliged to observe Soviet laws and maintain public order. The participants are forbidden to carry weapons, or especially prepared or adapted objects which can be used against people's life or health, or to cause material damage to state or public organizations or to citizens.

The organizers of mass events must be present at them.

Meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations are held at the established times and at the specified site, in accordance with the purposes indicated in the application. The law stipulates that they must be halted at the request of representatives from the organs of authority in the following cases: if an application was not submitted, if a decision to forbid them has been taken, if the procedure for holding a meeting has not been followed, if danger to citizens' life and health arises, if public order is breached or the normal functioning of transportation and other services is disturbed.

[BELTA] What responsibility do people have when they have violated the procedure for organizing and holding meetings, rallies and other such events?

[Tikhiney] In accordance with Article 167¹ of the Belorussian SSR Code Concerning Administrative Violations of the Law, the violation of the established procedure for the organization and conduct of meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations draws a warning or the imposition of a fine of up to 300 rubles, and in exceptional cases, if the application of these measures is recognized as inadequate, based on the circumstances of the case and taking into account the personality of the offender, administrative arrest for a period of up to 15 days.

Those same actions, if committed again within a period of a year after the application of administrative measures, by the organizer of either a meeting, rally, street march or demonstration, draw a fine of up to 1,000 rubles, or corrective labor of one to two months with 20 percent of one's earnings withheld, or administrative arrest of up to 15 days.

If a violation of the procedure for the organization or conduct of meetings, rallies and street marches and demonstrations is committed by an organizer of a meeting, rally, street march or demonstration after administrative measures have been applied to him for the same kind of actions, then he is brought to justice on the basis of article 196¹ of the Belorussian SSR Criminal code, which stipulates a fine of up to 2,000 rubles, or corrective labor for a period of up to one year, or imprisonment for a period of up to six months.

[BELTA] And if the participants in a mass event breach the peace or if they refuse to obey the demands of the representatives of authority?

[Tikhiney] In these cases, depending on the nature of the illegal actions committed, the appropriate articles of the Belorussian SSR Code Concerning Administrative Violations of the Law or of the Belorussian SSR Criminal Code are applied. In particular, articles 156 and 166 of the Belorussian SSR Code Concerning Administrative Violations of the Law are applied.

For petty hooliganism or for deliberate refusal to obey a legitimate order or demand by a member of the militia, the volunteer public-order squad or the military when performing duties for the protection of public order, administrative measures may be applied, including arrest for a period of up to 15 days.

In case of actions which grossly breach the peace and express obvious disrespect toward society, criminal proceedings may be started against the guilty parties for hooliganism on the basis of article 201 of the Belorussian SSR Criminal Code. Resisting a member of the militia, the volunteer public-order squad or the military, as well as other representatives of authority or the community who are performing duties for the protection public order; insulting these persons; threatening or being violent toward official persons or citizens who are fulfilling official functions; and infringement on the life of a member of the militia or the volunteer public-order squad draw criminal charges in accordance with articles

187, 187¹, 188, 188¹, 189, and 189¹ of our republic's criminal code, which stipulate criminal punishment measures.

The organization of, and equally, the active participation in group actions which grossly breach the peace or are accompanied by an obvious refusal to obey the legitimate demands made by representatives of authority or which disturb the operations of transportation, of state or public enterprises, of institutions or organizations are punished in accordance with article 186³ of the Belorussian SSR Criminal Code.

[BELTA] That is, military servicemen can be called in for purposes of halting violations of public order?

[Tikhiney] In accordance with the 28 July 1988 Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium "Concerning the Obligations and Rights of the Internal Forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in Protecting Public Order," the Internal Forces, in addition to fulfilling other tasks, may—in cases established by law—take part in halting violations of public order if these violations are massive in nature and present a threat to citizens' life and health, if they disturb the work of enterprises, organizations and institutions or are directed at the destruction of state, public or private property.

[BELTA] Illegal actions by offenders can result in material damage. Clearly, it must be recovered from the guilty parties?

[Tikhiney] Of course. Material damage caused to the state, to cooperative or other public organizations or to citizens during the conduct of meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations by those participating in them is subject to compensation according to the established legal procedure.

A civil suit to gain compensation for material damage may be filed in a criminal case or as civil proceedings in accordance with articles 442-468 of the Belorussian SSR Civil Code. The general principle is this: the injury caused to the person or property of a citizen, as well as the injury caused to an organization is subject to compensation—in full measure—by the person who caused the injury.

[BELTA] Valeriy Guryevich, clearly you are well aware that some readers are criticizing the existing legislation concerning the procedure for organizing and holding meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations; they are demanding that it be changed, even abolished. How do you react to this criticism?

[Tikhiney] Truly, the experience acquired in the application of this legislation provides evidence of the need to further improve it. As is well known, this question has been put on the agenda for the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. But even in ancient Rome people said: "Good law or bad, it is still the law." For this reason

whether a or not a person likes the law, its requirements must be fulfilled unfailingly both by citizens and by officials.

[BELTA] In this regard one other question arises: how do you judge the state of legality, of law and order in the republic? After all, one cannot deny the fact that violations of the law have become more frequent of late and that discipline is falling off everywhere.

[Tikhiney] You are right. Unfortunately, there is no firm legality and stable law and order in the republic today. Labor, state and public discipline are declining at industrial enterprises, in construction and in transportation. Instances of obvious disrespect for the law have been widely publicized. A wave of crime has swept over us. Statistics provide evidence that in 1989 there were 66,500 crimes committed in the republic, or 36.4 percent more than in 1988, and they included 10,000 serious crimes. The number of crimes in which fire-arms were used increased more than four-fold.

At the end of last year the republic's Supreme Soviet and government worked out urgent measures to strengthen discipline and public order; the necessary preconditions are being created for an effective struggle against crime.

Under today's conditions every violation of the law, no matter by whom it was committed, must be judged in principle, and the guilty parties must be punished. As long as the law is in effect, its orders are mandatory in everything and for everyone. The Leninist mandate "to prevent even a hint of deviation from our laws" remains absolutely timely. We must be law-abiding. If you will, it is necessary to force everyone to respect the law.

Belorussians Air Disapproval of Leadership

90UN1216A Minsk SELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian
1 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by V. Nikolaychuk and N. Shcherbachenyia: "Continuation of Opposition or Beginning of a Dialogue?"]

[Text] It must be confessed that when, at the very end of the meeting, we heard its participants being called upon to head for the television building and demand direct access to the airwaves, and when we saw that thousands of people were filling up the boulevard and moving toward Victory Square, we became a bit disturbed. Such disturbance was intensified even more when, having overtaken the column, we approached the television building and encountered persons in police uniforms. This was, most likely, the most dramatic moment of the Sunday events in Minsk.

The tension abated only after we saw on the screen the leaders of the Belorussian People's Front, and—after a certain amount of time—the republic's leaders. The following thought occurred to us: this studio is the most

suitable place for disputes, for eliminating the accumulated differences of opinion, conflicts, and contradictions, as well as for working out mutually acceptable solutions. And, of course, ideally it should be such: serious matters ought to be treated seriously; they should be solved at a "roundtable," in calm circumstances, rather than amidst the whistling, howling, and shouting of a mob comprising many thousands of people.

Frankly speaking, we did not entertain any particular hopes for the consolidation of this republic's working people during the upcoming meeting. Nevertheless, a hope glimmered in the depths of our souls that the republic's leaders and the BNF [Belorussian People's Front] would succeed if not in coming to an agreement regarding cooperation, at least in mapping out the approaches to it. Such a hope was inspired by the circumstance that the leaders of the Belorussian Communist Party and the republic's Supreme Soviet had expressed a readiness to establish contacts with the leaders of this informal organization. We thought that the participation by representatives of both sides in the discussion would finally lay the foundation for the beginning of a constructive dialogue.

Alas, it did not turn out that way. Indeed, this had become clear long before the meeting began. It should probably be recalled here that it had been initially conceived as an "act of protest against the violation of the Election Law." At least that's the way the notice was formulated by its organizers. However, upon arriving at one of the points for the meeting's participants to assemble on Sunday morning, we came to understand that the discussion there would be about something entirely different—about the expression of a lack of confidence in this republic's political leadership. Moreover, this was not concealed or covered up by the organizers themselves. The posters which had been made ahead of time testified to one and only one thing: this action had been very carefully planned. And its leitmotif became the indiscriminate deprecation of everything which is being done in this republic.

Various persons went up to the microphones which had been installed in Lenin Square. Both sides called for perestroika, but each one interpreted this concept in his one way and expressed his own idea about it. And this variety of expressed opinions not only did not help people to come together, but actually increased the turmoil in their minds and hearts.

Where is that path which will lead us to the temple of general prosperity and well-being? Where is that truth, which, as one of the speakers said, is only unitary? Could it be that it lies in that cross with the crucified Jesus, or could it be in those posters which the demonstrators were raising? Or in the clenched fists which they raised over their heads? Or in the sweet promises of their dynamic movement? Who knows...? A mob never puts such questions to itself; it is subordinate only to commands. "Comrades, take five steps backward!"—and the human sea recedes like a wave to allow an express bus

though. "Down with the Government!"—and a roar is heard over the square. "Who is for this?"—and there is a forest of upraised arms.

Let's take some thought about this at least now. Let's all give it some thought. During two and a half hours of swearing, insults, and scoldings we did not take even a step closer, for example, to solving our common problem—the Chernobyl Disaster. And will there be more items on the counters of our stores after this? Have we been spiritually enriched? We understand that these questions are purely rhetorical. But here's something else: for several days before the meeting this city of 1.5 million people was living an unsettled, disturbed life. It was literally inundated with rumors of imminent pogroms and disorders. At present it is impossible to ascertain where they originated. Nevertheless, the very fact of their appearance gives cause for alarm. Such a thing cannot be deemed normal in a state governed by law, which we intend to construct.

So do we need to have meetings these days? It is difficult to give a categorical answer to that question. Once people have gone out onto the street, it probably is necessary. But not in order to overly quickly construct and "vote" for a program for eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, to approve or put an end to "dubious socioeconomic experiments." Let's allow specialists to study these issues.

Nor will meetings at which we listen solely to "our own" speakers and whistle down the "others" do us much good, meetings where we lack the patience or tolerance to listen to another point of view, or to respect another person. Democratization has not merely awakened society from its sleep. It has also shed light on our troubles: above all, on the lack of standards for political polemics. Nowadays we can say that which we were previously terrified to even think; we can criticize our leaders without any fear. And we do this, all too frequently stepping over the line between criticism and insult. It was shameful, believe us, to see people demonstrably turning their backs on a speaker who, as they say, had not even succeeded in opening his mouth.

Most likely, not all our leaders are sufficiently skilled in oratory. But even the most skillful speaker can hardly "hold" an audience if it simply does not want to listen to him. In vain, the person conducting the meeting appealed for calm and quiet from those assembled there. He shouted into the microphone: "We are Europeans, so let's be quiet at least for five minutes." In vain and to no avail! At that moment "Europe" reminded one of an army of nomads assaulting an enemy city.

And in observing the reaction of the participants in this meeting, we asked ourselves one and the same question: is the opposition continuing, or has a dialogue begun, albeit without any particular success for the time being? But we have not yet found the answer. Perhaps it can only be provided by life itself.

Estonian Citizens Committee Addresses Russians' Concerns

90UN0994A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 6 Feb 90 p 3

["Appeal To The Russian-Speaking Population of Estonia From The Main Citizens Committee Of The Estonian Republic"; signed in Tallinn, 3 February 1990]

[Text] The Main Citizens Committee of the Estonian Republic shares the concern of the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Estonia regarding both the future situation in Estonia as a whole as well as the problems of the present. We were placed in such an unpleasant situation by certain irresponsible actions of the powers that be and the lack of clarity of their ideas. We do not want Russians to associate the activities of our citizen committees with certain hysterical pranks of those representatives of the local Soviet authorities who gathered on 2 February and who, it would appear, purposefully demonstrated their nationalism with the goal of causing trouble among people on nationalist grounds. We want to clearly and precisely present the main questions which due to reasons beyond our control are being interpreted in a distorted manner. Because of this a shadow is being cast on the independence movement, the current process of restoring the Estonian Republic.

These questions are as follows:

1. In the kind of democratic state we are trying to build the rights of the members of society do not depend on their nationality. We emphasize once again that the question of citizenship of the Estonian Republic is not connected with nationalistic or religious characteristics. That is how it was before 1940 and that is how we see our common future.
2. It is inconceivable that a civilized, democratic state would resort to any kind of force with the goal of deportation in regard to its own inhabitants. We do not hide the fact that we are ready to assist in the creation of a humane mechanism to aid those who wish to return to their Motherland but in no way do we associate this serious problem with force or pressure. Afterall, part of those who came to Estonia are truly ready to voluntarily choose another place of residence if the proper conditions were created for this complicated step.
3. Questions about citizenship of the Estonian Republic and human rights are often confused. Actually there is no contradiction here. Those who petition to be granted citizenship, apparently, will receive it from the future lawful government of the Estonian Republic. The fact itself of petitioning we view as support for an independent Estonia.

That does not mean that other inhabitants of Estonia will be discriminated against. Human rights, of course, will not be violated. An inhabitant of Estonia is not obligated to become a citizen of the Estonian Republic. Citizenship is not a privilege but a duty to be responsible for one's state. An inhabitant of Estonia can remain a

citizen of another state (for example, the Soviet Union) or can be without citizenship. This choice is purely voluntary. For those who do not have Estonian Republic citizenship resident visas will be sufficient and arranging a job will depend on the abilities of the person. Economics in conditions of free enterprise does not recognize nationalistic limitations.

To sum up what has been said, once again we assure Russians, Slavs and other nationalities that there will be no place for discrimination along national lines in a democratic Estonian Republic. Hostility will not come from us.

Our position from the beginning has been based on good-neighbor relations and high moral principles whose legal foundation is the Tartu Peace Treaty and the Constitution of the Estonian Republic.

We are convinced that the Russian-speaking population will be able to understand the current complex and extremely crucial situation and support our common aspiration for freedom. The world expects from us an example of a peaceful transition from totalitarianism to democracy and we do not have the right to miss this chance!

Brazauskas May Quit as First Secretary

90UN1316A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 12, 24 Mar 90 p 8

[Article by SOVETSKAYA KULTURA Correspondent V. Burbulis, Vilnius: "Has Brazauskas Surrendered His Position to Sajudis?"]

[Text] You cannot call the political situation in Lithuania today calm and simple. Rallies are occurring at which crowds of hundreds of thousands of people gather and at which contradictory assessments of the current situation in the Republic are given. The decision of the Lithuanian Republic (this is the official name of Lithuania right now) Supreme Soviet on the restoration of the state system that is tantamount to secession from the USSR was made on March 10-12 1990 and has been met with ambiguity by residents of Nemanskiy Kray.

Lithuanian Parliament sessions sometimes continue deep into the night. Deputies are hurrying to adopt laws that confirm the status of the new state system. Even the Republic's Interim Constitution that has become the primary constitution is already functioning as the basic law of Lithuania and deputies adopted it after some two hours.

But haste in the new Parliament's work is not always justified because some laws are being hastily born and it seems like they are not being thoroughly thought out. For example, this concerns the resolution on suspending the activities of the military commissariats in Lithuania and haste in the attempt to replace D. Shnyukas, chairman of Lithuanian Gosteleradio, etc.

Passions have become inflamed and the people's opinion has also been divided in connection with A. Brazauskas, first deputy chairman of the Republic Council of Ministers and first secretary of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee. The conclusion is being made that A. Brazauskas will quit the post of Central Committee first secretary and totally concentrate his efforts on work in the government. Incidentally, the leader of Lithuanian Communists also did not refute this fact. This idea was also heard in his answers at a press conference for local and foreign journalists. Therefore, a legitimate question arises: Will the departure of A. Brazauskas, the most popular political leader in Lithuania today, from the highest Lithuanian CP party post not become the beginning of the disintegration of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party? Many people assess this move by A. Brazauskas as the surrender of Communist Party positions to Sajudis.

The hundred thousand person rally (on the CPSU platform) organized in Vilnius at the initiative of the Lithuanian Communist Party and other organizations condemned the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet decision on secession from the USSR and demanded restoration of the force of the Constitution of the USSR on the territory of Lithuania. In turn, the participants of the rally organized by Sajudis supporters completely supported the Republic Parliament's moves. The watershed of public opinion is broadening and deepening. Workers brigades for protection of state and public property and safety are being formed in Lithuania. On the other hand, Sajudis announced the recruitment of volunteers (from 19 to 40 years of age) for protection and safety of their native kray. What is this for?

The word "Soviet" is currently not in fashion in Lithuania. For example, recently SOVETSKAYA LITVA Newspaper, an organ of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Republic Government, became the newspaper of the Supreme Soviet and Government with the new title EKHO LITVY. SOVETSKAYA KLAYPEDA began simply to be called KLAYPEDA, etc. Has not the Republic's leadership set out a bit too rapidly on the path of constitutional confrontation with the laws of the USSR? Lithuania is seething....

'Legal Nihilism' Decried in Lithuania

90UN1316B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by S. Karkhanin: "Debates in the Kremlin: The Birth of Laws"]

[Text] In accordance with the calculations of USSR Gosplan experts, Lithuania's debt to all of the republics of the Soviet Union is approximately 6 billion rubles. Losses from disruption of her economic ties with other republics may total 14 billion rubles. Expenditures on dismantling defense facilities on Lithuania's territory are another 3 billion rubles. And it will cost her another 5.5 billion rubles for new housing and job placement for

those who decide to live and work within the borders of the Soviet Union. Behind the figures listed are the labor and fates of millions of people and that is why a draft law on the union republic secession procedure from the USSR that was discussed on Tuesday in the Soviet Union probably concerns each of us.

A secession decision may be made only by a referendum and by the qualified majority of the residents of any republic. The Conciliation Committee is obliged to resolve economic and political issues in the interests of both parties. And only after that can the USSR Congress of People's Deputies make a final decision. These are the main points of the draft law. An transition period of approximately five years is also provided for and is required to resolve all controversial issues and for new economic structures to begin functioning.

Everything is logical and just and it is no accident that not one of the deputies came out against the document. However, immediately thereafter appeals were heard "to hurry slowly" and precisely to, first of all, wait for the new Union Agreement and the review of the foundations of the federation. Furthermore, the session's participants learned: Reception of telephone transmissions from Kaliningrad has already ceased somewhere in Lithuania and voices are more persistently ringing out that demand that the Moscow Television Channel be "jammed" for the Republic... Republic laws on responsibility for so-called "anti-state" appeals are being rapidly prepared. How can one not agree with Yu. Blokhin, representative of Soyuz Deputy Group: "We are afraid to disrupt democracy and we are always late. Although the Lithuanian leadership is using power methods."

Protection of the rights of people and all-union property is a priority problem that the future law is called on to solve. Naturally, it does not only apply in Lithuania: The document clarifies the general mechanism to realize constitutional standards. And, attacks against the draft law from Baltic area deputies are graphic evidence that: There are forces who are interested in drowning it in demagoguery and chicanery.

For example, one can already hear the rejoinders: They say the secession law does not affect Lithuania because it never entered the Union while being forcibly "occupied" by Soviet troops. The absurdity of this assertion is obvious. Furthermore, for half a century, the republic has legally and actually lived and acted like a union [republic]. Another torpedo in the side of the future law is the idea of Lithuanian authorities recognizing all Soviet laws as invalid on their territory. But A. Sebentsov, chairman of the Deputy's Committee on Legislative Issues, correctly pointed out: A state cannot arise in the center of Europe that does not recognize international legal standards.

It is understandable that the text of the document being discussed in the Union Council still needs finishing touches. For now it is not entirely clear how servicemen can participate in a referendum. Nothing is said about

the property of all-union social organizations and funds on a republic's territory. Not a word is mentioned about responsibility for extremism. However, the overwhelming majority of deputies agree on one thing: To ignore the law for the sake of separatist ideas means to provoke legal nihilism which is close to the anarchistic principle: "Each man is a law unto himself."

"We have every opportunity to conduct a dialogue and to normally reach an agreement while resolving the 'Lithuanian problem.' We cannot only manifest imperial or provincial ambitions." Thus, A. Sebentsov answered the question on how to get out of this emerging impasse. And common sense may be able to triumph judging by the planned approaches. It is another matter that deputies must also display both their diplomatic and legislative talents to do this. All the more so since they are proposing to send a Parliamentary commission to Lithuania to study the situation and the people's mood first hand. Meanwhile, the draft law which has been approved in the Council of the Union by a majority vote at the first reading will receive finishing touches in committees and commissions. It will obviously be debated during the second reading one and a half to two weeks from now.

It will be discussed in the Soviet of Nationalities on Friday. And on Thursday, this house conducted debates on the document on responsibility for infringement on the national equality of citizens and the forcible violation of the territorial integrity of the Union. Yu. Shari-pov, a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security Issues and a deputy from Ufa, commented on the results of this discussion as follows:

"Being in Azerbaijan, I became convinced that it is so important to begin to patch up the 'deficiencies' in our laws that are connected with the responsibility for igniting national discord. Major fines and incarceration are stipulated in the draft law. Time has proven that continuous rallies are not quite the 'path to the temple....'" It has been taken into account that both an entire organization and its leaders can assume responsibility for a violation permitted by some one among those who make up a so-called informal organization. As for the debates themselves, I was surprised by the speeches in which appeals were openly heard to make all of our state secrets accessible to foreign intelligence—that is precisely how I understood the speech of the Deputy Obolenskiy. B. Oleynik justly rebuked him. And our recent meeting with Admiral Crowe, the prominent American military leader, proved: The U.S. in turn is not planning to share its state secrets with us. Our deputies who have ended up abroad are sometimes affected by the courtesies extended to them and it seems that they even complain that they cannot share confidential information.... Returning to the draft law, I would like to emphasize that it would be a gross mistake to think that complete license is the mark of a ruled-by-law state.

Commentary on Independent Latvian Party

90UNI179A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 27 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by Aleksey Sheynin, correspondent: "Communist Party of Latvia (Independent) vs. All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)"]

[Text] A constituent congress will be held in Riga on 14 April to form an independent Communist Party of Latvia—the CPLa(N).

This could be called the main result of Saturday's conference of republic Communists. The important amendment proposed by staff member Yu. Goldmanis of the present CPLa Central Committee allows for the discussion of the creation of an independent Latvian Communist Party rather than its restoration.

The report by one of the organizers of the conference—First Secretary of the Kirovskiy Party Raykom in Riga Marite Rukmane (the reader will probably remember Marite Karlovna as the first secretary of the republic Komsomol Central Committee)—and the uncommon similarity of the statements made during the debates substantiated the need to form an independent CPLa.

The new party hopes to build a relationship with the CPSU on the basis of an equal partnership. The change of party names is not on the agenda yet, but five or six alternative names have been suggested (we will have more to say about the draft program and charter of the CPLa(N) in coming editions).

More than 92 percent of the people who attended the conference were Latvian. Many speakers stressed, however, that the new party's door would be open to all Communists and all inhabitants of the republic and regretted the Russian-speaking public's insufficient awareness of this matter.

The social composition of those who attended the last conference was interesting: around 8 percent workers and peasants and over 54 percent released party, economic, and other administrators on various levels.

Several resolutions were passed, as well as a decree acknowledging the illegality of the decision of the VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee of 8 October 1940 on the inclusion of the CPLa of that time in the VKP(b). An organizing committee was formed to take responsibility for the preparations for the congress on 14 April. It will be the constituent congress for the new party. Now we can move on from this brief account of the basic facts to the following.

Quick Commentary

It was obvious long ago that a split of the CPLa was unavoidable. People with diametrically opposed views could not be expected to belong to the same party for long. The pros and cons of the split will be discussed

later, at the end of the article, and at this point we will simply accept it as a fact, and as an absolutely unavoidable fact to some extent (and as a natural process on the strength of this).

All of the intrigue, however, can be found in the tactics of struggle for an independent communist party. Conference participants were asked to vote on two courses of action. **The first** would consist in convening a congress of Communists in favor of an independent CPLA and establishing the new party and new program and charter immediately. In other words, it would mean independence here and now. **The second** would consist in preparations for the 25th CPLA Congress in June on various platforms, separation into factions at the congress, elections of executive bodies, the legal transfer of property, etc.

What distinguishes the second option from the chosen first option? The fact that the "child" would be completely legitimate and sturdy. What distinguishes the first from the second? It saves a month and a half. It is difficult to say how legitimate the independent CPLA's possible demands for legal inheritance would be in this case in some areas (including property). But it did save a month and a half...

The reason the 587 Communists who voted for this option (374 voted against it) were in such a hurry is not clear. I personally think the second option sounds more reasonable, logical, and consistent, but the decision has been made and now we must wait for the consequences, including unforeseen ones.

Incidentally, one of them can already be named. The potential leader of the party of the independent Communists, Ivar Kezbers, who is popular and respected in Latvia, will probably be unable to attend the constituent congress on 14 April. This is understandable: How can he be the leader of two parties at once? Incidentally, here is what Ivar Kezbers told a SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH correspondent as soon as he left the auditorium:

"If we want to build a democratic state, we must also observe democratic principles in our social life. I was in favor of convening a CPLA congress before the scheduled date. Then the matter could have been settled with consideration for all of the different platforms. Today a decision was made to actually form a new party. I might have voted for the platform of the independent CPLA, but I will not participate in the formation of a new party.

"The organizing committee set forth its point of view, and this view won the vote. This is proper, but it does cause a great deal of confusion. Those who voted yes appear to have withdrawn from the party. To put it more precisely, they have provided an excuse for people to accuse them of schismatic activity. The split will take place, but there are several ways of carrying it out. I am in favor of the judicially correct option. This is how the independent Communist Party of Lithuania came into being."

"Would this simplify the decision on the property issue?"

"Of course it would! It would simplify all decisions."

"What will happen now?"

"The Central Committee plenum can decide this, but the present move will complicate the decision. It will be a difficult matter."

"Was impatience part of the reason?"

"It was emotion! And the 'Group of 16' dictated its own interests. Maybe this is what should have happened. I think that many here were influenced by some of the tactics employed by those who appealed for soviets without Communists and have now accepted this ersatz option.

"Nevertheless, I feel that many people will support the idea of an independent Communist Party of Latvia even though the chain of consistently developing events has been broken and a link has been lost."

I realize that some readers will not care how much the Communist Party of Latvia has to fight to save its prestige. I would dare to assume that there will be a different "third option": Many Communists will not voice any preference at all when they are asked to choose between the platforms of the CPSU and an independent CPLA. The total number of members of both parties will not be equal to the number of CPLA members today. There will be some ideological clarity, however.

In addition, we must not forget that political parties with clearly defined national-territorial features can be part of a unified political association.

Therefore, let us not start labeling different parties of communists. It is true that a split is a normal process, and all orthodox defenders of the unity of party ranks should go consult any textbook on party history. After all, the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party] was already experiencing its first split at its second congress (in Brussels and London in summer 1903). And what happened? It was precisely as a result of this split that Bolshevism came into being as a current, or even as what might be termed a party. Which of today's defenders of unity would object to this split?

The Bolsheviks held their third congress (London, April 1905) without the Mensheviks, but exactly 1 year later in Stockholm, at the fourth congress, they came together as friends and even called the gathering a "unified" congress (incidentally, it was at this congress that the national social democratic parties of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia and the Bund joined the RSDRP).

A year later, at the fifth congress, the "Bolshevik center" headed by Lenin had already been established. The "Mezhrayontsy" were accepted as members at the sixth congress in summer 1917.... Then the Mensheviks were eliminated. And later the Bolsheviks were too....

So what if the Bolsheviks were virtually the only ones responsible for the revolution? Does this make it less legitimate? Or more?...

[Box]

Draft Resolution "On Relations with Democratic Sociopolitical Organizations and Movements"

The conference advocates cooperation with the Latvian Popular Front, democratic parties, and other sociopolitical organizations and movements in the restoration of the independence of the Latvian state and the creation of a humane and democratic society based on the principles of political partnership and mutual respect.

Resolution "On the Attitude Toward the Resolution of the February 1990 CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the Communist Party of Lithuania"

The conference supports the creation of a Communist Party of Lithuania. The criticism voiced at the February 1990 CPSU Central Committee Plenum with regard to the creation of an autonomous Communist Party of Lithuania is unacceptable to us. We regard the CPSU Central Committee's willingness to offer temporary material and financial assistance to the CPLi Central Committee (on the CPSU platform) as interference in the internal affairs of Lithuania which might contribute to the exacerbation of political and inter-ethnic conflicts in the republic. The conference feels that direct contact should be established as soon as possible with the Central Committee of the autonomous Communist Party of Lithuania.

Resolution "On the Attitude Toward the CPSU Democratic Platform Association"

The conference notes that the ideological and organizational principles set forth by the supporters of the Democratic Platform coincide with the basic principles of the activity of the independent Communist Party of Latvia: the substitution of the idea of democratic socialism for the communist ideology, the recognition of the right of nationalities to self-determination and completely voluntary membership in the USSR, and the renunciation of democratic centralism. The conference expresses solidarity with the association for the Democratic CPSU Platform and is willing to cooperate with the association on the basis of equality and political partnership for the promotion of radical perestroika in the USSR.

Youths Demonstrate in Kiev

90UN1306A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 25 Feb 90 p 1

[News brief reported by RATAU correspondent: "Attempt to Picket"]

[Text] On 23 February as many as 30 young people, gathering on the Khreshchatyk, attempted to picket the

Kiev City Executive Committee building. They displayed posters in front of the main entrance, presenting a demand, in the form of an ultimatum, calling for the immediate release of one V. V. Chemerys.

A RATAU correspondent was informed by V. I. Shaposhnyk, deputy chief of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Kiev City Executive Committee, that one-time university student V. V. Chemerys was living in Kiev without legal residence permit and was without gainful employment. Two days back he had been placed under 15-day administrative detention by decision of a people's court for organizing an unauthorized mass meeting at the university. As a gesture of protest against the lawful actions taken by law enforcement agencies, a group of young people, which included students enrolled at Kiev higher educational institutions as well as several workers and persons of uncertain employment, decided to picket the city executive committee building.

Leninskiy Rayon Executive Committee and law enforcement agency officials called upon the picketers to display good sense, intelligence, and respect for the law. The picketers were explained the facts of criminal liability for unlawful actions and informed about the illegal actions by V. V. Chemerys on 20 February. But the assembled youths proceeded to shout rude epithets directed toward Soviet authority, and they continued disturbing the peace. In view of their extremely agitated state and the possibility of further deterioration of the situation, the police put an end to these antisocial actions.

"According to our information," stated V. I. Shaposhnyk, "on 23 February a mass meeting was held in Lvov, at which the public was subjected to disinformation, with the claim that the picketers in Kiev had been beaten by the members of a special police squad. No such thing ever took place. Following explanation of the situation, some of the pickets proceeded to disperse. Those who refused to obey the law were arrested. By decision of a people's court, some of them were sentenced to from 5 to 15 days of administrative detention. Charges were brought again 17 persons. Those who were arrested sustained no bodily injury whatsoever."

Ukrainian SSR Official on Unlawful Demonstrations

90UN1393A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 6 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with N.Ye. Shevchuk, collegium member, chief of the Ukrainian SSR Procuracy administration by unnamed RATAU correspondent "If Law and Order is Violated"; date, place not given]

[Text] Incidents of violations of the legislation on the conduct of meetings, rallies, and street processions have become more frequent of late. What measures are the law enforcement organs taking? Are guilty parties being

brought to justice? At the request of a RATAU correspondent, these questions are answered by N.Ye. Shevchuk, collegium member, chief of the Ukrainian SSR Procuracy administration.

People's civil activity has grown in the process of perestroika, the development of democracy, and glasnost. They have begun to express their views frankly. Meetings, rallies, and street processions have become one of the forms of manifesting public opinion. It is natural that the issue of legal regulation of such measures has arisen. As we know, in light of this, on 28 July 1988, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium adopted the ukase "On the Procedure of Organization and Conduct of Meetings, Rallies, Street Processions, and Demonstrations in the USSR," and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, for the purpose of ensuring due public order, and protecting the rights and interests of citizens while holding such measures, established accountability for violations of the law with an Ukase of 3 August 1988.

In particular, additions were introduced into the Ukrainian SSR Criminal Code on administrative violations of the law. It was stipulated that violation of the established procedure of organizing or conducting meetings, rallies, street processions, or demonstrations entails a warning or the imposition of a fine of up to R300, and in exceptional circumstances, administrative arrest for a period of up to 15 days. For repeated commission of such acts within 1 year, as well as for the organization of violations, a fine of up to R1,000 or corrective labor for a period of up to 2 months, or administrative arrest for a period of up to 15 days are designated. In addition, the Ukase establishes criminal culpability in the form of detention for a period of up to 6 months or corrective labor for up to 1 year, or a fine of up to R2,000 against the organizers of such measures if within the course of 1 year they permit such actions after the application of administrative penalty measures.

I must note that the changes in the legislation are first and foremost of a preventive nature. Many meetings, rallies, and street processions are conducted in strict compliance with the law, and are the expression of the developing democracy, in accordance with the principles of a law-governed state. At the same time, there are cases of violations of the law which are not isolated. Last year, 630 people were brought to the republic's courts on administrative charges for violations of the indicated legislation; of these 630, 402 were fined; 153 were issued warnings, and 73 were subjected to administrative arrest. The law enforcement organs apply the law with consideration for the nature of the violation committed, the identity of the violator, the degree of his guilt, and circumstances mitigating or aggravating his responsibility.

Violations of law and order by individual students at the Kiev gorispolkom were recently reported in the press. In light of this, I would like to remind you: The 24 April 1989 USSR Supreme Soviet Plenum explained in an adopted decree that the picketing of state or public enterprises, institutions, organizations, or other facilities should be considered a form of demonstration. The rules stipulated by the aforementioned USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase must be strictly observed in their organization and conduct. This means that to conduct such picketing, and the permission of the corresponding ispolkom of the soviet of people's deputies is also necessary.

The 23 February 1990 picketing of a youth group at the Kiev gorispolkom was illegal since the group had no permission for this. The representatives of the Leninskiy Rayon ispolkom and the militia staffers conducted explanatory work with the picketing individuals, however, the proper reaction did not ensue. The militia staffers were forced to detain the violators. The people's judges subjected them to administrative punishment. This was reported in the press.

It is surprising that individual young people did not draw the proper conclusions and set out on a premeditated violation of the law. On 27 February, a group of youth, primarily students, tried again to picket at the Kiev gorispolkom building, demanding the release of the individuals previously subjected to administrative punishment. Their actions expressed an obvious lack of respect for the law, and were aimed at the disruption of public order. They were therefore halted by the law enforcement organs. In accordance with article 185.1 of the Ukrainian SSR Criminal Code on administrative violations of the law, subjected to administrative arrest for 15 days they were Drogobychivskiy Pedagogical Institute student Pokhodzhay, N.M.; Lvov Polytechnical Institute students A.A. Gasanov and I.I. Kotsyurba, and unemployed Kiev resident I.N. Yegorov; for 10 days, Kiev Theater Institute student V.V. Golosnyak. Three students of the Lvov Polytechnical Institute, A.S. Anufriyev, A.V. Lupak, and I.V. Slipetskiy were arrested for 5 days each. Drogobychivskiy Pedagogical Institute student D.D. Steblak was fined R200. Other violators were also brought up on charges.

I would like to remind you once again that meetings, rallies, and street processions, including picketing, must be conducted in strict compliance with the requirements of the law. The permission of the soviet of people's deputies is necessary for them, with an indication of the purposes, place, and time of their conduct. In conducting them, it is necessary to observe public order, and to recall the rights and legal interests of citizens.

Soviet-U.S. Lawyers' Conference Planned

*90UN1051A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90
Morning Edition p 4*

[Article by TASS correspondent : "Lawyers Are Preparing For The Meeting"]

[Text] The first meeting of the organizing committee of the forthcoming Soviet-American Conference of Lawyers, scheduled for the fall of 1990, was held recently. Over one thousand lawyers will come to our country from the USA and an equal number of Soviet lawyers will participate in this conference; the major objective of which will be to give clarification to the legal provisions of Soviet-American economic relations. A meeting like this will be the first in our state's history.

In his interview with a TASS correspondent, A. Trebkov, deputy chairman of the Organizing Committee and chairman of the Lawyers' Union of the USSR, emphasized, "The people's diplomacy, as is well-known, has recently become one of the most dynamically developing forms of international relations and it is also showing itself, to a great extent, in areas of professional contacts."

The rank of our partners' representatives is evidence of the significance to them of the upcoming meeting. Their organizing and consulting committee for the preparation of the conference includes former Presidents of the USA James Carter and Gerald Ford as well as former Secretaries of State George Schultz, Cyrus Vance, and William Rogers; former and present Ministers of Finance, Trade, and Justice of the United States, eminent statesmen, public and political figures, etc. All of them are planning to come to the USSR.

Our Organizing Committee is headed by S. Sitaryan, deputy chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers. Minister of Justice of the USSR V. Yakovlev, and Director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of State and Law B. Topornin, have been appointed his deputies. Among the members of the Committee there are academicians G. Arbatov, S. Shatalin, and other notable scientists, statesmen, and public figures.

[Correspondent] To whom specifically does the idea of the conference belong?

[Trebkov] There is an authoritative non-governmental organization "People To People", which was founded in 1956 by the President of the USA, D. Eisenhower, for the development of mutual understanding among the people of good will all over the world. Traditionally, presidents of the United States are its honorary chairmen. One of the largest departments of the organization is called "Citizens - Ambassadors". It is developing a number of professional trends in international relations, the lawyers' contacts in particular. It was Norman Svoison, the head of this department, who addressed us with such a proposal. Our Ministry of Justice, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and other organizations have been involved in the preparation of this meeting, on our side.

[Correspondent] What problems are supposed to be discussed during the conference?

[Trebkov] The program of the conference has not been finally developed yet, but we already know that there will be major problems on its agenda. In particular, the Soviet party will present comprehensive reports on the realization of the political, economic, and law reforms in the USSR. Our partners will speak on their vision of the development of the Soviet-American relations up to the 21st century. No doubt, the reports of Soviet deputy ministers of foreign affairs and of the U.S. secretary of state on the new relations between the two great states will be of great interest. Attention will be given to the concept of the "supremacy of law" and the role of lawyers in our countries, to bringing to conformity the social interests and rights of an individual, as well as to the legal aspects of global problems.

Strategy for Handling Organized Crime Cases Analyzed

90UN0998A Moscow SOVETSKAYA YUSTITSIYA in Russian No 2, Jan 90 pp 23-24

[Article by N. Podolnaya, head of the Criminal Law and Trial Department, Mordvinian State University: "Proving the Facts in Cases Involving Crimes Committed by an Organized Group"]

[Text] The 4 August 1989 USSR Supreme Soviet Decree entitled "The Decisive Intensification of the Fight Against Crime" states that within the country there has been a sharp increase in crime, including organized crime. In this regard, the investigative agencies and the courts have been given the duty of preventing any indulgences toward dangerous criminals, leaders and active participants in organized criminal groups, or repeat offenders. The resolution of these tasks when handling each criminal case depends largely upon the degree of correctness with which the criminal manifestation was defined: does it have the nature of an individual crime or is it an episode in the criminal activity of an organized group?

Although it has been officially recognized that organized crime does exist in the country, in the outlying areas this phenomenon is frequently denied because of the fact that it has been insufficiently studied, and this results in the incorrect determination of the strategy and tactics for investigating and considering criminal cases dealing with the crimes committed by stable organized groups. As a rule, such crimes are investigated in isolation from the criminal activity of the group itself, and for that reason the organizers of that criminal activity evade responsibility. Frequently such criminal cases are suspended because of the inability to establish the person who should be named as the defendant (paragraph 3, Article 195, RSFSR UPK [Criminal-Procedure Code]), or are returned by the courts for additional investigation because of the incompleteness of the inquiry or preliminary investigation (Articles 258, 232, UPK).

In order to implement this USSR Supreme Soviet Decree, a factor of no small importance is the refinement of the concept of an organized group, inasmuch as all groups, to a certain degree, are organized. For example, in all regions of the country one has seen the appearance of crime-oriented youth groupings with various names. In Mordvinia, particularly in the city of Saransk, there are offices. They include consolidated and less stable groups. There are groups of adolescents that are formed at the place of study, residence, or work; they are not characterized by the stability of the times among the members, or their actions are of a situational nature.

There are groups of another kinds which, taken all together, form a criminal organization. Such a criminal group bears the name of its leaders and it is completely reasonable to call that group a gang. For the most part, adults are members of these groups. A minor can also become part of the gang if his brother is already a member.

Gangs differ from the other crime-oriented groups, in particular from the offices, by their stability, by the directed nature of their activities, and by their organization. The criminal activities of all gangs are directed by a group of people who are the "brains" of the criminal organization, who do not take part in the criminal operations. Their task is to teach the gang members how to remain unnoticed, how to hide the traces of a crime, how to behave at interrogations in the event that they are caught, etc. For this purpose they make use of various kinds of literature that is intended for workers in law-enforcement agencies. For example, a search carried out on members of various gangs revealed a "Guide for Investigators," literature of psychiatry and psychology, and a "Fighters" video film (produced in the United States), in which youth gangs are represented as champions of justice and the idea expressed is that they should combine their forces in the struggle against the workers in the law-enforcement agencies.

The investigation of the crimes committed by members of such groups is extremely difficult without the use of new methodologies and new means for proving the facts in a case. As a rule, criminal cases dealing with members of precisely such criminal groups are suspended. Those groups have worked out tactics for how to behave at interrogations, which preclude the giving of any information concerning the gang or its members.

For example, in the spring and summer of 1988, in the city of Saransk, there was an intensification of the fight for "turf rights" between two strong criminal groups that were the most active ones. Each group assigned the task of physically annihilating the opponent. For that purpose they used in the fight the very same methods that are used by the criminal operations service: ambushes, shadowing, etc., as a result of which various kinds of bodily injury, sometimes fatal, were inflicted, by the use of firearms and knives of various kinds.

The people on whom even serious bodily injury had been inflicted, by virtue of the instructions issued by the criminal organization, did not give the investigator the name of their enemies. Their responses at the interrogations were rigidly determined by the principle: don't establish any contact with the investigator. Members of an organized criminal group on whom bodily injuries had been inflicted (they were involved in the criminal cases as victims) responded identically at the interrogations: "I don't have any enemies, and I am not friendly with anyone; I will not prosecute anyone, because I am to blame for everything; I don't know anyone and, if I should meet anyone, I doubt whether I would recognize him, since I didn't see who it was, etc."

On the basis of a study of the cases we, like other researchers, came to the conclusion that a gang is a structural unit in a criminal organization, all the members of which are aware of the link between one another and each of whom knows his obligations. It is rather difficult by using the traditional methods of establishing the facts to uncover a crime that was committed by a member of such a gang. The investigator and the court cannot receive indictment evidence from witnesses, because the latter are afraid of vengeance on the part of the gang. For example, with regard to an instance of the inflicting of bodily injury, witness S. said that she had seen the person who had shot the victim, but she would not identify him because she was afraid of vengeance. In another case accusing N. of crimes stipulated by Article 148 and Part 1, Article 218 of RSFSR UK [Criminal Code], the victim, who had given the criminal's name, was threatened by the gang members with physical reprisal, and the investigator who had confirmed her depositions had his apartment set on fire.

In the criminal case accusing S. of a crime stipulated by Part 1, Article 108 of the Criminal Code, the witnesses—the victim's wife and father—who had given truthful depositions were threatened with physical reprisal by the gang in which the accused was a member. As a consequence, the victim's wife, and then his father, recanted their previous depositions. The case was sent back by the court for additional investigation.

A study of criminal cases shows that the incompleteness of the study of the evidence on cases in this category in the courts manifests itself frequently as a result of a recanting by the witnesses of their previous depositions, inasmuch as, on instructions from the "center," they are monitored at court by a group of gang members, who subsequently warn the witnesses and victims of reprisals.

This circumstance requires us to take a different look at publicity as a principle of justice, inasmuch as publicity is actively used by the criminal world as a means of hindering the court and the investigation from establishing the truth with regard to the case and as a means by which the guilty individual can escape responsibility. Therefore it would be desirable to view the cases in this category at closed sessions. However, proceeding from the contents of Article 18 of UPK, the courts cannot

resolve the matter in this way. It would seem that the situation that has developed in our country in the fight against organized crime necessitates a change in this article. In this regard, we propose rewording Part 1 of this article as follows: "The investigation of cases in all courts is open, with the exception of instances when this contradicts the interests of the protection of the state, society, or an individual."

The "center" of a criminal organization sets up large roadblocks against the court and the investigation. It arms the gang members who have been brought to criminal responsibility with legal knowledge, and frequently recommends to the defendant that he abuse the law in order to defend himself. Covering themselves by the humanizing of the social processes in our country, the defendants and the gang members state that their rights in all dubious instances have been violated. For example, S., an active and aggressive member of one of the gangs, stated in court that his right to defense had been violated, which violation allegedly had been expressed in the fact that the investigator had examined the place of the crime with his participation, but had not informed the defending counsel of that fact.

The court found the defendant's complaint to be substantiated and returned the criminal case to the procurator "because of a substantial violation of the law." Actually, in our opinion, the defendant's right to defense had not been violated, inasmuch as, at the preliminary investigation, it is the expression of the defendant's will, within the confines of the law, to defend himself against an accusation that has been made by becoming acquainted with the substance of the accusation and its repudiation by his own proofs, and also by means of the presenting of evidence of his innocence, the presentation of interceding pleas, and familiarization with the materials of the case upon the conclusion of the preliminary investigation or inquiry.

In the example given, defendant S. had not made an interceding plea concerning the carrying out of a repeated inspection of the place of the alleged crime with the participation of his defending counsel. In addition, the court, in accordance with Article 293 of UPK, could have carried out that investigative action itself, rather than returning the criminal case for additional investigation.

An analysis of the legal-investigation practice shows that, when attempting to prove innocence in cases involving crimes committed by an organized group, the workers at law-enforcement agencies must possess knowledge not only in the legal areas, but also in other areas of knowledge. For example, in order to conduct the trial correctly in a case in which the defendant fakes a mental illness on instructions from his accomplices, the judge must have information not only about the varieties of such illnesses, but must also know the form and type of their progress.

In the course of studying the cases in the category being analyzed, one can see that the criminals, in their activities, count largely on the humanitarian criminal policy of our state with regard to minors and, in particular, they count on having the courts suspend the sentences as applicable to them. Minors are frequently used as active participants in the commission of a crime, since "nothing will happen to them." This instruction given by a criminal group is almost always confirmed by practice.

The courts are not taking sufficient steps to investigate the personality properties of minors when applying Article 46.1 of the Criminal Code, which stipulates the suspension of the sentence. Thus, S., as a gang member and an active participant, committed a crime stipulated in Part 3, Article 212.1 and Part 2, Article 145 of the Criminal Code. Despite the heinousness of the crimes that had been committed, the court deemed it possible to suspend his sentence. This decision did not play the role of partial prevention. S. continued to engage in criminal activity and, after a short period of time, he was detained for having committed a serious crime.

In another instance Ch. stole some private property. The court recognized that he was guilty of having committed the crime and sentenced him to two years of incarceration, but suspended the sentence. A short while later, Ch. murdered someone his own age with a homemade pistol that he had taken away from some adolescents.

Errors by the court in applying Article 46.1 of the Criminal Code can be avoided if, in each criminal case dealing with a crime committed by a minor, an expert study is carried out to establish the defendant's personality traits. For example, in order to suspend the sentence with respect to the same Ch., it was necessary first of all to know his individual personality traits. It is impossible to gain a complete knowledge of them from performance appraisals. This is achieved by means of research by specialists in the field of psychology with the use of special methodologies. Thus, an analysis of Ch.'s intellectual level showed that Ch. is distinguished by a clearly expressed degree of debility and his intellectual development corresponds to the level of a student in grade 4 of a remedial school. That result was confirmed by research studies with the aid of various other methodologies. In addition, it was established by the use of expert studies that Ch.'s mental personality development had an active asocial trend, as a consequence of which he represented a threat to those around him.

If the court had had such information at its disposal when considering the first socially dangerous act, it could have made the correct decision, thus preventing the commission by Ch. of the second serious crime.

Without the use of various methods for studying the circumstances of the case and the criminal's personality, and without the further improvement of the criminal trial, even if the law-enforcement agencies are provided with sufficient material support, the successful implementation of the task of fighting crime is impossible.

Ukrainian SSR Commission on Repression Victims' Rights Meets

90UN1024A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in
Ukrainian 26 Jan 90 p 1

[RATAU report: "In the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission"]

[Text] On 25 January there was a meeting of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission To Foster and Secure the Rights and Interests of Rehabilitated Persons and Create Monuments to the Victims of Repressions That Took Place in the 1930s-1940s and Early 1950s.

The Commission's activities in the past year and measures to improve the work were the subject of a report by its chairman, O. P. Lyashko. He noted that commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, oblast, and Kiev City soviets of people's deputies have done a certain amount of work to help soviet organs secure the rights and interests of rehabilitated persons. More than 6000 citizen requests have been reviewed. Commission members have undertaken to ensure prompt review of materials and files on illegally repressed persons, with the result that procuracy and court organs have handed down decisions on the rehabilitation of over 1100 persons. The relevant executive committees, financial offices, and social security bodies have complied with more than 250 requests to return illegally confiscated property or make good the loss of its value. More than 100 families of rehabilitated persons have been given improved living conditions. Pensions of 55 persons have been reinstated or increased. Many persons have been

helped to obtain compensation due them, medical services have been improved, and other practical problems have been dealt with.

At the same time, it was noted at the meeting, the work of some commissions has been characterized by inattentive, sometimes formalistic treatment of citizens' requests. In many cases, officials have been insufficiently prompt in securing the rights and legitimate interests of rehabilitated persons. It is essential to institute strict monitoring of the handling of property, living, retirement, service, and other needs of rehabilitated persons and members of their families, and to get more party and labor veterans and production leaders involved in the work of the commissions. It is essential to generalize experience in exploiting the possibilities of historical and regional museums and other cultural and educational institutions to immortalize the memory of the victims and provide an objective picture of the period during which illegal repressions took place.

Participants in the meeting heard reports by O. I. Lozhkaryov and H. F. Ponomaryov, the chairmen of the commissions of the Vinnitsa and Kharkov oblast soviets of people's deputies, concerning efforts to help the executive committees of local soviets to find, beautify, and safeguard the graves of repression victims.

The appropriate decree was adopted in regard to the questions discussed.

The meeting was participated in by Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo member and Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman V. S. Shevchenko.

Belorussian Progress Liquidating Chernobyl Aftermath Reported

90UN1030A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 30 Jan 90 pp 1, 3

[Speech by Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman A. T. Kichkaylo: "Progress in Implementing the State Program to Eliminate the Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident"]

[Text] The republic's Council of Ministers and its ministries and departments completed a certain amount of work following the 12th Session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, at which the State Program to Correct the Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident in the Belorussian SSR was adopted.

The program was submitted to a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet for review. This was a hard thing to achieve for USSR people's deputies and the republic's government. As you know, Comrades Sokolov, Dementey, Yevtukh, Kebich, Koshperko and many other deputies spoke on this issue at the session.

The USSR government ordered the USSR Gosplan to conduct an expert examination of the submitted program. Six expert subcommissions were created under the USSR Gosplan. The Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers created similar commissions to substantiate and defend the different sections of our program.

Let me say frankly that the program's defense is not proceeding easily. It is difficult because the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences has still been unable to achieve a proper understanding and recognition of our positions in the USSR Academy of Sciences.

At the same time the republic's government, which was unwilling to wait for many of the issues to be resolved in union organs, enacted a number of practical measures to implement the adopted program. As you know, the program foresees resettling residents in 1990-1991 from population centers in the zone of radioactive contamination in Gomel, Mogilev and Brest oblasts, in which safe human habitation cannot be ensured. This is 7,454 families from 112 population centers. But considering the complex moral and psychological situation in these population centers, we began implementing emergency measures at the end of last year to hasten resettlement of families from the indicated population centers, so as to complete their resettlement not in three years but in one—that is, in 1990. With this purpose the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers adopted a decision to resettle, in the first quarter of the current year, 628 families from Gomel Oblast and 470 families from Mogilev Oblast that expressed a desire to move into clean rayons of this oblast, as well as 1,610 families in other oblasts of the republic. For this purpose the corresponding quantity of apartments or homes are being allocated in Gomel, Mogilev, Brest, Vitebsk, Grodno and Minsk oblasts.

The Belorussian CP Central Committee and Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers 19 January 1990 decree "On Measures to Ensure Fulfillment of the Quotas of the State Program to Eliminate the Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident in the Belorussian SSR, Set for 1990" ordered Belorussian SSR ministries and departments and union-subordinated construction organizations located in the republic to build 48 modern agricultural towns in clean zones of Gomel, Mogilev and Brest oblasts. By as early as this year 5,069 farmstead homes will be built in these towns, including 2,606 homes in Gomel Oblast, 2,361 in Mogilev Oblast and 102 homes in Brest Oblast. This will permit resettlement of residents from population centers earmarked by the program for priority resettlement. The republic's government has found a possibility for completely supporting the quota established for the current year for construction of these facilities with the necessary materials and equipment.

In addition capital investments planned for construction of facilities in Armenia will be channeled into erection of residential buildings for residents resettled from zones of radioactive contamination. All who remain there for practical purposes are just builders of the city of Minsk, who are not involved in efforts to correct the consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident. Builders will also be recalled from all other regions of the country in the very immediate future.

In December 1989 the republic's government approved an order to pay assistance in an amount of 15 rubles per family member to the residents of 1,523 population centers of Gomel, Mogilev, Brest, Minsk and Grodno oblasts in which consumption of milk and other locally produced foodstuffs is partially limited. Around 480,000 persons live here, and the total annual payments will be over 85 million rubles. The list of such population centers is presently being refined.

In order to ensure unconditional support to quotas foreseen by the program for construction of agricultural towns, three military construction battalions are presently being transferred into the republic. A few days ago a contract was signed with Poland's Energopol to build such towns in Mogilev Oblast, where construction and installation jobs will be carried out at a cost of around 10 million rubles. Polish builders will move from the construction site of the Smolenskaya AES to Mogilev Oblast as early as in April.

It should also be mentioned that it was precisely on the initiative of our republic and its deputies that the USSR Council of Ministers and the AUCCTU adopted Decree No 886 dated 20 October 1989, known to all of you, "On Additional Measures to Intensify Health Protection and Improve the Material Status of the Population Residing on Territory Subjected to Radioactive Contamination as a Result of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident."

Specific paths for implementing the program in the current year were determined by a decree of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers adopted on 19 January of this year. Following approval of our program by the USSR Supreme Soviet, we drew up specific measures and the paths of its implementation in the 13th Five-Year Plan.

We need to improve the health of 319,000 persons in the current year. Thus far we have allocated 216,000 passes, or 68 percent of our demand. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health, the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Education and the Belorussian SSR Council of Trade Unions need to show more persistence in this matter, and to resolve this issue in the next 2 weeks in union organs, since the republic has exhausted all of its possibilities.

Each year the entire population undergoes clinical examination and treatment in all regions of radiation monitoring. The coverage has been 90 percent of adults and 100 percent of children. Local doctors are aided in this effort by teams from all oblasts and from the city of Minsk. A total of over 300 doctors worked in such teams in 1989. A new order defining the work procedures of these teams more clearly was published for 1990. Their work schedule has been approved.

Evaluating and forecasting the status of the population's health in contaminated regions, we should note that a noticeable increase has occurred in diseases of the thyroid gland, especially among children, and of anemia, respiratory tract and visual organ diseases and so on.

The necessary medical measures are being implemented in this connection: The appropriate services are being strengthened, the needed equipment is being purchased, and the necessary medicines are being acquired. However, the alarming moral and psychological situation requires an increase in the number of residents to be resettled.

Two wards of 100 beds each have been organized in a clinic of the Scientific Research Institute of Radiation Medicine of the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health in order to treat children from stricken rayons. Assistance is being provided to them in all republic centers. A children's oncological department was organized in the Belorussian SSR Scientific Research Institute of Oncology and Medical Radiology in order to render specialized care to children with malignant neoplasms. Proposals of the Ministry of Health to reinforce the hematological service have been approved.

Gomel and Mogilev oblasts have been provided with 100 percent of their demand for canned meat and dry mixtures owing to redistribution of existing funds. Seven hundred tons of Tutelli mixture (Finland) were also sent to these regions.

The republic has accepted assistance from Austria's Volkshilfe benevolent organization, which provided

some foodstuffs to children in stricken rayons. The first consignment of 12 tons should arrive in the next few days.

On 24 January 1990 the Collegium of the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health discussed and approved medical contraindications to the population's habitation of the rayons exposed to radiation in connection with the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident. In December 1989 the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health sent the list of contraindications to the USSR Ministry of Health for discussion and approval. However, the USSR Ministry of Health and the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences have not yet resolved this issue. This is why the Collegium adopted the decision to approve it without waiting for a decision from above.

Specialized dispensaries are being opened and scientific research on this problem has been activated in the cities of Gomel and Mogilev. Development of the first and second generations of an all-union register has now been completed, the levels and schedules of clinical examination and treatment are now beginning to be monitored, and requested information is now being transmitted to local establishments. Information on 484,000 persons was entered into the register in 1989. There are plans for completing the third generation of the experimental retrieval system of the register in 1990. This will make it possible to ensure scientific substantiation of the register, and to receive dynamic information on the state of the population's health.

A decree of the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers foresees measures to cover the demand for medical workers in stricken regions in 1990 with graduates from medical institutes.

Additional medical equipment worth a total of 25.17 million rubles was allocated in 1986-1989 in order to support therapeutic and preventive institutions of rayons exposed to radiation. Of this equipment, 14 percent is imported.

Medical equipment costing a total of 7 million rubles was purchased in 1988 with hard currency provided by industrial enterprises, and 11 million rubles' worth of equipment was purchased in 1989. Contracts were signed on the basis of hard currency received in 1989 (1 million rubles). The USSR Council of Ministers allocated 2 million rubles in fully convertible currency for these purposes in 1990. We are working with foreign companies and various organizations in socialist and capitalist countries to provide uncompensated assistance to the republic.

However, despite all of the measures being implemented to find additional resources, the availability of medical equipment in stricken rayons remains far from adequate.

There are plans in 1990 to fully supply therapeutic and preventive institutions in the rayons with medical equipment that would reduce the radiation load (ultrasonic

apparatus, hematological analyzers, light-fiber gastroscopes etc.). Diagnostic centers and affiliates of the Scientific Research Institute of Radiation Medicine will also be created in the cities of Gomel and Mogilev.

The demand for medicinal preparations was 90-95 percent satisfied in 1989 due to redistribution in the republic as a whole. The USSR Ministry of Health has not allocated additional funds.

In order to strengthen the material and technical base of the efforts to improve children's health and treatment, three sanatoriums in addition to the Aksakovshchina Sanatorium, the administration building of the Fourth Main Administration and the building of the Affairs Administration of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers were transferred to the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health. Expansion of the children's hematological center and phased repair and reconstruction of the children's ward of Clinical Hospital No 1 in the first quarter of 1990 have been foreseen. The necessary materials, furniture and equipment have been allocated for these purposes.

Fulfilling the decree of a session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, the government of the republic adopted a decision in November 1989 for centralized supply of the population of Gomel and Mogilev oblasts residing in the zone of radioactive contamination with food commodities in correspondence with sensible food consumption norms, durable nonfood goods and basic necessities; this has created a priority in supply to the population of these oblasts. Thus the demand for meat products was calculated on the basis of the norm recommended by the Nutrition Institute of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences—80 kg per year.

Let me explain the calculations for meat consumption using Gomel Oblast as an example. In 1989 the amount of meat and meat products consumed on the average per person in the oblast was 66 kg. The plan for deliveries of meat by the oblast to the union republic fund for 1990 was decreased by 29,000 tons (by 37.4 percent) in comparison with the five-year plan, and by 14,100 tons (22.5 percent) in comparison with actual deliveries last year. Thus even while meat production is being maintained at the 1989 level, the increase in meat resources over last year is 11 kilograms per capita. Meat consumption in the zone will attain 80 kilograms per person per year. Approximately the same level of consumption will also exist in Mogilev Oblast.

In compliance with a decree of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet dated 5 December 1989, the republic's Council of Ministers submitted a petition to the USSR government to reduce state deliveries of meat products to the union fund by 96,000 tons. A request to reduce deliveries of milk, potatoes and flax was substantiated as well.

Stocks were allocated on the basis of sensible consumption norms in relation to vitally important food products such as oatmeal, sugar, confectionery articles, vegetable

oil, mineral water, cabbage, vegetables and fruits. As far as groats, fish products, coffee and coffee beverages, xylitol, sorbitol and fructose are concerned, their allocation in the required volumes is in the discussion stage.

The task of delivering clean perishable products to the population residing in rural areas is being carried out. While in 1989 85 units of specialized transportation were allocated, 262 units were sought out and allocated for the current year. Steps have been taken to ensure preservation of perishable goods. Over 650 additional units of refrigeration equipment will be installed in trade and public food services enterprises.

The population within the zone of constant monitoring in Gomel and Mogilev oblasts also received priority support in relation to nonfood goods. This year 34 percent more refrigerators than in the republic as a whole and 27 percent more washing machines have been allocated and sold to the population of Gomel Oblast, per 1,000 families. Twenty-six percent more furniture, four times more household soap, almost twice more toilet soap and 2.7 times more synthetic washing agents will be sold per person than in the republic as a whole. The necessary resources have also been allocated to the population residing in the zone of constant monitoring in Mogilev Oblast.

Following adoption of a program with regard for scientific research in 1986-1989 on the influence of radioactive contamination on the republic's agroindustrial complex, new "Recommendations on Agriculture in the Conditions of Radioactive Contamination of Belorussian SSR Land in 1990" and the procedures to be followed in further efforts to specialize the farms were approved.

Other recommendations foresee zoning the territory with respect to strontium-90, and ceasing agricultural production on agricultural land with a density of contamination by radioactive cesium greater than 40 curies per square kilometer. Milk production has been excluded in the zone in which the density of contamination by radioactive cesium is 15-40 curies per square kilometer, and the procedures for producing plant and animal products have been refined in order to exclude acquisition of contaminated products. Let me recall that 92,000 tons or 1.2 percent of the grain, 91,000 tons (1.2 percent) of the milk and 616 tons (0.03 percent) of the milk received in 1989 were contaminated. This is a hundred times less than the amount of such products received in 1986-1988. At the end of last year 151,000 hectares of agricultural land from which clean products could not be obtained despite implementation of agrochemical measures were removed from crop rotation.

Specialists and scientists of the republic, of Gomel Oblast and of Kormyanskiy and Khoynikskiy rayons have made calculations for farming these regions which account for the need for ensuring living conditions in these territories safe to human health, complete exclusion of production of agricultural products containing

radioactive compounds above the established norms, and the feasibility of agricultural production and protective measures.

An integrated program to study radioactive contamination of land was drawn up and additional surveys of the population are being carried out in the republic. Four thousand five hundred population centers have already been surveyed, and certificates have been prepared for each of them. As a result of the additional surveys the list of population centers specified on the lists of the first and second programs has been updated. Decrees offering benefits to the population have been adopted in correspondence with this. Survey of land on which contamination is greater than one curie per square kilometer with respect to cesium-137 and strontium-90 has been completed. Maps are being prepared for publication.

Additional measures were implemented to strengthen the staff and the material and equipment support of oblast, city and rayon radiological services. A system of providing extensive information to the population on the radiation situation is being created. Information groups have been created for this purpose in the oblasts and in all contaminated rayons. Centers for radiological monitoring will be created and public electronic information displays will be installed in the cities of Gomel and Mogilev in 1990.

There are plans for continuing efforts to update the situation in all of the republic's territory in the future. Data on the radiological situation and on levels of radioactive contamination are being published systematically.

Industrial instruments formerly employed in nuclear power engineering have begun reaching contaminated rayons of Gomel and Mogilev oblasts with the purpose of organizing dosimetric and radiometric monitoring following the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident. Such instruments will also be supplied to other oblasts in the republic in the future. There were 1,411 units of such equipment in 1986, 3,258 units in 1987 and 6,656 units in 1989. This modern equipment has been supplied primarily to monitoring institutions and to the dosimetric monitoring laboratories of ministries and departments in order to determine the volumetric and relative radioactivity of foodstuffs and agricultural products. In comparison with 1986, the quantity of instruments increased by a factor of 4.5.

The republic has now organized production of dosimetric instruments for the public. These orders have been placed with the Borisov Instrument Making Plant, the Gorizont Production Association, the Rechitsa Ritm Plant, the Gomel Izmeritel Production Association and the Minsk Production Association imeni V. I. Lenin. There are plans for manufacturing 66,000 such instruments for the population in 1990. The instruments will be sold through the retail trade network.

The opinion is sometimes heard that the government has only just begun actively working on this problem. But

this is not at all so. The most important issues have been examined systematically each year since 1986 in the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, and proposals have been submitted to the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. The fact that they were not all resolved, often due to absence of complete information and of coordinated, clear recommendations from scientists, is another matter. It was for this reason that we found ourselves unprepared to complete the program for the present year. Only 3 months ago did we begin planning agricultural towns for resettlement of people.

The main thing now is to promote faster implementation of the adopted documents in relation to all directions determined in the program to eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident.

Belorussia Receiving Chernobyl Relief From Abroad

90UN1030B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 30 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by V. Bogdanov: "The Bridge of Mercy Is Functioning"]

[Text] Seven thousand disposable syringes, 3,000 pairs of surgical gloves, 16 boxes of various vitamins and another 10 containing other medical preparations—such is the cargo delivered to our republic by residents of the FRG—Mikhail Melnik, a Belorussian, and Hans Olesh, a German. The medicines were acquired with funds collected by West German church-goers to provide assistance to the victims of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident. On 26 January in the quarters of the Belorussian Radzima Society they were transferred to representatives of Bykhovskiy, Klichevskiy, Mogilevskiy, Kirovskiy and Krichevskiy rayons of Mogilev Oblast for the treatment of children.

"This is the largest consignment of medicines entering Belorussia after a number of the republic's public organizations appealed in July of last year to compatriots living abroad with a request to provide assistance in surmounting the consequences of the Chernobyl accident," said Nikolay Vasilenok, first deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Belorussian Radzima Society. "The first to respond to our appeal for assistance was Mikhail Melnik. Learning of the scale of the misfortune that afflicted us, he turned to his brothers in the faith, and by as early as November 1989 he delivered medicines to us purchased with the 15,000 West German marks they collected. As we said our farewells to him, we never thought that he would return so quickly. He was back in just 2 months. This time the value of the medical cargo is around 20,000 marks."

Help is also coming in from other countries. A few days ago 2,700 disposable syringes were received from Holland. They were sent by the Kalinka Ensemble, which is engaged in the study of our folklore. It was reported from

Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport that a parcel of medicines from our compatriots in the African Republic of Ghana was being forwarded to our address. We transferred medicines obtained from the USA to a clinic of the Scientific Research Institute of Radiation Medicine in Aksakovshchino.

Belorussian Official on Measures to Counteract Chernobyl

90UN1037A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 31 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with G.N. Pankov, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers Department on Issues of Counteracting the Effects of the Accident at Chernobyl AES, by BELTA correspondent Yu. Bekhterev: "From the Point of View of Experts"]

[Text] The republic was visited by a group of specialists from the USSR Gosplan Expert Commission on environmental issues. Environmentalists visited Gomel Oblast rayons affected by the accident at the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Electric Plant]. They checked background radiation and talked with residents of villages who were in the area and with soviet, party and management employees.

On January 27, at the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, commission members met with A.T. Kichkaylo, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, and heads of a number of ministries, agencies and research institutes of the republic. Speeches by V.S. Ulashchik, Belorussian SSR minister of health care; A.V. Stepanenko, vice president of the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences and USSR people's deputy, and Ye.F. Sukharukov, first deputy chairman of the republic Gosagroprom, discussed the situation in the affected areas and explained the urgent need to transfer residents.

BELTA correspondent Yu. Bekhterev asked G.N. Pankov, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers Department on Issues of Counteracting the Effects of the Accident at Chernobyl AES, to talk about the problems discussed at the meeting.

[Correspondent] Georgiy Nikolayevich, judging by reports in the press, most Moscow scholars advocate the notorious concept of "35 BER for a life". When they come to Belorussia, they try to persuade republic leaders that this concept is valid. What happened this time?

[Pankov] The Gosplan group included both supporters and opponents of this concept. But different scientific views did not keep them from coming to the same conclusion, namely that people from affected areas must be moved, and moved as soon as possible. In the opinion of A.G. Nazarov, the head of the group, even the very tight timetable for the move drafted by the Belorussian SSR State Program for Counteracting the Effects of the Accident should be compressed further.

[Correspondent] It is a fine advice, but where can we find resources and funds to build dozens of new villages

and agricultural towns? The republic will not be able to carry out this work without the assistance of the whole country. Yet, the Belorussian program for counteracting the effects, drafted more than six months ago, has not yet been approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Pankov] In fact, the commission was studying our program. That document was praised by Moscow experts. They noted its humanitarian aspects and comprehensiveness, and praised it for being well-founded. No attempt was made to cut anything or to cast doubt on any measure. On the contrary, environmental scientists were trying to see whether we took into account and foresaw everything. For instance, they noted that we must continue to study the radioactivity situation in the republic. Migration of radioactive nuclei could have led to the appearance of new sources of radioactive pollution of which we know nothing so far. We lack sufficient information about the impact of plutonium and other radioactive elements on the human body.

In short, the documents that will be submitted to the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet should have no "blank spots", which is why both Belorussian and Moscow scientists will have to do much work on the program, justifying it thoroughly. In the near future, the document will be studied by several other groups of environmental scientists, medics and economists. Our scientists will go to the USSR Gosplan and Council of Ministers to argue their case.

This joint work will help set the exact sum of assistance needed by the republic to counteract the effects of the accident. It is not inconceivable that the final tab of the Chernobyl program will surpass even the R18 billion it is being put at today.

[Correspondent] Was there any document adopted on the outcome of the meeting?

[Pankov] The goal of the meeting was to exchange opinions and to state positions. It accomplished this fully. The final decision on the Program to counteract the effects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES will be made by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Ukrainian SSR Charity for 'Children of Chernobyl'

90UN1254A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 18 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by Ukrainian Radio and Telegraph Agency correspondent: "For the Children of Chernobyl"]

[Text] The Ukrainian republic division of the Soviet Children's Fund imeni V.I. Lenin has worked with specialists from the ministries and agencies, from scientific-research institutes and from rehabilitation centers to develop a program called Children of Chernobyl. It contains proposals for supplemental social, medical, legal, and educational-psychological assistance for the

children who suffered from the consequences of the disaster at the Chernobyl AES.

Funds from enterprises, institutions and organizations have already started to arrive for the charitable account of the Ukrainian Children's Fund 707802 in the OPERU [Gosbank office] of the ZhSB [State Bank for Housing and Construction] of the City Administration in Kiev, MFO [Gosbank Interbranch transactions] 322012 under the notation Children of Chernobyl. In particular, the Workers Supply Administration of the Ukrainian SSR Minenergo [Ministry of Power and Electrification] has allotted 228,000 rubles; the Kiev Obslovprof [Oblast Council of Trade Unions] has allotted 40,000, and the Ukrainian Division of USSR Vneshtorgizdat [State Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade] has allotted 5,000 rubles. Together with the collective of Kievkniga, it has produced 20,000 advertising calendar posters free of charge for the republic division of the fund. And the labor collective of the Kiev Radiozavod Production Association has manufactured 10 (above plan) color television sets with a specially developed adapter for computer games, which it has donated to the Ukrainian Children's Fund. Five sets have already been sent to Kiev School No 270, where more than 1,500 children who were evacuated with their parents from Prip'yat are pupils.

Contributions are also coming in from private individuals.

"We are grateful to Comrades Barantseva from Kiev and Bubenets from Klaypeda and to all those who are not indifferent to the fate of the children," says N.A. Parshutin, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Children's Fund board. The Ukrainian Children's Fund is planning to hold an auction in September of this year. The funds raised will be used entirely for the implementation of the Children of Chernobyl program. We hope that craftsmen; amateur and professional artists; the collectives of enterprises, cooperatives, and of public and creative organizations; as well as our foreign friends will participate in this charitable event and will donate their own works to the fund for subsequent sale.

Metropolitan Filaret Refutes Rukh Criticism of Church

90UN1295A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 23 Feb 90 p 3

[Article in the form of a letter, published under the heading "Letter to the Editors," by Filaret, Metropolitan of the Kiev and Galician Patriarchates, Exarch of All the Ukraine: "People, Be Circumspect!"]

[Text] The Russian Orthodox clergy and the church faithful are greatly concerned over a statement made by Ivan Fedorovich Drach, head of the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika [Rukh], in a round-table discussion, an account of which was published in the 15 February issue of the newspaper VECHIRNIY KYIV.

As a churchman I have no desire to enter into a debate on this subject. The Russian Orthodox faith and conscience, however, compel me to make some clarifying comments.

I.F. Drach calls the Russian Orthodox Church, with which the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is in a canonical unity, a "chauvinistic, centralistic" church and states that it is pursuing a "line of knives" [pogrom-encouraging policy] and that Rukh, Memorial, Zelenyy Svit [Green World—an environmental activist organization], Jewish organizations, and even party agencies must keep a close watch on the Orthodox Church in order, as I gathered from Ivan Fedorovich's statements, to avoid in the future a war among the Ukrainians. Such accusations against the Russian Orthodox Church: of harboring a pogrom attitude, of preaching favored exclusiveness on the part of certain nations and persecution of others—in addition to the fact that they are reminiscent of the methods of recent aggressive atheist propaganda, are deeply offensive to Orthodox believers both in this country and abroad, and could also further fuel the flames of religion-based animosity between people.

Today everybody is aware of the fact that the Church unites people of different nationalities and ethnic affiliation and carries the teachings of Christ to all peoples. It always bears in mind the words of Paul the Apostle that in Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek, that all men are the same. The Church lives and acts according to this truth. Within the Russian Orthodox Church, for example, as well as in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, there are people of different nationalities and ethnic affiliation both among the church hierarchy and among the laity. Just go into a church, and you will hear the faithful praying to saints from the lands of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Russia, and Moldavia. Church services are conducted not only in Church Slavonic but also in the languages of various peoples.

The voice of the Russian Orthodox Church can be heard at international peace forums. The Church has stood side by side with the people in times of war and in times of trouble and calamity. Sharing the fate of the people, the Church has taken upon itself the cross of suffering, torment and ruin. But the Church forgives all. Today as well, in this time of peace, when it is generously giving aid to orphans, the disabled and the elderly, the Church does not ask a person's ethnic affiliation or origin. The very life of the Church constitutes vivid testimony to the fact that it is a true Mother to all persons. The nationwide celebration in honor of the 1000th anniversary of the adoption of Christianity in Russia—an event which was celebrated both in this country and abroad—constitutes confirmation of this. And are there any grounds whatsoever for the insulting accusation of chauvinism leveled against the Russian Orthodox Church or that its role lies in pursuing a pogrom-encouraging policy? I think that it is high time for all of us to abandon the negative practice of hanging labels borrowed from the times of the cult of personality and voluntarism, particularly since perestroika and glasnost have made it

possible to reevaluate a great many things and to cast off the cliches and stereotypes of the past.

I shall not deny that even among Orthodox believers there are those who are living contrary to the precepts of Christ, but this does not mean that the entire Church of Christ has betrayed its mission. It seems to me that Ivan Fedorovych Drach has failed fully to weigh and grasp the entire picture when he characterizes the Russian Church in a negative manner, the name of which Church, incidentally, dates from the time of Saint Vladimir, for otherwise one would be forced to reach the groundless conclusion that the Russian Orthodox Church and, more specifically, its multiethnic clergy and laity are instigators of "nights of the long knives," that is, Jewish pogroms. In addition, what would be the purpose of sowing among people of good will such an absurd suspicion and distrust of the Russian Orthodox Church and, somewhat more broadly, of Orthodox Christianity as a whole? In any case it is not to the benefit of the peoples of the Ukraine.

As we know, thoughtless statements by politicians and public figures lead to enmity and hostility, and I therefore appeal to all: "People, be circumspect not only in your actions but in your words as well, for it has been spoken: by your words ye shall be exonerated, and by your words ye shall be judged."

I do not believe that the comments made by I.F. Drach about the Russian Church are shared by other leaders of the Popular Movement [Rukh] or by its members. Particularly since its membership includes Orthodox faithful.

I would also like to say a few words about autocephaly, that is, autonomy of any part of the Universal Orthodox Church. This subject was touched upon by Popular Movement head I. F. Drach in the round-table discussion. I do not deny that in time the Ukrainian Orthodox Church may in fact become autocephalous, while not severing ties with other Orthodox churches, but I want to stress that this question is a purely ecclesiastical matter and is inseparably linked with religious dogma, and for that reason cannot be the business of public or governmental organizations. And for this reason "autocephaly" proclaimed by a government or by some secular organization (history has recorded such incidents), or even by bishops, without appropriate Synodal authorization to do so, is both unlawful and is of no benefit.

Interference by nonecclesiastic elements in this matter as well as in relations between the faithful of different religious denominations constitutes a gross violation of the article in the USSR Constitution on separation of Church and State, and is also a violation of Church canons. Russian Orthodox faithful from Kiev and Lvov—participants in a religious procession and mass meeting which took place in Kiev on 11 February—made precisely this statement in their appeal-protest to Rukh. Incidentally, Rukh has not yet responded to this appeal. And yet in the meantime there is continuing

interference by members of unofficial ["informal"] organizations (Rukh, Ukrainian Christian Alliance, Memorial, Committee for Defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church) in Church affairs and, specifically, direct participation by members of the Lvov branch of Rukh in seizing or shutting down Orthodox churches in the Western Ukraine, in the village of Verkhnya Haya, Drogobychskiy Rayon, Lvov Oblast, for example, over which local Orthodox parishioners have lodged a complaint. This is being done at a time when a joint commission of the Vatican and the Russian Orthodox Church is beginning to function, at a time when recommendations on settling the conflict between religious believers, drawn up by representatives of these churches, have entered into legal force. Incidentally, this document was ratified by our country's government. "In this connection," the recommendations state: "It is extremely important to avoid any unlawful actions, particularly actions accompanied by force or violence. Such unlawful actions, which are incompatible with the Christian spirit, should be condemned; they also constitute a hindrance to registration of parishes of Eastern-Rite Catholics."

And finally, the Russian Orthodox Church cannot change its canonical regulations or its structure, which has come down through the centuries, just for a momentary exigency, as they say. Therefore there are those who are beginning groundlessly to accuse the Church of stubbornness and obdurate refusal to change its "centralism."

I believe that I have clarified in some measure my position regarding relations between Church and state as well as pertaining to negative statements by I. F. Drach, head of the Popular Movement for Perestroyka, directed at the Russian Orthodox Church, of which the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is a part.

Journalist Cites Tajik Official, Figures on Gissar Reconstruction

90US0587A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 6, 15-11 Feb 90 p 8

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Aleksandr Karpov: "Gissar: Thoughts Beside an Obelisk at a Fraternal Grave"; for additional reporting on this subject, also see Tadjik TA report published on page 20 of JPRS Soviet Union: Political Affairs Report, JPRS-UPA-90-009]

[Text] In January of last year an earthquake struck Tajikistan's Gissarskiy Rayon, adding to the gloomy list of world tragedies and catastrophes. Around 200 persons perished. Almost 30,000 residents were left without shelter. The material damage was a billion rubles....

The town of Sharora became the center of the misfortune of those days. There is no monument to the victims of the subterranean natural disaster here yet, but one will certainly be raised. The republic's government announced a contest for the best plan. And a temporary obelisk was installed at a huge fraternal grave on the tragedy's anniversary. The republic's leaders attended a

meeting held in the town. Recalling the events of the cold January days of last year, the people talked about what had been done since then, and to what extent normal life has been restored in the rayon.

There are things to recall, and to talk about. This week the Tajik Council of Ministers summarized the efforts to eliminate the consequences of the Gissar earthquake. Here are some facts and figures publicized at that meeting: One-time monetary assistance and insurance payments to casualties totaled 13 million rubles. Construction of five new temporary towns has been started. Five hundred eleven fully equipped apartments with a total area of 47,000 square meters were made ready for occupancy. Several apartment complexes and hundreds of individual homes were restored. The residents themselves built and overhauled almost a thousand homes. It is especially important that all of the rayon's schoolchildren are now studying in school buildings, and not in tent classrooms. A central rayon hospital and a polyclinic with a capacity of 400 visits per shift are operating in Gissar. The maternity hospital building and the stomatological clinic were rebuilt. A paved road, a power line, the sewage system and the water main have been placed into operation.

Life is returning to normal. But one question troubles the rayon's residents: Was what was done last year a lot or a little? And the answer—as much as could have been done—doesn't satisfy many of them. This means that almost a thousand and a half families are still living in mobile homes, and all of the efforts of the builders were only enough to provide housing to just half of the rayon's population in the disaster zone.

The builders cannot be blamed for this. By as early as late August Gissarstroy, a specially created planning and construction association, had completed the entire work volume planned for the year and was looking for additional resources. All of the republic's ministries and departments are actively participating in the efforts to eliminate the consequences of the disaster. Participation of some construction organizations of Surkhan-Darya Oblast also tangibly contributed to the efforts. The town they are erecting together with their Tajik associates is called Uzbekistan. But this is perhaps the sole example of day-to-day assistance.

I can recall last year's communications on the tragedy in Tajikistan, published in all of the country's newspapers:

"The misfortune brought pain to the hearts of millions," "We are with you, Gissar!," "Help is on its way!" And all of this was true. In fact, in those days assistance came in to the earthquake area from everywhere, and the people who had suffered from the terrible disaster did not feel themselves to be cast to the whims of destiny. But just half a year later, builders working in Gissar began returning to their homes. Deliveries of construction materials to Gissar's construction sites lagged. The Turkmen SSR, Kazakhstan and the RSFSR were short in their deliveries to Tajikistan by tens of thousands of tons of cement, wood and wood-chip panels and thousands of tons of metallic structures and various diameters of piping before the end of the year. Glass and linoleum are in extremely short supply today.

"Construction in Gissar is failing due to a lack of materials and equipment," said I. Khayeyev, chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers. "Our letters and telegrams and the requests of delegations of residents of Gissarskiy Rayon that have taken trips to the cities in which the supplying enterprises are located remain unanswered. Were we to solve the problem of regularity of deliveries today, in a year and a half we could completely finish the efforts to eliminate the consequences of the earthquake."

Executives of the Gissarskiy Rayon Executive Committee have already lost count of the number of times they appealed to the USSR Gosstrib to provide the construction materials and equipment so greatly needed in the towns devastated by the disaster. But all requests are forwarded just as regularly from Moscow back to the republic's Gosstrib. Why? Republic authorities, you see, cannot issue instructions to suppliers from other regions of the country, and at the moment it is hard to establish contract relations. Consequently the solution to the problem is being postponed. Time is passing, while people who had lost their housing out of bad luck are now in a second winter without permanent roofs over their heads. In order that construction in Gissar would not stop completely, the government of Tajikistan has been forced to transfer resources there from Dushanbe and from Khatlonskaya and Leninabad oblasts. This is not the best solution to the situation, since Gissar is not the sole sorry spot on the map of Tajikistan. Four and a half years ago an intense earthquake devastated the town of Kayrakkum. Many of its residents are still making their homes in temporary mobile housing. Is this going to really happen all over again in Gissar as well?

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